Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

TRADE AND NAVIGATION

Accounts ordered,
relating to Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom for each month during the year 1964."—[Mr. Heath.]

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE

Skybolt

Mr. Wigg: asked the Secretary of State for Air what was the nature of the assurance given to his predecessor about the future of Skybolt by the late President Kennedy at their meetingat the White House in January, 1962; and whether he will make a statement amplifying the statement made in the House on 12th March, 1962, on the same subject.

The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Hugh Fraser): I have nothing to add to the statement made bymy right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation on 20th December, 1963.

Mr. Wigg: Surely the Minister realises that the matter cannot be left here. His right hon. Friend gave notice to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition charging him with whatamounts to a distortion of the truth. Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is now established beyond any shadow of doubt that it is the veracity of the Minister of Aviation which is called into question and the honour of the Government? Is he notaware that not only did the conversations take place with the President in January, 1962, but that subsequently at the Nassau conference the President referred to those conversations? Is he not also aware that the Minister of Defence, at a meeting held at the Savoy

with the Association of American Correspondents, was asked exactly the same question and was fully aware that the future of Skybolt was in doubt at the same time as the Government were charging the Opposition with not telling the truth about the subject?

Mr. Fraser: I do not want to go into this subject. It has been debated at considerable length in this House. I would just say that a statement was made by the President of the United States on 7th March, saying that the United States Government were spending about a billion dollars on this project, and what the hon. Gentleman is now suggesting is that both my right hon. Friend's veracity is impugned and so is that of the late President.

Mr. Wigg: On the 12th March, 1962, the Minister of Aviation gave notice to my right hon. Friend and asked him to recount to the House statements which he had made and which the Minister of Aviation said he was in a position to check. Events showed beyond any shadow of doubt that the person who was not telling the truth was the Minister of Aviation. Is it not about time—

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is hopelessly out of order. The hon. Gentleman will know that he cannot make such an attack upon the personal conduct of another Member in a Question—it is out of order. He will have to make a substantive Motion for it.

Mr. Mulley: Does not the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that there is a great deal of doubt about this and that since the right hon. Gentleman made this statement as Secretary of State for Air his Department and the Air Force are involved in the question whether or not in our defence planning he knew that there was doubt about Skybolt being available, and will not he try to answer this part of my hon. Friend's allegations?

Mr. Fraser: I tried to answer that. I will repeat it again quite slowly and simply. On the 12th March my right hon. Friend made a statement to the House saying that there was no doubt at that time about the Skybolt programme. This followed precisely five days after the statement by the President of the United States saying that the


United States were spending 1,000 million dollars on the project.

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You gave a Ruling that I was out of order in making the statement that I did. Is itwithin your knowledge that I did in fact draft a Motion dealing with the conduct of the Minister of Aviation which I withdrew, or at least I did not place it on the Order Paper, on the understanding that we were to get a full statement from the Government? What we got was a shuffling, half-hearted statement from the Minister of Aviation on 20th December and nothing more.

Mr. Speaker: That does not arise from the Ruling I gave. The hon. Gentleman knows the principle perfectly well.

V-Bombers (Low-Flying Tests)

Mr. Mulley: asked the Secretary of State for Air when it is proposed to hold low-flying tests for the V-bombers of Bomber Command; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. H. Fraser: Tests have already shown that the V-force is fully capable of operatingin the low-level rôle. Arrangements have been agreed, in principle, for which I must express our gratitude to the Canadian Government, for the V-force to use a low-level training route in Canada as an extension of existing training facilities there. Details are being worked out.

Mr. Mulley: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House the purpose of the change of rôle of the V-bombers? Does he think that with the speed at which they will fly at low level and the great reduction in their expected life when they are put into a low-level rôle they will fulfil any sensible defence purpose?

Mr. Fraser: I think that the great variety of heights at which this important bomber can fly is of great value and there is no question in my mind that the ability to penetrate at low level is something which will be borne very much in mind by any potential opponent of this country.

Hunter and Shackleton Aircraft (Replacements)

Mr. Mulley: asked the Secretary of State for Air if he has decided the operational requirements for the replacement of Hunter and Shackleton aircraft; and when he expects these aircraft to reach the end of their service.

Mr. Cronin: asked the Secretary of State for Air what consideration he has given to replacing the Shackleton aircraft of Coastal Command.

Mr. H. Fraser: The problem of replacing both the Hunter and the Sea Vixen is still under examination and I have nothing to add to the Answers which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence gave on 20th November and 11th December.
The Shackleton has several years of effective life ahead of it, but studies on its replacement are in progress.

Mr. Mulley: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his Answer will give great concern to those interested in maintaining the strength of our Air Force, on the one hand, and maintaining the work of the aircraft industry, on the other? Is he not aware that there is great concern about the delay in taking decisions? Does he think that, if we delay taking these decisions, there is any possibility of obtaining the foreign orders for the aircraft chosen which are essential if we are to produce them at a reasonable and economic price?

Mr. Fraser: I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman that there is a matter of urgency here. At the same time, I think that it is more important to get the answer to this problem right.

Mr. Cronin: Is not the real truth of the matter that the Government have spent so much money on cancelled aircraft and on excessively high research and development costs that there is no money available to replace these aircraft?

Mr. Fraser: No, I do not think that is true.

Mr. Healey: Do the Government propose to take a decision on this matter for incorporation in next year's Defence White Paper?

Mr. Fraser: My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence stated that it is under active consideration. It is for him to make the decision and make an announcement to the House.

Strategic Transport Force

Mr. Edelman: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is satisfied that existing resources of freighter and transport aircraft are adequate for the contemporary strategic requirements of the Royal Air Force; and what action he is taking to increase them to meet future requirements.

Mr. Cronin: asked the Secretary of State for Air what types of aircraft are now available to the transport force for carrying heavy Army and Royal Air Force equipment over long distances.

Mr. H. Fraser: Our existing strategic transport force is adequate for present requirements. Heavy equipment can be carried over long distances by the Britannia supplemented by the medium range Beverley and Argosy using intermediate staging points. To meet future requirements, the strategic force will be augmented by the introduction of the Belfast and the VC10.

Mr. Edelman: In the light of the Estimates Committee's reprimands of the Government for their delay in ordering modern aircraft, may I ask the Minister to bear in mind that over a year has passed without the prototype order being issued for the AW681 freighter aircraft? Is the Minister aware that, because of the Government's inertia about ordering the AW681, in contrast to their over-zealousness in the case of the Concord, thousands of aircraft workers in Coventry are in danger of losing their jobs?

Mr. Fraser: The hon. Gentleman should address such questions to the Minister of Aviation. The transport force has shown how well and quickly it can cope with the job in the recent Cyprus emergency, when it did not have to give up any of its scheduled services.

Mr. Cronin: As the Britannia has a very small cargo cross-section and can be loaded only from the side and from a special ramp, is it not the fact that at present we have not got any kind of strategic freighter?

Mr. Fraser: No, that is not the case. Of course, there are certain loads which the Britannia will not take. As the hon. Gentleman will have seen, the first flight of the Belfast took place in January. Further, the VC10 will load from the side. This is not a major impediment. Of course, there are certain loads which cannot be taken, but on the whole the recent movements showed admirably that our present fleet is adequate for our present commitments.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the type of operations in which we are getting ourselves involved—rightly so, I am afraid—in Borneo and Sarawak demand a type of aircraft rather different from the ones which have been mentioned so far in these questions and answers? Would my right hon. Friend give us an assurance thathe is bearing this point in mind and that the supply of helicopters and aircraft not requiring enormously long runways is being properly looked after?

Mr. Fraser: Yes. That is a separate question, but we must cover the whole range, from strategic through M.R.T. down to helicopters and S.T.O.L. aircraft. If my hon. Friend tables a Question, I shall be pleased to answer it.

Mr. Mulley: Does not the Secretary of State agree that the great strain on our manpower resources underlines the need for the maximum mobility, particularly in the provision of transport aircraft? Is he satisfied that, if he had to mount an expedition to somewhere unlike Cyprus, where they had a base and stockpiled supplies, he would have the strategic airlift along with the air lift for the men? It is one thing to take men, and another thing to have to take all their equipment as well. Although this is primarily for the Minister of Aviation, as the Minister responsible for the Air Force is not the right hon. Gentleman concerned at the delays in the Ministry of Aviation in taking a vital decision like that on the engines for the 681 and placing an adequate order for strategic airlift?

Mr. Fraser: I am always concerned to get the Royal Air Force the best equipment we can. At the same time, I have absolute confidence in Transport


Command to undertake any task which is given to it at this moment. It has proved this admirably in the last few days.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Has my right hon. Friend noted the very great number of flights which had tobe taken in the Cyprus emergency? Does not this pinpoint a very serious weakness and in fact underline my right hon. Friend's luck in this operation?

Mr. Fraser: I am not quite sure what is behind my hon. Friend's supplementary question, unless he wants further orders for the Belfast for Northern Ireland. On the whole, the movement of troops to Cyprus was extremely efficient and was carried out very swiftly, and at the same time the normal schedules of the Royal Air Force Transport Command to other parts of the world were not interrupted.

Mr. Edelman: On a point of order. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I wish to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOME DEPARTMENT

Foreign Students (Maintenance)

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, in view of the action of the Iraqi Government in cancelling their grant to Sherif Youssef Ahmed, a student at the Welsh College of Advanced Technology, so leaving him without any means of subsistence, if he will make it a condition of entry of foreign students to this country that, if their private means are not sufficient, they shall produce an undertaking from their home Government that a grant will be maintained for the whole period of their studies.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Miss Mervyn Pike): It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to allow bona fideforeign students to pursue whole-time study in this country, provided they possess, or have a reasonable guaranteeof, adequate funds for their initial period of permitted stay. Their financial position is checked before any extension of stay is granted. It would not be practicable to make it

a condition of entry that means of support should be guaranteed at the outset for the whole period of study.

Mr. Thomas: Is the hon. Lady aware that I am deeply grateful to the Foreign Office for the help it has given in this case and the intervention it made? Is she further aware that that gratitude is shared by the Students'Union of the Welsh College of Advanced Technology? However, this afternoon the hon. Lady in her Answer was less forthcoming. May I look to the Home Office to ensure that this man, who has been unjustly treated, I believe—so do the college authorities—will have the support of the Home Office in getting proper maintenance whilst he is here? Will the Home Office tell the Iraqi Government that they cannot play about with the college authorities in this way or places will be taken that somebody else could have occupied?

Miss Pike: As the hon. Gentleman says, the Foreign Office has already protested to the Iraqi Government. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we will watch the position very carefully.

Mr. Thomas: I thank the hon. Lady very much.

Nightdresses (Non-flammable Materials)

Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will take the necessary steps, legislative or otherwise, to ban the production and sale of inflammable nightdresses, in view of the number of accidents caused to children and others.

Mr. George Craddock: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if, in view of recent fatal accidents from burns, he will introduce legislation making it compulsory for manufacturers to use non-flammable materials for children's nightwear.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Henry Brooke): The Committee on Consumer Protection considered this matter very carefully and came to the conclusion that statutory intervention would not be justified at that time. In view, however, of the tragic fatalities and injuries which continue to result from nightwear catching fire, I


propose to open discussions immediately with the trade and other interested parties on the possibility of taking effective action by means of regulations under the Consumer Protection Act, 1961.

Mr. Mallalieu: Is the Secretary of State aware that that Answer will give profound satisfaction to a very large number of people? In the meantime, would he use what influence he has with local authorities and hospitals to try to discourage the use of nightdresses as opposed to pyjamas in the homes and hospitals for which they are responsible?

Mr. Brooke: We are doing—so is the Consumer Council—everything possible by publicity to draw attention to the dangers of inflammable nightdresses. Matters concerning hospitals are for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health. In local authority children's homes the local authorities normally take care to ensure that fires are extremely well guarded, because they are aware of the danger. I think that my Answer will show how seriously I view this matter.

Mr. Craddock: I should like to support what my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) has said, and thank the Secretary of State for the consideration which he has given this question. I am sure that there is no need to dilate on this. He no doubt is aware that there are alternative manufacturers from whom these purchases can be made and that the choice has been widened during the past 12 months, and I am sure that people will have cheaper facilities.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Will the hon. Gentleman ask a question? It is Question Time.

Mr, Craddock: I hope that the Minister will look into that wider part of the question.

Mr. Brooke: I have given a comprehensive Answer and it shows that I am giving personal attention to the matter.

Mr. Wade: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I welcome his announcement? As a temporary measure, would it be practicable to make it compulsory for some kind of warning notice to be attached to material of this kind

to make it quite clear that it is inflammable?

Mr. Brooke: The best thing is for me to have these consultations as quickly as possible.

Mrs. McLaughlin: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the length of time it took the British Standards Institution to decide upon a standard for inflammable materials? Will he give an assurance that this matter will not be treated in such a dilatory fashion, and agree that it must be dealt with very quickly indeed? May I also thank him for what he has said this afternoon?

Mr. Brooke: In the Answer I gave, when I talked about discussions I used the word "immediately."

Approved Schools (Television Film)

Mr. Idwal Jones: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what instructions he gave to the headmasters of approved schools regarding the television film, based on incidents in an approved school, shown on 11th November.

Mr. Brooke: All approved schools were warnedthat this play would probably be unsuitable for general viewing by the boys and girls in them.

Mr. Jones: May I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that reply and for the instructions that he has given? Is he aware of the harmful effect that this film musthave had upon potential delinquents not yet in approved schools, and the disturbing effect it must have had upon the parents of boys already in approved schools? Further, does he consider that the film presented a fair picture of the work of the staffs inthese schools? Can he suggest what steps he will take in future to avoid a repetition of such a case?

Mr. Brooke: The hon. Member may know that I have set up a committee which is concerned with planning research into the impact of television on the young.It has no doubt noticed this programme. The programme contained a number of inaccuracies and misrepresentations. As the House knows, the Government do not interfere with the contents of particular television broadcasts. What worried me most


about this one was the misleading and disturbing effect it might have upon the parents of boys and girls in approved schools.

Miss Bacon: Since the Minister had prior notice and knowledge of this programme, what steps did he take to make representations to his right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General? Secondly, is he referring this case to the committee which is considering the effects of television on juvenile delinquency?

Mr. Brooke: I need not refer it specifically to that committee. I have no doubt that its members are alert enough to have noticed it. As I have said, the Government do not exercise control over individual television broadcasts, but the programme company concerned was well aware of my views on this programme.

Parking Meter Zones (Parking Privileges)

Sir J. Langford-Holt: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that in the London area parking privileges are accorded to chaffeur-driven cars which are not allowed to other motorists; and whether he will ensure that the law is enforced in this respect.

Mr. W. T. Williams: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department in what circumstances police and traffic wardens in London are instructed to grant parking privileges other than in an emergency in parking meter areas.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. C. M. Woodhouse): The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis informs me that no parking privileges are accorded to chauffeur-driven cars anywhere in the Metropolitan Police District which are not allowed to other cars; and that except in emergency non-statutory parking privileges are granted in parking meter zones only to those doctors and severely disabled drivers who have been given special car badges.

Sir J. Langford-Holt: Is my hon. Friend aware that I would be in entire agreement with what he has stated if it accorded with what takes place? Does he agree that nothing is more likely to bring the law into disrepute than the

suspicion on the part of ordinary drivers that different standards of enforcement are being applied? Has his attention been drawn to the fact that this question of a double standard has been mentioned not only in magistrates'courts but in newspapers and other forms of public information?

Mr. Woodhouse: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about the undesirable effects of any such suspicion. I can only assure him that the Metropolitan Police take the view that there is no ground for such suspicion. I am so assured by the Commissioner, I saw one report of the kind to which the hon. Member may be referring, in the Daily Mailof 5th October. I made inquiries of the Commissioner on the basis of that report, and he told me that despite all his efforts he was unable to identify either of the incidents there mentioned.

Captain Litchfield: Will my hon. Friend inquire into the abuse of parking regulations in the West End of London by cars bearing C.D. number plates?

Mr. Woodhouse: I will gladly refer to the Commissioner, for inquiry, any such abuses that there may be. Cars carrying C.D. number plates are subject to exactly the same law as any other cars, but if a prosecution is brought it cannot be effective unless diplomatic immunity is waived.

Fireworks (Accidents)

Mr. Boyden: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will now publish in the Official Report the statistics of accidents caused by fireworks between 14th October and 9th November. 1963, together with the comparable figures for 1962; and what further action he is proposing to take to reduce the number of such accidents.

Mr. Woodhouse: I am circulating the figures in the Official Report. My right hon. Friend is sending copies to the British, Firework Manufacturers'Safety Association with a view to discussion of the figures between the Home Office and the Association at a meeting early next month.

Mr. Boyden: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that I am grateful to the Home Office for the trouble that it has taken in providing these figures? Can he


say whether the steps taken by the trade in respect of bangers and the handling of fireworks, and the precautions that they have introduced this year, have had any effect in reducing the number of accidents?

Mr. Woodhouse: I am glad to assure the hon. Member that in respect of bangers the figures of accidents are distinctly smaller this year than they were last year. I am glad to say that nearly all the figures are smaller, but for bangers they are more conspicuously so. As for the precautions about handling, it would be wise for me not to make any further statement until the figures have been analysed and examined.

Mrs. McLaughlin: Is my hon. Friend aware that this year a considerable number of these bangers were still available in the shops and that where they were not available in the ordinary form they were obtainable in a converted type of firework? They were the original type in a doctored form. When discussing these matters with the Firework Manufacturers'Safety Association, will my hon. Friend see that this kind of alteration is investigated seriously, and that the manufacturers will not be allowed to treat this safety matter as being secondary in importance to sales?

Mr. Woodhouse: I can gladly give my hon. Friend the assurance for which she asked in the last part of her supplementary question. The question of the conversion of bangers into other types of firework is a matter which I am sure the Association will wish to look into.

Mr. Snow: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there are bangers and bangers? Is he aware that a rather undesirable practice has been developing on the part of some youths in London, to which the police have as yet not paid sufficient attention, of creating a devastating explosion by the judicious mixture of weed killer and sugar, and that there have been complaints in the Westminster City Council area about this practice, which has become extremely dangerous?

Mr. Woodhouse: I will gladly pay attention to that point. I am aware that there are bangers and bangers. In fact, this year the manufacturers took off the market the cheaper bangers—the penny

ones—which were the most damaging. I will certainly pay attention to the point which the hon. Member has raised about the "do-it-yourself" type of firework.

Following is the information:

Fireworks Injuries in England and Wales, 1963

The figures given below analyse in various ways information obtained from hospitals in England and Wales relating to the 2,461 persons who received hospital treatment for injuries caused by fireworks between 14th October and 9th November,1963. The figures in brackets are those for the comparable four-week period (15th October to 10th November) last year, when the total number of persons involved was 2,832.

A. Place where injury occurred


(i) Family or private party
1,144
(1,200)


(ii) Public or semi-public party in park or open space, e.g., sports club
372
(531)


(iii) Casual incident in street
717
(816)


(iv) Other places
89
(161)


(v) Unknown
139
(124)


B. Type of firework involved


(i) Banger
885
(1,236)


(ii) Rocket
280
(266)


(iii) Jumping cracker
237
(270)


(iv) Display firework (e.g., roman candle)
447
(483)


(v) Other than above (including home-made firework)
181
(206)


(vi) Unknown
431
(371)


C. Circumstances leading to injury


(i) Ignition in pocket
78
(157)


(ii) Accidental ignition in box or container
80
(115)


(iii) Examining firework after faulty or delayed ignition
302
(371)


(iv) Holding firework in hand
548
(570)


(v) Deliberate misuse
545
(645)


(vi) Other causes
555
(637)


(vii) Unknown
353
(337)


D. Age groups of person injured


(i) Over 21
398
(418)


(ii) 16–20
222
(264)


(iii) 13–15
509
(664)


(iv) Under 13
1,332
(1,486)


E. Nature of injury


(i) Eye
916
(1,038)


(ii) Face
493
(642)


(iii) Hand
827
(978)


(iv) Other parts of body
518
(687)


(These figures total more than 2,461 because some victims received injuries in two or more of the categories.)


F. Severity of injury


(i) Died
0
(0)


(ii) Admitted to hospital
332
(483)


(iii) Not admitted to hospital but injury severe
387
(505)


(iv) Minor injury
1,729
(1,828)


(v) Unknown
13
(16)

Carry-cots and Stands

Mr. George Craddock: asked the Secretary for the Home Department what is the result of the consideration by committees of the British Standards Institution concerned with personal safety of the possible need for a British Standard for carry-cots and carry-cot stands; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Woodhouse: I understand that the British Standards Institution's Advisory Committee on Personal Safety hopes to decide at its meeting on 23rd January whether or not to recommend the preparation of standards for these cots and stands. In the meantime the two manufacturers known to be producing open-ended carry-cot stands have been approached by the Home Office. One has decided to supply retaining straps with its stands, and the other is giving the matter urgent consideration.

Mr. Craddock: I thank the Minister for that reply. I wish to point out that there have been a number of deaths recently, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will bear that in mind and try to carry the job through.

Mr. Woodhouse: Certainly.

Dogs (Fluoroacetamide)

Sir Richard Glyn: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will give particulars of certificates issued under Section 5 of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, within the last 12 months with regard to experimenting and testing dogs with drugs of the fluoracetate group; and whether he is aware that a number of dogs recently lost their lives as a result of such experiments.

Mr. Woodhouse: One certificate under Section 5 of the Act of 1876 was given in October last in connection with investigations concerning fluoroacetamide, but other licensees under the Act hold certificates which would enable them to carry out similar work. My right hon. Friend is aware that a small number of dogs has recently been used for experiments of this kind.

Sir Richard Glyn: Will my hon. Friend ask his inspectors to make quite sure that when these necessary experiments on dogs are carried out, the animals are

rendered insensible from the beginning of the experiments so that they are not exposed to pain before they die? I am sure that my hon. Friend will agree that that is a vital necessity in each case?

Mr. Woodhouse: I certainly agree. But it is the task of the inspectors to make sure that the provisions of the Act are carried out in respect of all experiments. Experiments without anaesthetics require a special certificate, certificate A, which can be granted in exceptional circumstances, but only on the advice of the president of one of the learned scientific societies or a professor in a relevant sphere.

Train Robbery Case (Police Costs)

Mr. John Hall: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the estimated cost of the investigations by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Metropolitan Police into the train robbery case in Buckinghamshire; and if he will make a special grant to the Buckinghamshire County Council to cover the costs of their investigations into this case.

Mr. Brooke: It is not possiblewithout unduly laborious research to estimate the cost of these investigations, which are continuing, but it is undoubtedly considerable. It ranks for 50 per cent. Exchequer grant, but I have no authority to make a special grant, over and above that, to the county council. In accordance with the usual arrangements, the substantial help given by the Metropolitan Police to the Buckinghamshire Constabulary has been provided free of charge.

Mr. Hall: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that there is need for a reform in the present system which requires a local authority not only to meet the police costs but also the very considerable legal costs of such an investigation when, through a sheer geographical accident, a crime happens within the boundaries of theauthority? In the case of the train robbery, which is a national crime of tremendous importance, is it fair that the county should be expected to bear the very high costs?

Mr. Brooke: It would be extremely difficult to make any allocation in these


matters. Generally speaking, in this country the cost of combating crime has been regarded as a local responsibility with, of course, assistance by Exchequer grants. In this case additional expense has been caused to quite a considerable number of police authorities and not only to Buckinghamshire and to the Metropolitan Police. I do not believe that it would be possible to work out a fair and equitable scheme by which each such case could be the subject of a special grant. I have great sympathy with Buckinghamshire in this case, but I would point out that it is not only in Buckinghamshire that crimes of a national character are committed.

Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: Is the Minister aware that in this case some of the cost arises from the fact that the whole of the money recovered—such as it is—has to be taken to the magistrates'court and back, and now to the assizes and back on every single day of the court hearing, and that this money has to be heavily insured against theft? The cost is considerable.

Mr. Brooke: I am aware that there are these complications. My special concern, if the people guilty of this theft have been caught, is that they should be properly dealt with.

Mr. Fletcher: Does the Home Secretary think it sensible or fair that where there is a crime of this magnitude which is on a national scale, the cost should fall on a particular local authority in the area in which—through a pure accident—it occurred? Does not the Home Secretary think it possible to devise some machinery for spreading the cost equitably?

Mr. Brooke: I have answered that question. The difficulty is to decide which should be regarded as national crimes and which as local crimes. There would be even more argument about where the demarcation line should be drawn.

Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881

Sir F. Soskice: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department to what extent he intends to introduce legislation to amend the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, in its application to fugi-

tives accused of having committed political offences; and what amendments he proposes to introduce.

Mr. Brooke: The Government do not contemplate legislation on this subject until our consultations with other members of the Commonwealth about the Act as a whole have been completed.

Sir F. Soskice: Would not the Home Secretary agree that, as the law stands, he may, in the exercise of his discretion in dealing with future cases of political offences, be called upon to make very invidious distinctions between the judicial systems and the police systems of sovereign independent Powers? Does not he agree that the law should be altered as soon as possible in order to relieve him or his successors of that responsibility?

Mr. Brooke: It is because the Government as a whole think the law outdated, and in a sense that it should be reviewed, that we have started these consultations with the Commonwealth. I think that the whole House accepts that this is a matter where we could not act unilaterally. I am glad to say that hitherto I have not had to make the kind of invidious judgment suggested by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and I hope that I shall not be called upon to do so.

Mr. Dudley Smith: Can my right hon. Friend say whether these consultations with Commonwealth Governments are actually under way?

Mr. Brooke: Yes, they are going forward and I think that there is a general reaction throughout most of the Commonwealth countries that it is desirable to have a review of this Act. But it is not a matter which can be settled in a day or two.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the intense indignation which would be aroused in this country if by any chance he should accede to a demand for the return of a Ghananian citizen by the dictator of that country?

Mr. Brooke: That is a hypothetical question.

Sir Richard Glyn: Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that he will resist pressure on the Government, from


whatever source, to act unilaterally in this matter without due regard for Commonwealth opinion?

Mr. Brooke: Yes. It is the firm determination of the Government to obtain the views of the Commonwealth as a whole before presenting legislation to this House.

Mr. Paget: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many members of the Commonwealth have already acted unilaterally in amending this Act and why we cannot act unilaterally in a matter concerning our jurisdiction?

Mr. Brooke: To the best of my belief, two members have already acted unilaterally. I am sure that it would be the view of the House as a whole that in a matter such as this, which affects the whole of the Commonwealth, this country, of all Commonwealth countries, should not act unilaterally.

Oral Answers to Questions — UGANDA

Kampala Party (Representations)

Mr. Bottomley: asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relationswhat representations he received from the Government of Uganda about a party held at Tank Hill, Kampala; what action he took in this regard; and if he will make a statement.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies (Mr. Duncan Sandys): The story of this unfortunate episode is too involved to explain in an oral Answer. I will therefore, with permission, circulate a statement in the Official Report.

Mr. Bottomley: Does the Commonwealth Secretary see any useful purpose being served by asking the Uganda Government to agree to a joint inquiry into the whole affair?

Mr. Sandys: I do not think so. The sooner this is forgotten the better.

Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that one of the deportees, who is a constituent of mine, has assured me that the party was a joke; that what was being mocked at and joked at at the party was not African nationalism but old-fashioned British imperialism; that what is regarded as a false picture has

been given to the Uganda Parliament and that the perpetrators of the party have offered their apologies to the Government? Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the punishment is out of proportion to any unintentional offence which the party may have given?

Mr. Sandys: I think that I have covered those points in the statement which I am circulating in the Official Report.

The statement is as follows:

On 11th December, the eve of Kenya's independence, certain British residents in Kampala organised a "bottle colonial sundown" party. The wording of theinvitations, some of the fancy dresses worn and, it seems, the conduct of some of the participants gave the impression that it was the intention to ridicule the African. While we here do not get unduly upset if people from other countries make fun of us,and usually accept without protest the rough things which are often said about us by African newspapers and politicians, we have to recognise that people in other countries are often more sensitive about anything derogatory which is said about them. The party in Kampala undoubtedly caused deep offence and gave rise to inflammatory statements in Parliament and the Press, This in turn roused strong anti-European sentiments and threats of violence against the British community.

Although this private party undoubtedly exhibited deporable taste, it seems that greatly exaggerated importance has been attached to it However, in view of the high state of feeling, the British High Commissioner was authorised to express to the Prime Minister of Uganda our regret at thedamage caused by this thoughtless episode to the happy relations between the British community and the people of Uganda. At the same time he reminded the Uganda Government of their responsibilities for the protection of British lives and property, and they readily provided police protection for those concerned. The High Commissioner also emphasised that in our opinion, this deportation of 15 persons with families was, in the circumstances, an unduly severe step.

Oral Answers to Questions — COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

Overseas Students (Hostel Places)

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations how much was spent from public funds on the official scheme for providing hostel places for overseas students in 1962–63; and how much it is estimated will be spent in 1963–64.

Mr. Sandys: Expenditure in 1962–63 was about £112,000. It is estimated that £345,000 will be spent in 1963–64.

Oral Answers to Questions — RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

Co-operation

Sir T. Moore: asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations what forms of co-operation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will operate now that the Central African Federation has been dissolved.

The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. John Tilney): Northern and Southern Rhodesia will jointly own and control the Kariba project and the Rhodesia Railways. The three territorial Governments will operate a joint Higher Authority for Civil Air Transport, under which the Central African Airways Corporation will be maintained, and a joint Agricultural Research Council.
All three Governments have recognised the importance of retaining for the time being the general pattern of the Federal tariff and have agreed that goods produced or manufactured in one territory shall, with limited exceptions, continue to be free from protective duty when entering another.
All Governments have agreed on the steps to be taken for introducing separate currencies and in the meantime maintaining the credit of the present currency and the authority of the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Sir T. Moore: I thank my hon. Friend for that very informative and, on the whole, satisfactory reply. May we assume that the future co-operation or organisation of these three States will to some extent follow the amazing multiracial federation established by that great man Sir Roy Welensky?

Mr. Tilney: In the political circumstances of dissolution, the very considerable measure of collaboration which I have endeavoured to show in my Answer should go to the credit of my right hon. Friends and all the Governments concerned.

Mr. G. M. Thomson: Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House whether various problems relating to the compensation and resettlement of public servants have now been settled?

Mr. Tilney: Perhaps a Question will be put down about that.

Oral Answers to Questions — INDUSTRY, TRADE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Thorne and Goole

Mr. Jeger: asked the Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development arising from his recent visit to Yorkshire, what proposals he has for the development of industry designed to achieve a reduction of unemployment in Thorne and Goole.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. David Price): Unemployment in Goole is only fractionally above the national average. Where Thorneis concerned, the Board of Trade will continue to give sympathetic consideration to firms wishing to expand there, subject to the over-riding priorities of the development districts.

Mr. Jeger: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that although unemployment in Goole appears to be only fractionally higher than the national average, in reality it is much higher because much of it is concealed because people have to travel long distances to work outside the area? Will he give an assurance that where local initiative by Goole attracts new industrialists or expansionists, his Department will not discourage these initiatives, as it has been doing up to now?

Mr. Price: As the hon. Member knows, we look at each case like Goole on its merits, but neither I nor my right hon. Friend could ever give a blanket assurance that any local initiative, however large, would automatically get permission, because this is one of the sources of getting new developments for development districts.

Mr. Jeger: Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that any industrial development in Thorne or Goole will attract the unemployed from the one to the other area and thereby provide employment? Will he therefore treat the whole area as one and encourage expansion within it?

Mr. Price: I do not think that I can add anything to what I have said.

Industrial Organisation and Development Act, 1947

Miss Quennell: asked the Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development how many Orders


designating industries by activities have been issued by Her Majesty's Government under the Industrial Organisation and Development Act, 1947.

Mr. D. Price: Four Orders establishing Development Councils have been made under this Act. Two have since been revoked. In addition Orders imposing levies under Section 9 of the Act are in force for four industries.

Miss Quennell: In view of the importance of the definition of industries under this Act and under other legislation relating to the training of young people, can my right hon. Friend say whether that definition is clear, lucid and satisfactory?

Mr. Price: So far as I know, I have had no complaints about that, but if my hon. Friend has any points in mind, perhaps she would like to discuss them with me.

British Lion Films, Limited

Mr. Jay: asked the Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development whether he will make a statement on the proposed sale of British Lion Films by the National Films Finance Corporation.

Mr. Price: My right hon. Friend will be making a statement in the House today.

Monopolies Commission's Report (Electrical Equipment)

Mr. Jay: asked the Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development what action Her Majesty's Government proposes to take following the report of the Monopolies Commission on the Supply of Electrical Equipment for Mechanically-Propelled Vehicles.

Mr. D. Price: Of the Commission's four recommendations, one has already been implemented. Two are covered by the Government's general proposals about which my right hon. Friend made a statement yesterday. He is still considering the fourth.

Mr. Jay: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that the Board of Trade has had this Report in its hands for about nine months? Is he now telling us that

he is still unable to tell us what action is to be taken? Can he say what is to be done about this Report or at least say on what date we shall be told when the decision will be made?

Mr. Price: As I explained in my Answer, there were four main recommendations in the Report; one has already been implemented, two others are covered by the general statement made by my right hon. Friend yesterday and the fourth is being considered by my right hon. Friend, who will doubtless have something to say to the House in due course.

Oral Answers to Questions — CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Ql. Mr. Dalyell: asked the Prime Minister what recent initiatives have been taken by United Kingdom representatives at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to propose an exchange of information on chemical and bacteriological weapons, between Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): None, Sir. The subject has not yet come up for discussion at Geneva but the United States disarmament plan, which we support, makes provision in Stage I for examination ofthe problems of chemical and biological weapons. The Conference is working on an agenda which covers all the important points in the first stage of the United States and Soviet disarmament plans.

Mr. Dalyell: In the light of the technical evidence which Isent the right hon. Gentleman, does not this represent a missed opportunity?

The Prime Minister: I think that the hon. Gentleman misunderstands. This must form part of the general problem of disarmament, because any disarmament in this respect would obviously have to be subject to inspection at some stage, so t should be discussed in Stage I.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: As this form of warfare is universally condemned and as research is going on very rapidly, would it not be desirable to have a full discussion before a treaty came into force?

The Prime Minister: I do not understand which treaty is to come into force. Of course, there will be full discussion of this and every aspect of the disarmament plan when my right hon. Friend gets to Geneva.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTERS OF THE CROWN

Mr. W. Hamilton: asked the Prime Minister whether he will introduce legislation to ensure that no Minister of the Crown is in direct membership of any non-industrial association which is in receipt of public money.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. The principle which the hon. Member appears to have in mind is that Ministers should so order their affairs that no conflict arises, or appears to arise, between their private interests and their public duties. I am satisfied that the existing rules are sufficient to safeguard this principle.

Mr. Hamilton: How does the Prime Minister square that with the fact that he himself chose to join the National Farmers' Union only after he became Prime Minister and after that power group had asked for another £100 million of public money? Does he not see the contradiction between what he has just said and the fact that local councillors are prevented from voting on issues where their rents are concerned? Can he say why the House and the country regard it as invidious for Ministers of the Crown to be directors of private companies while he sees no objections to their being members of pressure groups which are getting hundreds of millions of £s of public money?

The Prime Minister: I see no contradiction in my public duties and membership of the National Farmers'Union. No Government money is paid to the National Farmers' Union [Interruption.] I imagine—although I do not know—that many Ministers have been members of different trade unions while holding office. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: I cannot make my voice prevail far enough to call Mr. Emrys Hughes.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that many of the farmers

in my constituency are delighted to know that at last he has joined the union, but that what they want to know is whether he will pay his 30 years' arrears of subscription?

The Prime Minister: I shall not be able to pay up if hon. Members opposite get in at the General Election, but I shall otherwise.

Oral Answers to Questions — NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION AND WARSAW PACT

Mr. A. Henderson: asked the Prime Minister, following the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organisation discussions, what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal for a non-aggression pact between the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact; and whether he will discuss the proposal with President Johnson during his forthcoming visit to Washington.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add at present to what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said on the subject of non-aggression arrangements on 15th November during the debate on the Address. As I told the House on 14th January, East-West questions will obviously come up during my talks with the President.

Mr. Henderson: May I ask the Prime Minister whether discussions are now taking place among the members of N.A.T.O. on this proposal and whether the main difficulty arises from the problem of non-recognition of East Germany, which is a member of the Warsaw Pact?

The Prime Minister: I think that there are all sorts of difficulties attached to a proposal of this kind. We have always urged on the Soviet Union the desirability of settling all our disputes by negotiation. The question really is whether anagreement of this kind would apply to Berlin. I should like to talk to the right hon. and learned Gentleman about that. There are some real difficulties in this question.

Sir C. Osborne: Since President Johnson made it clear that he thought that improvement between East and


West was one of the greatest issues before the civilised world, and since this Government also wish that and Mr. Khrushchev has said that he desires it, would my right hon. Friend give the House and the country an assurance that hewill do all in his power to see that whatever approaches come from the other side come to a fruitful conclusion?

The Prime Minister: I am in sympathy with the approach that we should settle all our disputes by negotiation, but this must not be used as a cover whereby in local situations subversion and other techniques may be used which could lead to a response by a free country.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Is not the Prime Minister aware that Mr. Khrushchev, in making this suggestion, referred to "outlawing" violence? Is not that an immense advance on anything said before, and does it not imply that the Soviet Union is coming round to the view that it will be necessary to enforce world law? Therefore, should not this suggestion be explored to the utmost limits?

The Prime Minister: Certainly we are exploring the suggestion and, in consultation with our allies, considering how we should reply to Mr. Khrushchev's latest note. This Question relates to a treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and members of the Warsaw Pact, and there are particular difficulties about that.

Oral Answers to Questions — SKYBOLT

Mr. Wigg: asked the Prime Minister whether he will publish a White Paper setting out Her Majesty's Government's policy in relation to Skybolt and giving a full account of the statements made by the late President of the United States of America at the Nassau Conference in December, 1962, in relation to the President's past discussion with the Minister of Aviation on the future of Skybolt.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir.

Mr. Wigg: Is not the Prime Minister aware that it is about time that the facts in this matter were made public and the whole situation cleared up? Is he aware

that his right hon. Friend, after giving notice to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, came to the House and stated that he had seen the same authorities as my right hon. Friend and that there was no truth in the statements made by my right hon. Friend and that subsequently an article appeared in the Sunday Times, written by a most distinguished journalist, not one single word of which has been challenged by the Government, in which there is an exchange of view between the President and the Minister of Aviation?
Furthermore, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Mr. Brandon stated quite categorically that at the Nassau Conference the President referred to the conversation with the Minister of Aviation and that the Minister of Defence, who sits beside him, addressed the Association of American Correspondents where the same statements were made? Should not these facts be stated and cleared up in a White Paper?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I have absolutely no intention of publishing anything about a private conversation. It was a private conversation between the President and my right hon. Friend. I would only remind the hon. Member that, on 7th March, President Kennedy told a news conference that the United States was going to spend over 1 billion dollars equipping its present force of B.52s with Skybolt. My right hon. Friend's statement was made on 12th March, five days later.

Mr. H. Wilson: Since it has been authoritatively stated that the then President said at Nassau that Ministers had been told in the previous spring that Skybolt was unlikely to be forthcoming, and since the Minister of Aviation has twice told the House that this is not so, will the right hon. Gentleman, without publishing the full results of the Nassau Conference, tell us whether the late President said that or not at Nassau so that the House can judge which of these two accounts is correct?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. The Nassau conversations between my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) and the late President were also confidential. My right hon. Friend was saying exactly what the


President of the United States had said in public to the whole American nation five days before.

Mr. Wigg: In view—[HON. MEMBERS: "Shut up."]

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is perfectly in order in giving notice.

Mr. Wigg: I beg to give notice that, as the right hon. Gentleman has challenged—[HON. MEMBERS: "That is not right."]

Mr. Speaker: There is a traditional formula for giving notice.

Mr. Wigg: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the Prime Minister's reply in challenging the accuracy of what I have said, I beg to give notice—

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is in order in giving notice by the proper formula but not in using the privilege of giving notice to make a speech. I wish that he would be good about it, because this is unkind to other Members who have Questions on the Order Paper.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON (TALKS)

Mr. Frank Allaun: asked the Prime Minister if, at his meeting with President Johnson, he will discuss the extent of British defence commitments with a view to a reduction of Great Britain's arms expenditure on a scale proportionate to the net annual saving of £350 million recently decided on by the President, or the £240 million reduction announced by Mr. Khrushchev.

The Prime Minister: I hope todiscuss with the President of the United States a variety of subjects across the whole field of world affairs but against a rather broader background than the hon. Member suggests.

Mr. Allaun: But is it not distinctly unhelpful that the British Government, in contrast, are proposing to increase our arms burden by £265 million a year? Was the Prime Minister's recent profession honest when he declared that his main objective was to cut our arms programme when the very next day the Government White Paper proposed a big increase? Alternatively, was he in the position of his predecessor, namely, that nobody told him?

The Prime Minister: I think that we shall discuss some of these matters a little later today, but I am satisfied that our expenditure and commitments are in the right relationship. Taking the proportion of the gross national product of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and ourselves which goes on military expenditure, that of the U.S.S.R. is 13 per cent., of the United States 9 per cent. and of ourselves 7 per cent.

Oral Answers to Questions — PLOWDEN COMMITTEE (REPORT)

Mr. Mayhew: asked the Prime Minister if he proposes to publish the Plowden Committee Report.

The Prime Minister: The Committee on Representational Service Overseas, under Lord Plowden's chairmanship,has carried out a most thorough and comprehensive survey; and I am very grateful to it. I am at present studying its report, and I will make a further statement covering the point raised by the hon. Member as soon as I can.

Oral Answers to Questions — DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (AID)

Mr. Oram: asked the Prime Minister what consideration he is giving to the diffusion of responsibility for aid to developing countries among several Ministries, including the Treasury, the Department of Technical Co-operation, the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office, and to the consequent dilution of the effectiveness of such aid and the lack of Parliamentary discussion of this question; and what action he proposes to take to concentrate responsibility for these matters.

The Prime Minister: There are full arrangements for the co-ordination of policy on aid to developing countries, and I am not satisfied that any further concentration of responsibility is at present desirable or practicable.

Mr. Oram: Donot recent troubles in several newly-independent countries in various parts of the world underline the necessity for economic stability as an aid towards political stability? In view of this, is it not very important


that this country's aid should be at a considerably higher level than it is at present and that it should be better expended and directed through a single powerful Ministry responsible for these matters?

The Prime Minister: The level of aid is, I think, a matter which is not particularly dealt with in this Question. The Question really relates to Government machinery. On this, I am willing to keep an open mind, but when I have looked at this matter in the past it has been very difficult, because it is so mixed up with general policy, to take it away from the Foreign Office and the C.R.O.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER AND MR. KHRUSHCHEV (MESSAGES)

Mr. Frank Allaun: asked the Prime Minister what was the nature of his reply to the new year's message from Mr. Khrushchev; and what proposals he made regarding the level of arms expenditure in Great Britain.

The Prime Minister: The exchange of messages was published in the Press. There was no reference in these messages to the level of arms expenditure.

Mr. Allaun: Does the Prime Minister agree that the recent cuts by America and Russia without awaiting all-round agreement have had an excellent effect and are leading to further lessening of tension? Why is Britain lagging behind?

The Prime Minister: I have just given an Answer which I hope showed the hon. Memberthat in fact we are in front in this sense, because we spend a smaller proportion of our gross national product on arms than certain other countries. I gather than in a few moments the party opposite is likely to ask us to increase expenditure on conventional arms. Therefore, I think the hon. Member had better be a little careful and listen to his Front Bench.

Mr. Hector Hughes: Will the Prime Minister realise that Mr. Khrushchev's new year's message presented him with a splendid opportunity to invite Mr. Khrushchev to this country for peace talks? Will he now mend his ways, and invite Mr. Khrushchev for that purpose?

The Prime Minister: I do not think that that matter arises on this Question.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. H. Wilson: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business of the House for next week?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): Ye s, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 20TH JANUARY—Second Reading of the New Towns Bill, and Committee stage of the Money Resolution. Remaining stages of the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Bill.

TUESDAY, 21ST JANUARY—Second Reading of the Plant Varieties and Seeds Bill [Lords], and Committee stage of the Money Resolution, which it is hoped to obtain by 7 o'clock.

And, the remaining stages of the Industrial Training Bill.

WEDNESDAY, 22ND JANUARY—Second Reading of the Family Allowances and National Insurance Bill, and Committee stage of the Money Resolution.

Motions on the Local Government Luton and Solihull Orders.

THURSDAY, 23RD JANUARY—Remaining stages of the Export Guarantees Bill, the Legal Aid Bill, and the Shipbuilding Credit Bill

FRIDAY, 24TH JANUARY—Private Members' Motions.

MONDAY, 27TH JANUARY—The business proposed is Second Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill.

Mr. Wilson: Can the Leader of the House tell us what time the Government propose to allocate, and when, to debate the statement made by the President of the Board of Trade yesterday about resale price maintenance, monopolies, and other things? Secondly, in view of the fanfare of trumpets with which the Government greeted the Robbins Report, now three months ago, and as they have not in all that period even been able to decide which Minister is to be responsible for higher education, will he say how soon we can expect a debate on higher education so that we can begin to inject


some sense of urgency into the Government on this question?

Mr. Lloyd: Both of those topics are suitable for debate by the House of Commons, and I think advantage must be taken of the usual channels to see what opportunities can be found; certainly not next week.

Mr. Wilson: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman trying to tell the House, after this statement yesterday by the Presidentof the Board of Trade—which raises very big issues, and which, we gather, has given rise to a great deal of controversy, at any rate, on the other side—that it is for the Opposition to provide time for that subject to be debated?

Mr. Lloyd: I did not say that at all. My right hon. Friend indicated that there would be a Bill. All I can say is that neither of those topics can be debated next week; but subsequent opportunities can be examined.

Mr. Grimond: Can the Leader of the House tell us whois to be responsible for higher education and when an announcement will be made?

Mr. Lloyd: Not in the statement of business for next week.

Mr. Wigg: Is the Leader of the House aware of the Motion, in the names of myself and a number of my hon. Friends, asking for a Select Committee to inquire into a Canberra replacement of the TSR2? Can he hold out any hope at all about a debate on this very important subject?

[That this House expresses grave concern at the failure of Her Majesty's Government to keep the House informed of the difficulties experienced in the development of the Canberra replacement and calls therefore for the appointment of a Select Committee to examine the planning, development and cost of this aircraft, with the power to call for persons,papers and records.]

Mr. Lloyd: I thought that I would wait and see what was said about that today.

Mr. Woodnutt: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of Motion 37, in the names of myself and some of my hon. Friends, drawing attention to the

plight of ex-colonial servants who worked in Ghana? Is he aware that President Nkrumah has made a savage cut of 7s. in the £ from their pensions, which he calls a tax, and can my right hon. and learned Friend give the House time to debate the matter?

[That this House, recognising the residual moral responsibility of Her Majesty's Government to ex-Gold Coast civil servants, urges Her Majesty's Government to take immediate action to protect individual pensioners against the hardship imposed on them by the recent action of President Nkrumah in making, unilaterally, a severe reduction in their rates of pension.]

Mr. Lloyd: Discussions are taking place at the present time with the Ghana authorities, and I think that a debate would be quite inappropriate while those discussions are taking place.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the Leader of the House tell us what business he has for 19th March? Does he not think that, for the convenience of hon. Members opposite, they should have some idea of the date of their own funeral?

Mr. Lloyd: The announcement of business for 19th March will be made at the appropriate time.

Mr. Mellish: The Leader of the House will be aware that, since 1960, we have been awaiting legislation to confirm the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, and he was present yesterday when there were exchanges between his right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport and ourselves. Can he say whether he can change the business for next week so as to have matters of this kind dealt with quickly?

Mr. Lloyd: I am afraid that I cannot change the business for next week, and I have nothing at the moment to add to what was said yesterday.

Mr. Mellish: That was nothing.

Mr. Milne: Will the Leader of the House consider giving an opportunity to discuss the Motion, signed by hon. Members on both sides of the House, in regard to advertising cigarettes on TV, particularly in view of the recent American Report and of the fact that it is today reported that even juke-box


advertisers have now decided to remove cigarette advertising from juke boxes in this country?

[That this House, gravely concerned at the expenditure of large sums of money on the advertising of cigarettes, and at the impact of such advertising on young people, in view of the proven dangers to health, including cancer, caused by cigarette smoking, urges Her Majesty's Government to stop all cigarette advertising on commercial television as a first step towards restricting such advertising on all media.]

Mr. Lloyd: I am aware of the Motion and of the large number of signatures that have been attached to it, but I am afraid that I cannot promise Government time to debate it.

Mr. Pavitt: Can the Leader of the House give further consideration to discussing the Motion in my name? Does he recall that last week he advised me to await the reply of the Prime Minister? The Prime Minister has judged that there is no case, but it is the job of the Leader of the House to protect the rights of back benchers and for justice to be seen to be done. That being so, will he look at this matter again, with a view, if not of finding time to debate it, at least of allowing the Select Committee on Procedure to look at it, in order to satisfy back benchers as well as Front Benchers?

[That this House is of the opinion that answers to oral Questions asked by Members should not be given to the Press for publication before the Member receives such Answers; and urges that a Select Committee should be set up to look into the matter.]

Mr. Lloyd: I remember the answer I gave to the hon. Gentleman just before the Christmas Adjournment, and I also saw what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said. I am, in principle, completely with the hon. Gentleman; I think it is undesirable that Answers should be given out before they can be announced in this House, and I would be very willing to discuss the facts of this particular case with the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Callaghan: What degree of importance do the Government attach to the question of legislation on the

safety of life at sea, as they have had the subject under consideration for four years? As the Government's programme is so flexible that they can now put forward a new Measure on resale price maintenance, are we to assume that they regard the safety of life at sea as being less important? Recent events at sea should surely have convinced them of the necessity of such legislation. Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman recognise that, unless this country ratifies it, the Convention cannot come into force for the world as a whole,so that there is an international responsibility bearing on the Government, as well as a national one?

Mr. Lloyd: I am aware of the importance of the matter and the issues at stake. I will take account of what the hon. Gentleman has just said, but I cannot alter the business for next week.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Has the Leader of the House noticed that no fewer than 140 hon. Members have already signed the Motion relating to the Channel Tunnel and asking for an early decision? Can he not give an early indication of when we may discuss it?

[That this House, noting that the report of the British and French officials about a fixed Channel link advises that the twin-rail tunnel, providing special facilities for road vehicles, is the most practicable and economic of all solutions and also preferable to substantial expenditure on developing existing cross-Channel services; convinced that such a link is of vital importance to the beneficial development of British communications and trade with all parts of Europe and essential to deal with growing cross-channel traffic congestion, urges that Her Majesty's Government should now, jointly with the French Government reach a decision in principle, in favour of proceeding with such a tunnel, so that precise plans can be made forthwith for its construction and financing under arrangements satisfactory to both Governments.]

Mr. Lloyd: I am afraid that all I can say is "Not next week".

Mr. A. Lewis: Can the Leader of the House assure us that the Government and the Cabinet are keeping him in touch with everything that is happening with regard to Parliamentary business?


I ask that question because in today's newspaper the former Leader of the House has said that there was no consultation with him on vital matters affecting the business of the House, and goes on to say, in effect, that the Patronage Secretary is a liar—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We must, in the general interests, confine business questions to business.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Speaker, I am asking whether or not the Leader of the House has been kept informed by and is in the confidence of the Government, be cause other hon. Members—[Interruption.] Can I ask whether or not the attention of the Leader of the House has been drawn to the fact—[Interruption.] I am on business—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Let me hear the hon. Gentleman's question, and we shall see.

Mr. Lewis: On Monday week, there is to be a debate on the Consolidated Fund Bill. Will the Leader of the House make provision to be present, together withthe former Leader of the House, so that we may discuss here to what extent the House is kept in ignorance of what is happening with regard to Parliamentary business, as revealed by the former Leader of the House in today's Spectator?

Mr. Lloyd: I will consider the hon. Gentleman's suggestion with the attention it merits.

Mr. Ross: May we have an assurance from the Leader of the House that the Bills to be given a Second Reading next week will not be sent to Standing Committee but will be considered in Committee on the Floor of the House? Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that, at present, almost every Committee Room is taken up, that the clerks must be pretty well stretched in order to man the Committees, and that the same applies to many of theMinisters? Is he aware also that it is becoming quite impossible for some hon. Members, who, because of the nature of things, must duplicate their membership of Committees, to race from the Westminster Hall from one important Committee which is sitting there to Room No. 12, No. 14, or wherever it

may be where other Committees are sitting? Will the Leader of the House pay close attention to this problem with particular reference to the Second Readings next week, bearing in mind that the Motion to take the Committee stage on the Floor of the House must be put at that stage?

Mr. Lloyd: If I may say so, I think the hon. Gentleman has raised an important point. I shall look into it.

Mr. Mellish: The Leader of the House said that he was aware of the importance of safety at sea and the need for the Convention to be applied. Does he realise that that can be done only by legislation passed by the House, as the Minister said yesterday, and will he therefore, give an assurance now that, if it is not to be taken next week, it will be taken the week after?

Mr. Lloyd: I said that I would consider the point.

Mr. Webster: Is the Leader of the House aware that I have a Bill on the subject of safety at sea to be taken on 13th March and that it is very much hoped that the Opposition will support it and that Government time will be given during the Committee stage?

Mr. Lloyd: My hon. Friend has drawn attention to a fact which is not absent from my mind.

Dr. Bray: Can the Leader of the House say whether the Government will find time to debate the recent important White Paper on Public Expenditure proposals for the next six years?

Mr. Lloyd: Not next week; but I think that that is a matter which can be considered through the usual channels.

Mr. Loughlin: Will the Leader of the House consider the possibility of debating the present situation in Aden, where the Aden T.U.C. leaders are now in gaol? Could he change the order of business for next week, in view of the urgency of the situation?

Mr. Lloyd: I shall consider that suggestion, but I can only say, as I have said before, "Not next week."

Mr. Fernyhough: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us whether.


on Monday week, business on the Consolidated Fund Bill will be taken formally, being followed by a debate, or whether there will be the traditional free-for-all with no time limit until hon. Members have exhausted their complaints about the Administration?

Mr. Lloyd: That is really a matter for the House, not for me.

BRITISH LION FILMS, LIMITED

The Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development and President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Edward Heath): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on British Lion Films, Ltd.
Successive Governments have, for many years, attached importance to British film production, and the present Government adhere to that policy. They consider, however, that their support should be limited to the provision, through the National Film Finance Corporation, of a certain amount of risk-bearing finance and acting as a specialised film banker. They have never had any intention of participating in the actual production or distribution of films.
In 1955, however, the Government found themselves obliged to authorise the N.F.F.C. to acquire the British Lion undertaking in partial satisfaction of a debt owing to the Corporation.
Both at that time and subsequently, the Government declared their intention to find a suitable purchaser for the company once its fortunes had been sufficiently restored. This would enable a large amount of the public money which had been tied up in British Lion to be recovered.
I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a detailed narrative of the events which have led up to the present situation. The position is as follows: British Lion Films Ltd., independently valued at £1,590,000, excluding the benefit of a tax loss, is now wholly owned by the National Film Finance Corporation; and the five executive directors have been paid sums amounting to a total of £795,000 in settlement of their half share in the company which they acquired in 1958 for £9,000.
In conformity with its general policy, the N.F.F.C. recommended to me that this opportunity should be taken of returning British Lion to private ownership, and I authorised it to proceed accordingly.
On 20th September, 1963, Mr. Box had approached the N.F.F.C. on behalf of a group who had appreciated that the company might become available for purchase as a result of the option arrangements announced to the House by my predecessor on 8th March, 1963. At that time, Mr. Box appeared to be the only suitable purchaser and, on the 20th December the N.F.F.C. entered into negotiations with him.
In recent weeks, other approaches have been made to the N.F.F.C. I have, therefore, agreed with the Corporation that, subject to my final approval, it will negotiate the sale of the whole of the business at the valuation price to a purchaser able to give assurances satisfactory to the Corporation and the Government that the company will remain independent and that the facilities which it provides for independent production will continue to be available. The terms will provide that the benefit of the tax loss will not pass to the purchaser. In considering offers, the N.F.F.C. and the Government will attach the greatest weight to the ability of the purchasing group to provide the necessary financial strength and skill in management and to maintain its independence. I am examining with the N.F.F.C. the precise formulation of these assurances and the means of maintaining them.
If the business of the company is not to be seriously damaged, it is essential that the negotiations for sale should be brought to a conclusion within the next few weeks.
The sale of the company on this basis would enable British Lion to continue to support independent film production and to provide the "third force" in the industry which is generally held to be desirable; it would also enable the N.F.F.C. to revert wholly to its proper function as a source of loans for this purpose.

Mr. Jay: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his second or third thoughts are usually better than his first, and is he aware also that, in the opinion


not merely of many hon. Members but of widespread sections of the film industry, it is essential for the objectives which he has set out today that there should remain a substantial public ownership in British Lion? Is he prepared now to give an assurance that he will see that this is done, because, if not, he must expecta great deal of opposition both in the House and from the film industry?

Mr. Heath: There is no difference between our position now and the position when the National Film Finance Corporation first approached me. It has always been our determination that British Lion should remain independent and should continue the functions which it has been carrying on. That has always been our intention and the intention of the N.F.F.C.
Those who have been to see me have all emphasised the importance they attach to the continued independence of British Lion, with which I am in full agreement, and they have made a variety of suggestions as to the means by which this can be assured. As I have said, I am now examining those means with the National Film Finance Corporation.I should not like to go into them in detail at this time because of the negotiations which now have to be carried on between the Corporation and those who are interested in the purchase of the company.

Mr. J. Rodgers: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of us on this side, at least, will welcome his decision to sell the taxpayer's interest which is at present invested in British Lion Films, for two reasons: first, because conditions have greatly changed since the original decision, and television has ousted the film as a major medium of mass communication; second, because this move will allow the N.F.F.C. to have more funds available to support independent British film production? We greatly welcome his decision.

Mrs. White: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that there is a very strong monopoly in the film industry? Is he not also aware, particularly following his statement yesterday, that it is incumbent on the Government to deal with this monopoly situation? If the Government do so, will they remember that the value

of British Lion might be very different in a short time? What business has the right hon. Gentleman to dispose of a publicly-owned firm in the present circumstances of the film industry, when he has made no decision about what is to be done with the rest of the industry, which could have a strong effect on the value of British Lion? Is he further aware that we are aware that he has had an offer from the former chairman of British Lion, on very favourable terms to the Government, to goin on a holding operation for a period of 12 to 18 months, which would ensure continuity of the business of British Lion and give time for the right hon. Gentleman and his Department to make up their minds about what they are going to do about the monopoly position in the rest of the industry?

Mr. Heath: While I am aware of the anxieties that have been expressed in the industry and by others about the position—which is usually described as duopoly in the industry—I am awaiting the recommendations of the Films Council, which I hope to receive very shortly, about this situation. Whatever the recommendations are on this matter, I am sure that they will be in agreement with the views of those who have been to see me and who have emphasised the need to maintain the independence of British Lion; and that is what we are determined to do in the way in which these negotiations are carried out.
I am, of course, aware of certain offers made by people other than Mr. Box. All of these will be considered by the N.F.F.C. and discussed with those who put them forward. I have authorised that to be done. But if these five directors had so wished, they could have exercised the second option to buy the whole of the company and run it themselves or agreed with the N.F.F.C. to allow the options to continue; and the present situation would remain as it is. They did not wish to do that. I am not criticising them. They wished to recover their capital holding in the firm, which they have done, and it is now our responsibility to find a satisfactory solution which will retain the independence of British Lion.

Captain Orr: In deciding upon the future purchaser of the company as between one and the other, will my right


hon. Friend give an undertaking that he will keep aneye on this himself, because there is some doubt as to whether or not the independent British film manufacturers have any confidence in the present management of the N.F.F.C.? Will he add to the criteria by which these choices will be guided the point that the purchaser, in addition to other things, should command the confidence of the independent British film producers?

Mr. Heath: I think that my hon. and gallant Friend will accept, from the discussions which I have had with him, his colleagues, hon. Members opposite, and many representatives of the film industry, that I am handling this matter personally and am keeping in the closest touch with it, though I would not accept the reflection my hon. Friend made on the N.F.F.C. The point he has made is implicit in the announcement which I have made about the qualifications required for the ownership of this company.

Mr. Lubbock: While I welcome the concern the right hon. Gentleman has expressed for the independence of British Lion, I agree that Government participation in the company through the N.F.F.C. is the strongest possible guarantee of its continuing. Will he give an assurance that none of the groups with which he is negotiating have among their members people who are associated with either Rank or A.B.C.? Will he tell the House what is the nature of the assurances which are to be required from a potential purchaser, and will they be incorporated in the sale agreement? In particular, would he confirm that the purchaser will be asked to give an undertaking that the studios owned by British Lion will not be sold off to any property speculators?

Mr. Heath: If the hon. Member will consider my statement, he will see that the last point he raised is covered. I said:
…a purchaser able to give assurances satisfactory to the Corporation and the Government that the Company will remain indedependent and that the facilities which it provides for independent production will continue to be available".
On the question of an undertaking that no one will have any connection with Rank or A.B.C., I could not give an

assurance of that kind. The N.F.F.C. must be entitled to discuss with anyone who applies what the situation is, and I could not tell it that it must refuse to interview anyone who approaches it on thismatter if that person has any particular connection. However, it will exercise its judgment when making recommendations to me on the lines which I have given here about the ability to maintain the independence of British Lion.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: We really must get on in the interests of other business, and I regret that I shall be having to detain the House far a moment to make a statement on accommodation.

The following is the narrative:

The National Film Finance Company Ltd., which was incorporated in October, 1948, and the National Film Finance Corporation, which was established by statute in March, 1949, made loans totalling £3 million between October, 1948 and April, 1950, to the British Lion Film Corporation Ltd., the company round which the independent film producers were grouped and which was in financial difficulties. This loan was made at the request of the Government very largely in order to pay the company's debts and to enable it to remain in business. This money was mostly lost and, with the Government's agreement, in June, 1954, the National Film Finance Corporation put a Receiver and Manager into the British Lion Film Corporation, which was subsequently wound up. A new company—British Lion Films Limited—began operations at the end of January, 1955.

The arrangements which the National Film Finance Corporation made for the setting up of British Lion Films Limited were set out in a statement laid before the House on 25th July, 1955. The National Film Finance Corporation acquired the entire issued capital of 600,000 ordinary £1 shares in British Lion Films Ltd. in satisfaction of the British Lion Film Corporation Ltd.'s debenture debt of £3 million and of the National Film Finance Corporation's subsequent advance to the company of £569,000.

Efforts were made by the N.F.F.C. during 1957 to find private investors who would buy the British Lion shares at a fair price and were willing and able to continue to finance and distribute independent British films. No satisfactory offers were forthcoming.

Under a reorganisation of the management of the company at the beginning of 1958 the Board was strengthened by the appointment of a number of successful independent film producers. Mr. DouglasCollins was appointed as Chairman and Mr. David Kingsley as Managing D rector.

The producers (Messrs. John Boulting, Roy Boulting, Sidney Gilliat and Frank Launder) and Mr. Kingsley were given an opportunity,


which they took, to acquire a holding in the equity of British Lion Films Ltd. The existing shares belonging to the National Film Finance Corporation were converted into 600,000 preferred shares of £1 each and these five gentlemen became the holders in aggregate of 180,000 deferred sharesof 1s. each. The rights attaching to the two classes of shares were such as to protect the interests of the National Film Finance Corporation while at the same time ensuring that the deferred shareholders would benefit if and when the company became profitable.

It was made clear in the reports of the National Film Finance Corporation for the years ended March 31st 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1962 that in the opinion of the Corporation its holding in British Lion was an inappropriate investment which should ultimately be sold to suitable private interests. Statements to the same effect were made by Board of Trade Ministers in the adjournment debates on 15th July 1958 and 22nd January 1959.

Attempts to acquire British Lion Films Ltd. by various private interests continued but understandably had an unsettling effect on the management and staff of the company. The National Film Finance Corporation therefore decided that the management of British Lion Films Ltd. should be given adequate time in which to make the companyprofitable and announced on 11th December 1958 that "no negotiations for the sale of the Corporation's interest in British Lion Films Ltd. are in progress and no such sale is now contemplated."In November 1959, in the belief that the deferred shareholderswere the most suitable purchasers, the National Film Finance Corporation initiated negotiations with the deferred shareholders to sell the company to them. These negotiations, which were extremely protracted, ultimately led to a proposal which was acceptable to the National Film Finance Corporation but which was rejected by the then President of the Board of Trade.

Further negotiations led to an agreement concluded in November 1961 between the National Film Finance Corporation and the deferred shareholders, the essence of which was that in return for the deferred shareholders'agreement to forego any residual rights which they might have to taxation benefits derived from the losses of the company and its predecessors in business when the options referred tobelow matured, together with their agreement to continue to make their services available to the company until March 1964, a series of options would apply to decide the future ownership of the company early in 1964. The National Film Finance Corporation had the first option, to acquire from the deferred shareholders their interest in the company at either a mutually agreed price or an independent valuation, the price under such valuation being the fair value as at 31st December 1963 of the shares on the basis of a sale as between a willing buyer and a willing seller of the entire issued share capital of the company on the open market. This valuation would disregard the right of the company to set off for tax purposes against future profits all past losses incurred by it

was not exercised the other shareholders were and its predecessors in business. If this option entitled to acquire the Corporation's interest in the company or to require the Corporation to acquire theirs, in both cases at the same independent valuation.

These arrangements were announced to the House by the President of the Board of Trade on 8th March last at the same time as he announced a scheme for the reorganisation of the capital of British Lion Films Limited under which the company would repay to the National Film Finance Corporation £591,000 in cash and realisable securities. In consequence of the repayment subsequently effected, the Corporation and the other shareholders each held half of the capital of the company. The option arrangements continued in full force and effect.

As the date for the exercise of the options drew closer there was, not unnaturally, an unsettling effect on the staff and business of the Company. To reduce this to a minimum, therefore, the N.F.F.C. and the other shareholders agreed on 18th July last to bring forward the date of the independent valuation on which the options were to be based.

The N.F.F.C. have informed me that they were left in no doubt at that time that Mr. Kingsley and his colleagues would neither exercise their second option to buy the Company nor continue the option arrangements on the same basis for a further period.

The valuation of the Company, which was carried out by Sir William Lawson of Messrs. Binder, Hamlyn & Company, was completed early in November. The 600,000 shares were valued at £2 13s. 0d. each, a total of £1,590,000.

On 27th November, Sir Nutcombe Hume, Chairman of the National Film Finance Corporation, told Mr. Kingsley, the Chairman of British Lion, that the N.F.F.C. had decided to exercise the first option to buy out the other shareholders. On the 29th November Mr. Kingsley indicated the agreement of himself and his colleagues to this being done on the basis of the valuation, provided that the exercise ofthe option took place by 14th December. At the same time Mr. Kingsley was informed that it was the intention of the N.F.F.C., subject to my approval, to sell British Lion Films Limited to a suitable purchaser. Sir Nutcombe Hume added that, despite the previous indication by Mr. Kingsley and his colleagues that they would not exercise the second option to buy the Company out right, he proposed nevertheless in all fairness to give them one more opportunity of doing so.

The first option was exercised on 9th December and on 13th December the N.F.F.C. made a formal offer to sell British Lion to Mr. Kingsley and his colleagues. As both sides agreed that it was important in the interest of the Company's staff and business that the future of British Lion should be promptly settled, and in view of the previous discussion on 27th November, Mr. Kingsley was asked to notify his acceptance of this offer by not later than 1st January. The offer was formally rejected on 16th December.

HOUSE OF COMMONS ACCOMMODATION (BRIDGE STREET)

Mr. Speaker: I have a statement to make to the House about accommodation.
On 11th December, 1963,I announced that I proposed to appoint a Committee to advise on the short-term allocation of the additional accommodation which the Government had made available for Parliamentary purposes on the second, third and fourth floors of No. 1 Bridge Street, until the demolition of those premises took place. I have now received the Committee's Report, making the following recommendations, which I understand are likely to be generally acceptable.

(i) Rooms on the fourth floor should be allocated to Members' secretaries;
(ii) all 16 rooms on the third floor should be made available to the main Opposition party;
(iii) space for 14 individual Members on the second floor should be made available to the Government party, and for 10 Members to the main Opposition party;
(iv) the large room on the second floor should be made available to the main Opposition party for such use as they may wish to make of it;
(v) the small rooms on the second and mezzanine floors should be used as a staff mess-room and for the office-keeper;
(vi) Room 10 on the first floor should remain at the disposal of the main Opposition party;
(vii) the allocation of the rooms should last only for the life of the present Parliament.
I should like to express the thanks of the House to the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for South Angus (Sir J. Duncan) and his fellow hon. Members for the very prompt help they have given to the House in dealing with this problem.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[The Prime Minister]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[5TH ALLOTTED DAY]

REPORT [19th December]

Orders of the Day — CIVIL ESTIMATES, SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1963–64

Resolution reported,
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £40,084,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1964, for the services included in the following Supplementary Estimates, viz.:

CIVIL ESTIMATES, SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES,1963–64



£


Class II, Vote 6, Colonial Office
1,323,000


Class II, Vote 7, Colonial Grants and Loans
954,000


Class II, Vote 10, Central African Office
2,785,000


Class III, Vote 4, Scottish Home and Health Department (Civil Defence Services) 
212,000


Class III, Vote 12, County Courts
117,000


Class III, Vote 13, Legal Aid Fund
780,000


Class IV, Vote 5, Export Credits (Special Guarantees, etc.)
1,000


Class IV, Vote 11, Roads, etc., England and Wales
9,000,000


Class V, Vote 8, Food (Strategic Reserves)
270,000


Class VI, Vole 5, General Grants to Local Revenues, England and Wales
23,750,000


Class IX, Vote 3, Public Buildings Overseas
700,000


Class XI, Vote 5, Supplements to Pensions, etc. (Overseas Services)
192,000


Total
£40,084,000

Resolution agreed to.

Orders of the Day — DEFENCE

3.58 p.m.

Mr. Harold Wilson: I beg to move,
That this House expresses concern at the increasing demands on Great Britain's already strained military resources and calls on Her Majesty's Government to produce a Defence White Paper embodying proposals which will ensure that the armed forces are capable of fulfilling Great Britain's legitimate military commitments and give priority to the provision of adequate conventional regular forces.
This Motion was not tabled in the form of a Motion of censure because we believe that the present overstretched state of Britain's defence forces raises issues which the whole House must consider as a problem for the whole House and for whatever Government emerges from this year's General Election. I trust that the Prime Minister will approach the debate in the same spirit.
We begin from the facts which have been underlined by recent movements of our forces, showing the strain that they are under. The Government recently sent 3,000 troops to Cyprus. I will not go into the Cyprus problem as such this afternoon—there will be other occasions—and with an important and difficult conference just beginning this week it would not be helpful to go into the issues there. For the purposes of this debate, Cyprus is important in showing how stretched is the thin red line of British forces. The troops sent out are, I understand, in addition to infantry, pioneers and armoured corps, paratroops and artillery, who are being used without their field guns in an infantry capacity. This is showing an ominous state of affairs.
We have also sent forces to Borneo, and more may be needed there. I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about this, and we have made this clear before; we wholeheartedly back the pledge of full support to Malaysia. So far, 6,000 are there.
Units have been sent to British Guiana andwithdrawn—or their orders countermanded—and, of course, here we cannot divorce the movement of these troops from the decision of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in imposing what we regard as an unprecedented and undemocratic form ofelection on that country.
The truth is that the elastic is stretched desperately tight. The doctrine of the strategic reserve which has featured in White Paper after White Paper has run up against the ineluctable facts of commitments and contingent commitments, which exceed the available forces, or, if one likes to look at it this way, of forces inadequate to meet commitments, whichever blade of the scissors one chooses to emphasise.
It would not be out of place to register the fact that, time and timeagain, we have issued warnings about recruiting—warnings too often met by complacency and a blithe disregard of statistical realities. The warning we have given most often is that the Government cannot run a strategic reserve on the principle of astage army. In the debate on 31st January last I said:
The strategic reserve, which is required now in the Far East, now in the Middle East, now for some other trouble spot, perhaps in the Commonwealth, is going to be required at a moment's notice to be the balancing force needed to make our contributions to B.O.A.R. It can be one thing or the other, but it cannot be both. The old conception of a stage Army, where half-a-dozen minor actors moving quickly behind the scenes can represent the whole of Caesar's legions, may be all right for a second-rate repertory company, but it is not a sound basis for Britain's defence policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st January, 1963: Vol. 670, c. 1243.]
Now the stage army is desperately stretched, and I cannot believe that the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defence, or any of the Service Ministers, can be anything but desperately apprehensive about the situation. Our Motion asks the House to express concern. The Government apparently seem unwilling to express concern. I hope that at any rate they feel concern.
Let it be said at once—for I do not intend to sidestep the nuclear problem—that the thermo-nuclear deterrent, on which the Government rest so much political argument, has proved to be wholly irrelevant to the problems the country is facing. One cannot use it in Cyprus or in Borneo. The Government are not going to drop it on the trade union leaders in South Arabia. With this realisation must come the recognition that the whole deployment and the balance of expenditure of the national military effort is proving irrelevant to the kind of problems we are facing and


shall face in the future. Let us examine the manpower figures.
The 1957 Defence White Paper was based on the new doctrine of almost totalreliance on a genuine independent deterrent—Blue Streak—which Ministers also thought and said was going to give us defence on the cheap—that was one of the motives for the White Paper. Paragraph 46 said that we should rely on stabilising the Armed Forces on an all-Regular footing at 375,000 by the end of 1962. The 1958 White Paper announced recruiting ceilings as being 88,000 for the Royal Navy, 165,000 for the Army and 135,000 for the Royal Air Force, making a total of 388,000.
In 1959 the Army target was raised to 180,000, the overall target for the Forces being correspondingly raised from 388,000 to 403,000. Last year's White Paper showed a figure for the Army—or an estimate of what the Government thought the figure would be—for 1st April last. The figure, of course, referred to Regular, adult males. It was 172,300. The Government estimated at the time that the total in the Army by 1st April, 1964, would be 180,000.
The actual strength on 31st December last—the latest date for which the Minister has given figures—was not anything like that, although that date is only two months away. It was 171,000—less, in fact, than the total at the time of last year's White Paper. Of course, the conclusion must be that we are about 9,000 light on this year's minimum requirements and, so far at any rate, there is no sign of any improvement in the dismal recruiting figures.
But, of course, this is not just a question of total numbers. Every defence debate has emphasised the problems of balance, especially of tradesmen and technicians. Here there is a shortage of about 10,000 men, and many technical units have become, in effect, non-operational. I remember the right hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan), in the Debate on the Address on 31st October, 1961, referring to this lack of balance and to a shortage on the administrative side—of "tail" not "teeth", as he put it.
This shortage has spread to the fighting units. If the establishment of an infantry battalion is taken, as I understand it to be, as 774, then we have to

take account of the fact that the House was told last July that eleven battalions at the time were between 50 and 100 short of establishment and that 13 were over 100 short of establishment. That is, nearly one-quarter of the battalions were more than 100 short of establishment.
We have seen during this period our N.A.T.O. contributions progressively whittled down. The original pledge, made in the most solemn terms when the House agreed with many reservations and considerable reluctance to German rearmament, was to maintain four British divisions in Germany up to 1998. We have never started to honour that obligation, and I do not think that there has been much pretence that we have. But, on3rd July last year, the actual figure, excluding, of course, the women's services and Berlin, which has nothing to do with the N.A.T.O commitment, was only 52,500 all ranks. The Minister of Defence then said:
Our policy is to honour our treaty obligation, and our treaty obligation is to bring our forces up to 55,000."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd July, 1963; Vol. 680, c. 412.]
I ask the Prime Minister to say whether this is still the policy of the Government Is it still their policy to bring the forces in Germany up to 55,000, because, we understand from the Press, General Lemnitzer has been put on notice of contingent withdrawals. The present figure, we are told, is 52,000. I hope that we shall have a very frank statement from the Prime Minister of whether he regards 55,000 as an overriding commitment.
Of course, we know that there are things at the back of the minds of Ministers here. The Minister of Defence, when he arrived at London Airport the other day from the Far East, said on television
…if we have to find more troops for that part of the world"—
he was referring to Malaysia—
we shall. That is what the reserves are for.
I suspect that this may have been a cunning play on words. Did he really mean that we have an adequate strategic reserve and that that was what the strategic reserve was for? Did he mean that? If so, perhaps we shall be told


how big it is and where it is. Or was this really a dark reference to a possible call up of Reserves—of the 105,000 ex-NationalService men who are still liable to recall? If that is what he had in mind, let him be frank with us today about it, and be frank with those National Service men as well. We would like an explanation from the Prime Minister as to what was meant by the Minister of Defence's references to Reserves.
Now I turn from the manpower situation to other immediately critical problems, and I begin with decisions, which should be taken before the 1964 White Paper comes out in a month's time, about conventional aircraft. First, there is the Hunter replacement. Last July, the Minister told us that this was to be the P.1154, which would also replace the Sea Vixen. On 20th November he said that he had got into difficulties—we could have told him that—because the Royal Navy wanted one type of plane and the Royal Air Force another. We recognise the problem and understand that he has been pulled about on this question.
In fact internecine conflict between the two Departments concerned has reached such a state thatit is featuring in the Press. One is seeing the Department again briefing the Press against other Departments. There was a full statement when the Minister was away, and I suggest to him that he looks it up and stops this kind of thing. The Minister mustrealise that it is undesirable, and it was unprecedented until the little public row between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence about the mixed-manned force earlier this year. It was unprecedented even for this Government. I hope that the Minister will not take this too lightly, and that he will do his best to stop this practice.
Will the Minister, at any rate, say where we stand today on the Hunter replacement, because there is great uncertainty in the industry and in the Services, and, of course, we are talking about a plane of which one estimate refers to a cost of about £500 million. That would justify him taking his time, but I hope that this matter will not be decided in the next three or four weeks as a result of some bargain, somecompromise, some pulling about of the

Minister by Service Chiefs and the Ministry of Defence.
One suggestion is that the Minister has somehow spent all his available money; that he has shot his financial ceiling. Another suggestion—and this hasappeared in the Press, presumably from someone in his Department—is that there is now a complete reappraisal going on; there is a rethinking based on doubts about VTOL. Perhaps we may hear about this from the Prime Minister, because I cannot conceive that, within two or three weeks of the receipt of the White Paper, with questions of such tremendous importance to be decided, he is not giving his personal attention to these matters in what used to be the Defence Committee.
Secondly, there is the Beverley-Hastings replacement. This is urgently needed. Transport Command did a good job—and I think that the House would want to commend it for the job is did—at the time of the Cyprus airlift, but is a fact that 27 of the planes involved had tostop and refuel at Nice or Malta. The planes available to Transport Command are becoming obsolescent, and if we want further proof of that we have the important report of the Estimates Committee published yesterday on this question of the equipment of Transport Command. When we realise the short ranges covered by so many of the planes involved in the Cyprus airlift, it is difficult to talk about the mobility which we all recognise must be one of the main characteristics of Britain's modern defence services. Perhaps we shall be told what is happening about transport replacements.
Last March the Minister of Aviation said that the Government had decided on the AW or HS 681, but as late as November they had not decided on an engine for it, and this thing has been hanging about for years. That is one of the troubles. It always happens, and that is why when the planes come along some are almost obsolete before they are produced. Can we be told—the Prime Minister must know, because it must have come before his Committee—whether the Government have decided on the engine for this aircraft? What engine will it have? Have the Government started negotiations? Have they placed orders, or are we again in some


difficulties about the financial ceiling, andhave they decided to postpone a decision until they get into the new financial year? That is an old trick; one of the oldest for dodging the Treasury. Or again, is it that here, too, there are fresh doubts both about vertical and short take-off?
I must also ask about the Canberra replacement. It is a little difficult to refer to this without the Minister of Aviation going into orbit, because he has a substantial, and as it is proving highly expensive, constituency interest in the TSR2. Our view is that onall that is publicly known it is a monumental design achievement on the part of the British aircraft industry, and if all the hopes that have been centred on it prove justified, in its tactical strike and reconnaissance capacity, it will be a major aeronautical and scientific break through.
We have not, as yet, been given reliable figures of cost. The Minister of Aviation has ducked this with great agility, though we know that it has cost the Chancellor of the Exchequer sleep less nights. We know that thereare un answered problems, and that for many months more there will be unanswerable problems and doubts about such questions as whether in the heavy air near the ground it can fulfil its design specification as to speed and range, or whether the differentconditions near ground level will reduce it to subsonic speed and in adequate range. We do not know, and I doubt whether the Government can know, at this stage. There are problems, too, of metallurgical strain and strain on pilots flying so near the ground at supersonic speeds.
Let us not burke the issues. They may be serious. The problems will have to be overcome, and I trust that they will be, but until they are neither we nor Her Majesty's present advisers can say whether the Government which is in office after the election will find it right to go on. For our part, we have an open mind. If the plane will do what is expected of it and at reasonable residual cost after all that has been spent on it, as compared with a possible alternative, we should propose that the nation would be right to go on with it in its TSR conventional capacity. The present Government can go no further than that.
On television the Minister of Aviation refused to answer the question whether he would give an assurance that the Government were not going to cancel it. Neither side can really give a final answer on that question until we know more about it, but our view is that it should be judged in its TSR conventional capacity. We do not seek to give it a strategic nuclear rôle, whether of a real or shop-window kind. It has to be judged in the capacity for which it was designed—tactical strike and reconnaissance. So much for aircraft.
On the question of the Royal Navy, we would like to know the position about aircraft carriers, and also the position about specialist manpower in the Navy.

Mr. Julian Critchley: Would the right hon. Gentleman be prepared to use the aircraft to which he referred in a short-range nuclear rôle?

Mr. Wilson: I shall come to the whole question of nuclear policy. I am saying that our policy is that, if the plane works, we believe that it has a rôle to play from what we know of the defence situation, but we do lot believe that if it has no rôle in a TSR capacity it should be used, as it were, stuffed and padded for shop-window purposes in a nuclear capacity.
I was talking about the position of specialist manpower in the Navy, because last year we had the Minister blithely telling the House that H.M.S. "Blake", on which £15 million had been spent, was about to be commissioned, and only three days later we heard that about £15 million worth of her was to be put into mothballs because there was no technical manpower to enable her to be commissioned. I should like the Prime Minister, who must have been giving his attention to this question, to tell us the result of his inquiries into the subject of technical manpower in the Navy.
Perhaps while on the subject of the Navy I might be permitted to reflect on the extraordinary fact that, with all the naval resources available to us, it was not possible to get the Foreign Secretary off the Island of Mull at a time of grave international crisis; so grave that the Prime Minister told his constituents that we were within an ace not merely of a general conflagration in Cyprus but of


war between Greece and Turkey, two N.A.T.O. allies. At such a time one realises the strong desire of the Foreign Secretary to have returned to his post. We know that he wasstorm-bound, but the gales were so continuous and so localised that they forgot to mention them in the gale warnings given by the B.B.C. However, the packet boat sailed every day.
I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman was possibly under house arrest at the time. Perhaps he was preparing his contribution to the latest series of memoirs of what happened last October—I do not know. At any rate, assuming his keen desire to get back, and assuming, as I do, a correspondingly strong desire on the partof the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to have him back, I should have thought that the task would not have been beyond the capacity of naval helicopters, or even, if necessary. of surface vessels. Perhaps we shall hear about the inquiry which the Prime Minister has no doubt held into those strange events.
The other big defence question on which I hope the Prime Minister will be utterly frank with the House relates to the mixed-manned force. We have stated our attitude on this matter with complete frankness both in the House on 3rd July last year, also in a speech I made at our conference at Scarborough, and also in a speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) at W.E.U. a few weeks ago when the W.E.U. Assembly, including some very wise hon. Members opposite, voted in support of my right hon. Friend's resolution. Our position has been made clear, but the picture that the Government present on this issue is one of utter confusion; indeed, a straight Cabinet split which the right hon. Gentleman vainly tries to conceal under a procrastinatory formula.
I have drawn his attention across the Floor of the House to the unprecedented situation last September, when his Foreign Office and the Minister of Defence's Department were entering into direct competition with each other in briefing the Press, and I thought the Prime Minister seemed to agree that this was an undesirable practice. But this

has happened again. At the N.A.T.O. Ministerial Conference last month we read that the Ministry of Defence had aired a plan for a mixed-manned force of TSR2s. This was put out to the Press. A high American source in Paris was reported as saying "This is the stupidest damned thing I ever heard of." The next day the Foreign Office repudiated the right hon. Gentleman. It indignantly denied that any such thing had happened. It said that he had not said it and, if he said it, he had not meant it and it had not happened and was not in contemplation. There could not have been a more complete repudiation. The Prime Minister, who on his election promised to be more frank with the people, can begin by being frank with the House about this incident.
I should like to ask the Prime Minister where he stands on this matter and where the Cabinet stand, if that is a fair question to put to him. When he went to the United States in September—this was before he was Prime Minister and while he was Foreign Secretary—after the three long-drawn out Cabinet meetings when no agreement was reached in the Cabinet we were on the touchline and in the Press we had a full account of all that was happening. This was when he went to America to give some sort of reply to the American proposals. I quote from something written about this incident a little time after he became the Prime Minister. It was written in the most friendly terms—unlike some others I have read—saying how highly he was regarded in America:
He had just won his transatlantic battle against his own Ministry of Defence and had gladly told the Americans that Britain would, after all, be joining the technical talks on the controversial N.A.T.O. "mixed-manned"nuclear fleet. A relieved Washington still had one nasty lingering doubt. Might not Britain be joining the talks only to sabotage them? Home promptly gave his personal word of honour that there would be no such hanky-panky as long as he sat in the Cabinet. His pledge was accepted as though it had been the word of his deeply divided colleagues. 'If Alex says so that's good enough for us', was the reported White House reaction.
I read this in other places. The White House, at any rate, got the impression from the right hon. Gentleman that we were joining these operations with serious intent, with a real intent to form


part of the mixed-manned fleet. I know this will be bad news for the Minister of Defence, but it is certainly the impression which the Prime Minister has given in Washington, and I think it time he was equally frank with the House of Commons. We know that as far as public statements are concerned he is trying to postpone the decision on this until after the General Election. This is government by procrastination. We have had it in a number of other directions, but it means government without authority and government by paralysis.
Before I come to the proposal I want to make for joint talks on these vital questions, particularly of manpower and commitments, the situation in Borneo, the aircraft decisions and the mixed-manned force, I want to dealwith a question which is frequently thrown up. We are frequently asked where we stand on the so-called independent, so-called British, so-called deterrent, which on the demise of the V-bombers will not be independent nor British. I should be making a muchshorter speech this afternoon had it not been for the fact that I think hon. Members opposite want me to deal with this subject. So I hope I shall not weary the House by making a longer speech than otherwise I would make, as I have been asked by hon. Members opposite where we stand.
Our position is clear—I am saying this by way of introduction. It has been made clear and has not changed. I stated it very fully and at great length on 31st January last year. I think it was reported in columns 1236–50 in Hansard, but that might need to be checked. I stated it fully in Washington. It was reprinted—I could not under stand why—in the Congressional Record. It was very fully dealt with in the Debate on the Address by my right hon. Friendthe Member for Belper on 13th November. He spent a full half hour on it replying to the Prime Minister's declaration the previous day that the Prime Minister was going to fight the election on this issue. We have not been backward in coming forward on this issue. When the Prime Minister made his challenge to me across the Floor of the House and defiantly hurled down his kid glove, I immediately offered to debate this matter with him coram populo, if he does not mind the phrase—

Sir Cyril Osborne: Why not in the House of Commons?

Mr. Wilson: If the hon. Member will wake up, he will find that he is in the House of Commons.

Sir C. Osborne: rose—

Hon. Members: Sit down.

Mr. Wilson: I accept that he has awakened. He will remember that on the occasion when the Prime Minister made his challenge to me I had already exhausted my right to speak in the debate because I had spoken before him. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper dealt with this question at this Dispatch Box. However, today we are again in the House of Commons and the hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) can listen. For the benefit of all hon. Members opposite and, perhaps, those who read the Prime Minister's propaganda material who either cannot read or will not read, I will make it plain again.
As a party we supported up to April, 1960, an attempt to devise a genuinely independent British deterrent. As a party we supported that. The Government put all their money, or the taxpayers' money, on Blue Streak. In late 1959 andearly 1960 we had doubts about Blue Streak's future. We expressed them in this House but were told that all was well. But in April, 1960, the Government, having changed their defence Minister again, abandoned Blue Streak and abandoned the last attempt to find a British strategic weapon. That was the end of the road, and we recognised it. From that moment—and we said this in the Blue Streak debate on 27th April after the cancellation of Blue Streak—from then on all of us, Hugh Gaitskell, all my right hon. Friends and myself, every one of us said in the words of the policy which my right hon. Friends commended to the conference at Brighton:
Britain should cease the attempt to remain an independent nuclear Power, since this neither strengthens the alliance nor is it now a sensible use of our resources.
That has been the policy of our party now for nearly four years. That was our position, is and will be our position. I for my part repudiate the suggestion


we sometimes hear from unthinking hon. Members opposite and some newspapers that it has been over the past year or the past months, or whatever time it may be; it has not. Hon. Members opposite are fond of contrasting statements made pre-Blue Streak with those made after Blue Streak. The Conservative Central Office Book of Campaign Quotations with calculated dishonesty secure their effect by quoting Hugh Gaitskell pre-Blue Streak—without quoting what he said after the reappraisal of 1960—with what I and others have said in thepost-Blue Streak period. Hon. Members opposite will find that all our post-Blue Streak statements on the question of the independent British deterrent are consistent. The argument that we had—and we had an argument; we made no bones about it—was not on the question of whether Britain should give up the deterrent. We were all united on that.
Hon. Members opposite—and right hon. Members, too—have made some highly inconsistent statements about defence. I challenge any of them to read what the former Prime Minister said about the value of Blue Streak as against Polaris four years ago, what the then Minister of Defence said about the value of Skybolt as against Blue Streak or what the present Minister tells us about the value of Polaris against the Skybolt situation. Hon. Members opposite have been changing the situation all the time.
Now I come to the reasons for our policy. I have stated them in great detail on a number of occasions, particularly on 31st January last. I am sorry to goback to previous speeches, but I am told so often that we have never said this that it would be helpful, particularly for the Prime Minister, if he is addressing himself to that speech, as I feel that he may, to be given the references so that he can address himself to what we have said.
Meanwhile, I will summarise the argument, and I apologise for the time I am taking. First, we do not believe that the Government want the deterrent for use against a non-nuclear Power. I trust that they are not contemplating another Suez, certainly not a thermonuclear Suez. As I have said, Cyprus and

Borneo—and Aden and Hong Kong, too—show the utter irrelevance of the so-called deterrent to the kind of problems that we face today. Equally, however, they underline how the vast expenditure of money and resources upon the deterrent has undermined our ability to deploy urgently-needed resources, both on manpower and equipment and on mobility.
Secondly, we do not believe that the Government contemplate taking on Russia alone in a thermonuclear exchange. I should like to know their estimate of our second-strike capacity. There are not many first-rank military experts who think that we have very much. In their calculations, however, do the Government contemplate the possibility of a first-strike alone, without our allies? I shall not repeat my words of a year ago about this. I will simply quote a recent speech by Sir John Slessor to a N.A.T.O. defence conference when, speaking not in the context of any obsolescentV-bombers, but in the context of what the Government regard as the last hope for Britain—Polaris—he said that
for Britain and France the only advantage of a small missile submarine force seems to me to be that it would afford us the doubtfulconsolation of a posthumous revenge—devastating no doubt, but not lethal—after our countries and the bulk of our population had been obliterated.
I certainly do not believe that the Government are contemplating taking on Russia alone in a thermonuclear exchange.
Thirdly, however, I believe that the Prime Minister is committed on this point. If the House will permit me another quotation, the Prime Minister said in Ottawa last May:
Thousands of Russian missiles are trained on our island. This colossal threat can be deterred only by the combination of United States and British nuclear power.
There was no doubt in the Prime Minister's mind where the balance lay between the two.
In October, the Prime Minister said that there was no substitute for N.A.T.O., and I think that that is his view, but how does he reconcile this with the argument that we sometimes hear that a situation may arise when our allies refuse to embark on a nuclear war and that we might have to use our nuclear


weapons as a means of forcing America's hand—the so-called catalytic strike? This needs to be referred to.
From what I know of him, I would acquit the Prime Minister of anything so fundamentally evil as that proposal, or in that matter so self-defeating, becauseif the Americans have decided not to honour the alliance, I am not certain that they will be shamed into it by the fact that we have committed suicide first. However that may be, they talk in these terms. When I have sometimes asked the Prime Minister whether he really believes that the United Stats will supply Polaris for us to engage in a war to which the United States are opposed, he accuses us of not trusting our allies. But the Government's nuclear argument is based upon not trusting our allies, because they envisage a situation in which the United States desert us and default on the affiance. They think that they can bring the United States in by going it alone. I challenge the Prime Minister, when he meets the President of the United States, to ask him whether the idea of a catalytic strike to bring in an unwilling America is the President's interpretation of the Nassau Agreement. If it is not, the Government's whole case falls to the ground.
We believe, therefore, that the real reason has nothing to do with Britain's defence, but is political. The right hon. Member for Bromley did not dare come back from Nassau in the then mood of his party without bringing at least a fiction of a deterrent—and he was right. His back benchers would have eaten him alive. In the present mood of a substantial minority—it may be even a majority; I do not know—of hon. Members opposite and in defiance of all informed opinion in this country, the position is that no Conservative leader could survive who did not maintain this pretence.
That is what is so pathetic about the Prime Minister, because he is far too intelligent to believe that kind of argument that is put forward from his own side, but he holds his place only by maintaining the fiction. Now he hopes to use this in addition, not merely as a weapon of intra-party warfare, but as a weapon of inter-party warfare in the General Election. In doing this, he is sadly underrating the intelligence of the electorate. One thing of which I should

remind the right hon. Gentleman is of those members of the electorate—and I grant that they are substantial in number—who support a deterrent, do not support our policy. They do not support the Government's policy. They do not support the Government's version of a deterrent which is obtained from our allies. By a large majority they support—I am sorry that they do, but I am stating the facts—the Dally Express view, if I may put it that way, that it must be independent, of British origin and not a weapon that we possess by the grace and favour of our allies. That is precisely what the Government cannot offer with their Polaris deal.
Fifthly, we believe that the preoccupation with the deterrent and the resultant misdeployment of our forces places Western forces in Europe in a dangerous reliance on tactical nuclear weapons—indeed, on immediate recourse to them—with the virtual certainty of escalation to nuclear war. It means, of course, a reliance on American tactical nuclear weapons, because we do not have any.
I ask the Prime Minister to answer this question. Suppose that he were to take on the Russians alone in a nuclear war, what does he think would happen to the British Forces in B.A.O.R.? Apart from the fact that they inevitably man only part of the front, our ground forces, I understand, have no usable tactical nuclear weapons. The Minister of Defence will agree that we have no usable tactical nuclear weapons under our own control, because the weapons which they have—the Honest John, the 8-in. atomic howitzer, and the Corporal, which are obsolescent compared with what the Germans are getting from the Americans, and this should be pointed out—have no warheads. They are under American lock and key. If we are going it alone in defiance of the Americans or as a means of bringing them in, does the right hon. Gentleman expect the American Supreme Commander in Europe to release the warheads to us for this operation?
Further, we believe—and this again must be stated—that the Government's policy and the mixed-manned idea, which has come into being only because of Nassau and because of the Government's policy, have serious, perhaps fatal, implications, although I hope not, for our hopes of a disarmament agreement, of an


anti-proliferation agreement, of a pact to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. If the Government believe in disarmament, their defence programme should facilitate the kind of disarmament programme which they want to follow.
One of the most critical arguments against the Government's policy, even if one felt that it had more military validity than it can be shown to have, is that it is an almost fatal blow to the idea of an anti-proliferation agreement and to all the proposals for disarmament.
We in the Labour Party have only recently sent to the Foreign Secretary a note of our own proposals. One of the most urgent and most important is an anti-proliferation agreement limiting the ownership of nuclear weapons to the two major nuclear Powers. I believe, also, that our expenditure on the nuclear effort has had, and will have if it is continued, serious and limiting effects on our ability to build up adequate conventional forces, and therefore a decisive part in creating the present crisis.
Concerning the future, I want to make this prophecy—or I would make this prophecy if I thought that there was any chance of it ever being tested—that if by any improbable mischance the Government got themselves re-elected, they would within thelifetime of the next Parliament themselves give up this costly nuclear illusion. I think that they know this themselves, but for political reasons dare not say so. I am as confident of this forecast as I was of the one that I made in 1958, that if they got back in 1959 we should have a 7 per cent. Bank Rate, an autumn Budget in 1961 and a pre-election boom in 1963. The only difference is that this particular prophecy will not be tested.
I shall say clearly where we stand on the V-bombers and on Polaris. Wehave said for years, many times—there has been no change here—that we shall keep the V-bombers for the rest of their limited life—and that is not long now—and we shall keep them unequivocally assigned to N.A.T.O. We believe that they cannot be viable for very long, because I remember that the main argument of the 1957 White Paper in favour of Blue Streak was that even a supersonic nuclear bomber could not be built

before 1965, and by then it would not be credible.
If that White Paper was right in its estimate, unless we assume that either some new means of providing credibility has come along since that time for a non-supersonic bomber, or unless we assume that Russian anti-aircraft defences have deteriorated in that periodor have not progressed as fast as expected—something that I do not assume—I would have thought on the argument of the 1957 White Paper the V-bombers cannot be viable for very much longer. We say that we shall keep them in N.A.T.O. as long asthey have a job to do.
Then, of course, on Polaris we have made it clear a hundred times that we intend if returned to power—that is what we are asked by the right hon. Gentleman—to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement on the basis of our declared policy that our proper contribution to our Alliance and that our most effective military strength in this country is secured without the illusion which is created by nuclear missile carrying submarines. I have said a hundred times—and the right hon. Gentleman is capable of reading what I said—that we shall renegotiate or, if one likes, denegotiate the Nassau Agreement. It is plain what it means to the right hon. Gentleman, who knows perfectly well—he has made so many speeches attacking us for this—and I would remind him of his speech of 31st January last year when he knew perfectly well we said that we should renegotiate this Agreement to end the proposal to buy Polaris submarines from the United States. Has he got it now?

The Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): I think that we have all got it now all right. We understand now that what the right hon. Gentleman is saying is that he is going to denegotiate Nassau; but is not he going to get anything at all in return for giving up the nuclear weapon? I was going to deal with the speech of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown). I gather from what he said that they are going to try to negotiate a new arrangement whereby we get control over the weapons of other people andnot only our own. Is that the right hon. Gentleman's policy?

Mr. Wilson: Yes. I said it very plainly in Washington, and in this House, that our contribution to the defence of the West will be through N.A.T.O. We believe it is urgent and have said thismany times from 1960 onwards—it is all on the record—that we believe there should be much closer co-operation in N.A.T.O. for deciding not only questions of targeting, guide lines and the rest, but deciding what Mr. Finletter once called theconsensus, the circumstances in which the bomb should be dropped. I understand, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman will understand, that it has been made clear on a number of occasions from the United States that they want more co-operation and more decisions in N.A.T.O.
Before hon. Members start spreading threats of unemployment around the shipyards involved in the Polaris field, let me repeat that in our view—we have said this many times in Service debates—we shall need more conventional naval vessels, including nuclear power-tracker submarines, whose building has been held back by the Government's misdirected expenditure on nuclear fiascos. I think it has been admitted in this House that this programme has been held back.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: The right hon. Gentleman confirms what the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said a few weeks ago about the retention of the V-bombers until they are run down or worn out. Does he confirm that these V-bombers, if assigned to N.A.T.O., would be equipped with nuclear weapons?

Mr. Wilson: Our position is that this is a decision for the N.A.T.O. Alliance. We have said many times that we believe—and this is really what the argument was about three or four years ago—that the West, and that is N.A.T.O., must have its own nuclear weapons. But, quite frankly, we know that the present rôle of the V-bombers is not a strategic nuclear rô1e and, therefore, this particular question is not one that is likely to last for very much longer.

Viscount Lambton: rose—

Mr. Wilson: I am sorry, I have given way rather a lot and I am very conscious of the fact that I have gone on longer

than I meant to, but I thought that it was right to deal with these issues at some length.
Finally, I turn to our suggestion of joint talks I believe that the critical situation of our defence position in terms of conventional resources would justify serious, deep probing discussion between the Governmentand the Opposition. We would like to know the assessment which the Government and their advisers have made between commitments and resources, including the N.A.T.O. commitments, and about the issues involved in the vital decisions that have to be taken in the next two or three years about the Hunter and Sea Vixen replacement, the Hasting-Beverley replacement, and, on a longer period, about the Canberra replacement.
I do not believe that these talks are likely to bridge the gulf between us on the so-called deterrent. Some Conservative papers; have suggested, not without a little briefing, that the talks should take place only if we first accept the Government's policy, or pretence, on nuclear questions. This would not be a serious consultation on vital national matters; it would be unconditional surrender on our part. It would be a surrender of the policy that we consider necessary to put Britain's defence on a basis not of illusion but of reality and hard fact. It is obvious that that could not be the basis of talks between us and I hope that it will not be suggested.
In December, three weeks after his great electoral challenge on this, the right hon. Gentleman suddenly announced that he would like to keep defence out of the election. I think he said this when addressing the Parliamentary Press Gallery. That did not last long. Because within 48 hours the Lord President was making it the centre of his Marylebone campaign, with somewhat discouraging results. This very week—I quote the Central Office Weekly Newsletter, dated 11th January, 1964—we read:
It is not a good thing for the country when such questions become Election issues.
That is very pious. It then goes on to prove its sincerity by devoting three of its four pages to a crude attack on our defence policy, or rather upon its ignorant or wilful misrepresentation of


it. In this connection, I must ask the Prime Minister whether he authorised the special insert on page 2, which says:
The Government's policy of maintaining the deterrent is based on the advice of the chiefs of staff with all the weight of Service experience and knowledge behind them.
Did the Chiefs of Staff agree to this going into a party polemical statement? Did the Prime Minister agree to this going in? The duty of theChiefs of Staff, which they very well understand and do not need telling by any of us, is loyally to support the defence policy of the Government of the day and not to be used in this way. Therefore, I hope that the Prime Minister will tell us whether hedefends this. If he defends this and thinks it right to have the Chiefs of Staff quoted, perhaps he will say what their advice has been on the mixed-manned force. I hope, however, that his answer will be that their advice is a matter for the Government and not for the public.
Having said all this about the fact that I do not think that we shall bridge the gap between us on the nuclear deterrent, I still think that joint talks would be useful. Both sides would, of course, retain freedom of action. There is no suggestion that we should, as a result of these talks, draw a veil over the Government's responsibility for the state our defences are in—that is not the idea—or the long dismal record of wasteful expenditure on missiles and aircraft which never even left the drawing board. I am not suggesting that, if we have talks, we shall be precluded from saying these things.
This was the basis of the last similar talks. The House will recall that in 1949 the then Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), whom we are all delighted to see here again in his place, complained that Parliament was not being given the facts by the Labour Government on the question of defence. The then Prime Minister, Lord Attlee, proposed talks. This proposal was accepted, and three meetings took place. Subsequently, replying to a question by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), the then Prime Minister said this on 28th November:

Certain of my right hon. Friends and I have had three meetings with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and other Privy Councillors on the subject of defence. As the House is aware, the object of these meetings was to enable certain right hon. Members, who are ina special position as members of His Majesty's Privy Council, to be put in possession of information which it would not be in the public interest to make widely known.
Then the right hon. Member for Woodford said this:
I presume that I may take the last sentence of the right hon. Gentleman's Answer as making it clear that the Opposition in no way accept any responsibility for the state of national defence by the fact of these conversations.
Later the right hon. Member for Woodford said that he hoped that the House—
will not take it that this absence of Debate and anything that he "—
that is, the then Prime Minister—
has said in his statement, in the slightest degree commits us"—
that is, the then Opposition—
to approval of or agreement with the Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th November, 1949; Vol. 470, cc. 769–770.]
Again I quote from a letter by the right hon. Gentleman:
I must ask you as I did Mr. Baldwin in 1936, that we shall be free to use in public any information of which we are already possessed, with due regard to the national interest and safety.
It is in the light of that precedent that I suggest that talks should be held.
As to the subject, the question of stretched resources—the balance of resources against commitments—should be central. We should like to know about the Government's assessment of the manpower and recruiting position, and we should like to put forward our own ideas. Have they given up hope of reaching their own target, announced as recently as last autumn? Do they expect the forthcoming pay increase, which I gather is now on the way once again, to have more than a temporary effect on recruitment? If we are to try to muddle through on existing figures, what plans have they to try to make the most effective use of existing manpower by amalgamating units? Do they still stand by the 55,000 target for N.A.T.O. in Germany? Do they now regard B.A.O.R. as constituting a second line strategic reserve? What is their


policy on forward strategy and on the redeployment of our forces in Europe? What is their policy now, because there has been some argument with our allies about this, on recourse to tactical nuclear weapons? What is the Government's assessment—it would be particularly helpful to have this from the Minister of Defence after his visit—of the situation in the Far East, with particular reference to Malaysia? What is their view of the possibility of an Australian or New Zealand contribution to the position there? What is their view about closer co-operation generally with the Commonwealth in the Far East on questions of defence policy?

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: rose—

Mr. Wilson: May I continue, because I am just listing the questions? I will then give way. What are the prospects of recruitment of further Gurkhas, who would be highly relevant in the Borneo context? What are the Government's plans—or have they any—for recruitment elsewhere in the Commonwealth? Has the temporary ban on recruitment of married men, which has been forced by financial stringency and therefore is not unconnected with our argument on nuclear expenditure, had a serious effect on the numbers available? What other plans have the Government for increasing recruitment by linking enlistment, for example, with the provision of housing, not necessarily abroad, but in the man's home district? In parts of my constituency, where one has to be married for five years before one is even put on the list for consideration, and in other areas where housing is the major social evil, do not the Government think that such a policy would have even a marginal effect on recruitment? I may be wrong about this, but I think that I am right.
Then again, on weapons and aircraft, what is the position on the replacements I have mentioned and what are the financial commitments involved? I am only trying to make a list of some of the questions so that the case for general talks can be understood. What is the Government's assessment of our general commitments? Are we beginning now to write off B.A.O.R. and N.A.T.O.? I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be utterly frank on this question of the

commitments. I will be frank and speak for myself. With the desperate stretching of our thin red line and the inescapable commitments I believe we shall have to face east of Suez, I believe that we should get rid of some of it. I hope that we car. Let us not delude ourselves about this. If we are to deploy our full influence in the world, I would myself at the margin regard 1,000 men east of Suez, with the fullest provision for mobility, with all that that means, not least in terms of cost, as preferable to another 1,000 in Germany. I take that view, and I believe that it accords withthe contemporary strategic thinking of our allies. But how far can we take these decisions to run down the numbers in Germany at a time when the United States-German special relationship is just beginning to develop in the way it is? Have the Government thought about this, or are these hard realities being swept under the carpet at a time when, as the Prime Minister said so frankly—
…every act we take, every attitude we strike, every speech we make in Parliament or elsewhere, must have that"—
namely, the General Election—
in mind.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: If the right hon. Gentleman really is as uncertain of all these matters as he says, how is it possible for him, if he really expects to be taken seriously by the country, to say today that the Labour Party if returned to power would abandon our nuclear weapon? [Laughter.] How can he say this when he is so totally ignorant that he cannot even make up his mind on these questions?

Mr. Wilson: In the first place, the hon. Gentle man, to whom I gave way—I am sorry that I did; he was more than courteous in his intervention—would, if he had listened to the questions and not been bobbing up on his feet all the time with his question ready to put, have realised that every question I put related to our conventional forces, as regards manpower, as regards commitments and as regards aircraft. I will be quite frank. Not only do I not know the answers to some of these questions, but no other Member of the House knows the answers tothese questions, except members of the Government, and I am not sure that they do. There is not a single hon. Member in the House who


can tell me the answer to the question I have just put to the right hon. Gentle man—what is the Government's view about the N.A.T.O. commitment of 55,000? If there is a question as big as that which must be answered—

The Prime Minister: Even after only a few minutes I must tell the right hon. Gentleman that, of course, the obligation stands at 55,000.

Mr. Wilson: The obligation stands. We are to man up our forces in Germany to 55,000. I ask the right hon. Gentleman, when he rises, to tell me when we are to do it, by what period, and to reconcile with that the statement that has been made that we are preparedto take forces out of Germany if they are needed in the Far East. The right hon. Gentleman must know that he cannot get a quart out of a pint pot, and that is what he has to answer this afternoon.
Finally, I want to answer a question I have been asked—it was in last Friday's Daily Telegraph—whether the proposal we have made for joint talks is a proposal for the immediate pre-election period only. It is true that there are arguments of immediate relevance to a pre-election period. It would mean that, so far as possible—and this cannot extend to the major nuclear question—some issues which are perhaps prejudicial to the safety and security of our Services, or to our alliances, would be insulated from electoral damage on both sides. There is that possibility ahead.
It would also help to ensure that the decisions which the Government have to take in the next three or four weeks, before the publication of the White Paper, will be taken in terms of the national interest and will not be made the subject of pre-election window dressing. I do not see why any arrangements that we might make about joint talks should end with the election, whoever might win it. These talks would be of continuing value whoever is the Government and whoever theOpposition. We have had exchanges over a period on the question of security, and I think that the Prime Minister would agree that they have worked well. For a long time we have had frank discussions on foreign policy—I had many with the light hon. Gentleman when he was Foreign Secretary—on the basis that I

would never disclose any information given to me in confidence, but equally that I was free to comment or to criticise on the basis of information publicly available.
I think that that was helpful. There are times—and the right hon. Gentleman can think of those times as well as I can—when, whatever Government is in power, the national interest is best served if an issue is not pressed at a particular time or in a particular way. I have never felt muzzled by that obligation, nor need Members of any other Opposition, at any time.
Talks there should be; every one of us, including the Government, knows that reappraisals will be necessary on the question of commitments and the deployment of our resources. Whatever electoral temptations there may be—and we shall have enough to fight about in other directions—every one of us must recognise that the first duty of any Government of this country must be to secure our national defence, however unpleasant the realities and however unpopular the decisions. It is a profound miscalculation of the mood of our people to think otherwise. We are probably all agreed about that.
I hope, therefore, that the Government will agree to our proposal for joint talks. There is nothing sinister in what we propose. I see no electoral advantage either way in the matter of these talks—unless it were that the Government have a great deal to hide that even we do not suspect. If this is the case, then, in the national interest, the sooner the talks are held the better.
But if our proposal is rejected, while the nation will no doubt draw its own conclusions, I believe that it is not the Government or the Opposition, but the national interest and the security and the strength of our Services which will be the sufferer.

5.3 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): I beg to move, to leave out from "House"to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
Commends the effectiveness and speed with which the armed forces have met the recent heavy demands on Great Britain's military resources; and recognises the need for continued provision of adequate and appropriate conventional forces as an essential part of a balanced military capability".


This Motion has been on the Order Paper for only a few days. Therefore this debate is rather hurried. The ostensible reason which the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) has given the House for having it—incidentally, thereby displacing a debate on Commonwealth development—is that the Cyprus situation has revealed the narrow margin on which we are working between our resources and commitments. The right hon. Gentleman would like to talk about those questions, among others, with me and perhaps with other Members of the Government.
But as the right hon. Gentleman's speech went along other reasons for this debate were revealed—and perhaps other reasons for speed. He made it the cover for the proposal that we should have joint conversations—which I shall deal with in a moment. Incidentally, I learnt of this originally from the Press; the right hon. Gentleman did not tell me that he would like conversations on this matter. I am a little intrigued by his desire for speed and his sudden enthusiasm for this matter. I wonder why he did not come to me earlier—for this reason: last year I had to answer a Motion of censure in another place, moved by the noble Earl, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. It was a pretty violent Motion of censure on Government defence policy by the Opposition.
I was then aware of no desire for bi-partisan talks; in fact, the boot was on the other foot. So violent was the attack that I said, in winding up, that it was not by my wish that we had to face a Motion of censure, because we wanted to contrive a defence policy which the nation and all parties supported, and I hoped that we could do so. That is still my hope. Therefore, if the right hon. Gentleman wants to talk to me about a number of defence matters I shall be glad to talk with him.
First, however, I want to say a few words about this proposition. I thought that I detected in what the right hon. Gentleman said a suggestion that in the last months of Government we might not be in a positionto take the decisions that we ought to take in the national interest and, indeed, that there might be some election window-dressing. I re-

ject that suggestion absolutely. We will base our decisions on the national interest, and we will take those decisions. We will tatke the decisions which we believe to be right, and believing them to be right we will think it right that they should be operated whether the right hon. Gentlemen opposite succeed us as a Government or we win the General Election and remain the Government ourselves. We shall not be prevented, in the last months of a Parliament, from taking decisions in the national interest; I can assure the right hon. Gentleman of that.
I also thought that I detected in the right hon. Gentleman's speecha degree of over-confidence—and perhaps a counting of his chickens before they were hatched. He must forgive me if I refer him to a poll which was recently taken, when the question was asked: if the country had to have its affairs and foreign policy conducted by the Conservatives or the Socialists, which would it choose. I am a fairly modest fellow, but I must point out that the result of the poll showed that the country would want its affairs controlled by me, to the extent of 47 per cent, and by the right hon. Gentleman to the extent of 2 6 per cent.

Mr. H. Wilson: Will the right hon. Gentleman be modest enough to tell us what the same poll disclosed about the date on which it was thought the General Election should be held—whether it should be held immediately?

The Prime Minister: I have no doubt that the light hon. Gentleman is tremendously interested in the date of the General Election, but I shall not disclose it to him now.
I wish to give him credit for making a serious proposition this afternoon, and I shall treat it as such. But as he has been in a hurry, and I doubt whether he has been able to consult a number of his right hon. and hon. Friends, before he arranges anything definite in the way of talks I should like to put before him and his hon. Friends a few considerations which they should bear in mind in formalising talks, because, as the right hon. Gentleman said, there is a history behind this matter.
In 1949, Mr. Attlee—as he then was—had three meetings with my right hon.


Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill). The Leader of the Opposition—my right hon. Friend—at that time put in a number of memoranda, one of which was entitled "Value for Money". It may be of some interest to hon. Members opposite to know that after that the discussions were not resumed, partly, no doubt, because of the memorandum but also because the Leader of the Opposition felt that he would be hampered in his duty of criticising the Government of the day both in this House and, if necessary, outside it.
On the next occasion on which attempts were made to have formal talks of this kind the rôles were reversed; my right hon. Friend was Prime Minister and Mr. Attlee was the Leader of the Opposition. At that time Mr. Attlee took the same view; he thought that he would be hampered in his duty as Leader of the Opposition. He thought that the talks might be resumed after the debate on the Estimates, but in fact they never were.
Then again, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) made a proposal to Mr. Gaitskell, when he was Leader of the Opposition. Mr. Gaitskell took a more definite view even than Mr. Attlee. He said that there were very serious difficulties in this proposition and he went so far as to reject talks on the 1949 pattern because, he said, he preferred the traditional practice which was that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should see the Leader of the Opposition on matters of specific importance. I am not saying that these conclusions were right or wrong. All I am saying is that four eminent gentlement, sitting where the Leader of the Opposition sits now, came to these conclusions. But even so, I will, of course, talk with the right hon. Gentleman. I think that the form of the talks need very careful consideration because the responsibility for action cannot be taken away from the Government of the day.
There are several considerations about this proposition. I think it ought to be considered from several angles and in relation to several aspects of defence. One of these matters on which the

Government have to take daily decisions is, as the right hon. Gentleman said, the weapons systems. He would want, I gather, the talks to cover these. He has asked a lot of questions about the TSR2 and questioned its value. I think that any question he has asked can perfectly well be answered in public.
The Government are satisfied as to the value of this weapon which is a very valuable weapon with a tactical rôle, and it has a strategic rôle as well. But the kind of question which I have in mind that the right hon. Gentleman would want to ask, I take it, would be, what is helping the Government to decide whether to persevere or not to persevere, for instance, with vertical take-off aircraft. In all the circumstances, should we buy any weapon from overseas? Should we, or should we not, subscribe to the proposed N.A.T.O. mixed-manned force?
If I may pause there to answer one of the questions which he asked, I think that my position has been quite clear on this from the start. I have always said that there were the strongest political reasons for a mixed-manned force. I want to know whether it can be militarily justified, and that is why we injected this into the group which is considering it in Paris. That group will consider whether this proposal, which originated with the United States, or any other proposition, is really justified from the military angle.

Mr. Denis Healey: Are we to understand, from the very in-interesting statement which the right hon. Gentleman has just made, that the Government believe in it so far as political considerations are concerned, and that they are, on balance, in favour of such a proposed military force, and therefore the only question will be its military feasibility?

The Prime Minister: I say that there are strong political reasons, because the reason which the Germans and the Americans support very strongly—and the Italians too—is that they think this would demonstrate the cohesion of the alliance. There is a lot to be said for that. I think that what remains to be seen, so that we may take a balanced decision, is whether this can be justified from the point of view of N.A.T.O.


requirements in the military field, and whether this new weapons system is the best way to fulfil it. Those are the questions which we want answered.
When I was in Washington of course I talked about these matters to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and to the President. When I was in New York I told them that the British Government were willing to come into discussions with this group with an open mind. When we go into talks of this kind with our allies, we do not go in to sabotage them. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to understand that.

Mr. H. Wilson: I think, if I may say so, that in the answer which he has given this afternoon the right hon. Gentleman has been reasonably frank with the House. He seems to have said to the House—[Hon. Members: "Oh."]—well,. no one has ever been frank on the question of the mixed-manned force before, and it is right to say to the right hon. Gentleman that what he has said this afternoon seems to me to be in accord with the reports which I have read from Washington. In his view, there are strong political views for going in, but we have to test its military feasibility. May we deduce from that that if it is militarily feasible, the right hon. Gentleman will support it?

The Prime Minister: I do not know. I should like—[Hon. Members: "Oh."]—I should like—

Mr. George Wigg: Dodging!

The Prime Minister: I am not dodging—the hon. Gentleman need not shout "dodging"—but I do not take a decision until I know all the facts, both militarily and politically.
The point I wish to make about all this range of information which the right hon. Gentleman would like to have about the weapons system is this—he has accepted it—that this could be given only in complete secrecy. It is clear that the right hon. Gentleman would arrive at his own conclusions, and so would any Privy Councillors whom he brought with him. But, of course, that means that the right hon. Gentleman would arrive at his own conclusions, but he could not explain them to his hon. Friends, or to this House, or to the

country. At least, this was the difficulty which previous Leaders of the Opposition have i.een—that they did limit their function as Leader of the Opposition if they had formal talks on matters of this kind. I am not turning this down at all. But this was the view of previous Leaders of the Opposition.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: May I remind the right hon. Gentleman, as he probably knows, that in America, where they have a defence committee of Congress, and in Germany, those concerned are under just as much secrecy—and they have not broken their secrecy—as he wants to limit the Privy Councillors to here?

The Prime Minister: I am simply saying that previous Leaders of the Opposition have felt that. If theright hon. Gentleman feels that this is not so in respect of himself and his colleagues, I have said that I will talk. That ought to be good enough for him.
The right hon. Gentleman having, under 12 headings I think, asked for talks with the Government onvarious matters of defence, in effect said that there is a large area of the defence field which would have to be left out of the talks because, as he said—or I think he said—the party positions were well defined. Rather to my surprise, theright hon. Gentleman put the nuclear arm into this category. I was not surprised that he felt that the Government had defined their position quite clearly. We have said that we will subscribe Britain's nuclear arms to N.A.T.O.—the bombers now, the Polaris submarines later. What we have said is that we will subscribe it, with the ultimate right of the Prime Minister and the Government of this country to use it if the defence of Britain is thought by the Government of the day—if the situation of our island is thought by the Government of the day—to be in mortal peril.
We have adopted this policy not because we want to use the nuclear bomb in the sort of situation about which the right hon. Gentleman talked in his speech. He recalled Suez and said that of course we did not want to use the nuclear bomb in a situation such as that in Malaysia. Of course we do not. No one has ever thought of using it in that capacity at all. The whole


point of a nuclear deterrent is to deter. If it does not do that, it has failed.
What I am saying, and what I have said in this House many times, is that in the present state of the world and when we do not have international disarmament even, I think, probably within reasonable sight, it is a risk that I cannot recommend Parliament to take, to discard our British nuclear deterrent. I cannot tell, nor can the right hon. Gentleman tell, at this time how many other countries are going to acquire nuclear weapons or a delivery system of some kind.
What I know for certain is that China will acquire one and France will acquire one and others may. Unless we get international disarmament, each country will judge this according to its own interests. [An Hon. Member: "What a dismal prospect!"] I agree that it is not a very nice prospect. If we do not get international disarmament, of course the prospect is not good. However, there is certainly no evidence that if Britain were to abandon ultimate control over her own deterrent, that would have the slightest effect on the French decision, or the Chinese decision, or the decision of any other country.
I was five years at the Commonwealth Relations Office, moving among Commonwealth circles, and three years at the Foreign Office, but I have never heard it suggested by any representative of any country that Britain should make a gesture and unilaterally abandon her nuclear arms. Quite the contrary; if we were to remove ourselves by such an action from the top table of negotiation, there would be dismay among our friends. The right hon. Gentleman asked why we wanted to keep the deterrent and that is part of the answer—that the international situation is so confused and so dangerous that I could not recommend the country to discard it.

Mr. H. Wilson: When the right hon. Gentleman refers to France, he does not mention the Government's responsibility for encouraging France at the time of the Common Market in her nuclear ambition. He should deal with that—[HON. MEMBERS: "What about China?"]—I said France. Secondly, if the right hon. Gentleman is saying that

we do not have a right at the conference table without the bomb, what answer can he possibly give to the Germans? Is he not, therefore, encouraging the Germans to want to be a nuclear Power?

The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman believes that we are encouraging General de Gaulle to have a nuclear weapon, he will believe anything. The Germans have renounced—and have recently repeated this—either the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Here, again, the multilateral force comes into the picture, because that would help the Germans politically never to wish to have their own nuclear weapons.
I know that the right hon. Gentleman does not accept it, but I have said time and again that the fact that we have nuclear power gives us influence and authority in the councils of the world. I know that he does not accept it and that his hon. Friends probably do not accept it, but I say most emphatically that if the House and the country want to increase the authority and influence of Britain in international councils, we shall not do so by unilaterally discarding our power.
Anyhow, whether the Government are right or wrong, they have a policy on this matter and there is no doubt—and the right hon. Gentleman wanted me to declare what we believed in—that we keep control of the nuclear deterrent but ask for it back only in the ultimate resort if the Government of the day believe that our island is in danger. I take it—and I amcoming to the right hon. Gentleman's own account of his own idea of the nuclear weapon—that he would abandon that right, and that is a heavy responsibility for him to take. The other side of this—as I have made crystal clear to hon. Members opposite what the Government's attitude is—is to examine whether the right hon. Gentleman has made quite clear where his party stands. I dare say that he has, but I am not sure. I keep an open mind because up to now no one has known where his party stands.
In the last few months I have listened to speeches from the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and from the right hon. Member for Smethwick


(Mr. Gordon Walker) and found them very confusing and, more than confusing, ambiguous. That is not my word and nor do I get it from any Tory pamphlet. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman does not read his own literature as he might, but in the issue of 6th December, 1963, five weeks ago, Tribune had this to say—[Interruption.] I think that the House will be interested in this. I listened to what the right hon. Gentleman had to say and I hope that he will now listen to this. Tribune said:
Ambiguity is deplorable. You are either for the independent deterrent or you are not and if you are not you must make a better job of arguing your case than the Labour Party has done of late. Labour must choose. There must be no more flannelling around with this Shadow Minister saying one thing and the other something quite different.
I will now examine with some care what the right hon. Gentleman has just said, as I recollect it, because I think that it was a recooked version of speeches made by the right hon. Member for Belper and the right hon. Member for Smethwick.
The central point of this and the right hon. Gentleman's attitude is that he is suggesting that if we give up our nuclear deterrent and if he makes another arrangement with the N.A.T.O. alliance, somehow he will be able to get control, as the right hon. Member for Belper puts it, over other weapons not our own alone, other nuclear weapons. As the right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well, we already have joint planning and targeting arrangements with the Americans, and in N.A.T.O. we already have the N.A.T.O. nuclear committee which is familiar withall these matters. Are the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friends suggesting that we would get something more by abandoning our nuclear deterrent?

Mr. Wigg: Yes.

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman does. He believes that we will get control over the decision of the Americans or the French to use their nuclear weapons. If he believes that, let me say that from my certain knowledge that is nothing but moonshine, dangerously misleading and almost deliberately misleading, because right hon. Gentlemen opposite know that that is not possible.

Mr. Wigg: The operative word here is "control". I do not believe that we could get control, but I do believe that this country would have greater influence over American opinion and American policy if the Government started to honour their obligations about B.A.O.R.

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman must not run away. This is very important to the country. He is saying that if he gives up the deterrent, he will get compensation by getting control, so the right hon. Member for Belper says, and so I think does the right hon. Member for Huyton confirm, over other people's weapons, some control and influence over the weapons of other people.

Mr. Wigg: rose—

The Prime Minister: I am telling him—

Mr. Wigg: rose—

The Prime Minister: —that the word is "control". If the hon. Gentleman will stop jumping about like a jack-in-the-box, he must concentrate on the word "control". He says that he does not mean control. If he does not get control, there is absolutely nothing more than we have already.

Mr. Wigg: The Prime Minister and I both understand racing terms. What he has not learned is that one cannot welsh on one commitment and be believed on another. If he and his Administration will start tohonour our conventional defence obligations, they might have some chance of not being regarded is an international laughing stock.

The Prime Minister: Who is trying to ride out on a different argument now?
What the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends are doing is to give the impression that if we gave up our deterrent, we would get control over the decisions of other people. In fact, they will be giving up our deterrent for nothing. I think that today we had a straight and clear answer from the right hon. Gentleman. The fact is that he is going to keep the nuclear bombers with a strategic rôle as long


as there is life in them, whereas all his hon. Friends say that they are useless.

Mr. Wigg: Yes.

The Prime Minister: They are going to keep the bombers. They admit that they are useless. They are going to refuse to get the Polaris submarine, which is known to be the best weapon in the world. I doubt whether that deserves to be dignified with the name of a policy.

Mr. Wigg: Apparently the PrimeMinister does not realise that the V-bombers also have a conventional rôle, and a very important one. Therefore, we should keep them for that purpose.

The Prime Minister: When the hon. Member becomes Leader of the Opposition I will give way to him more often. Perhaps he will allow me to continue.
When we are thinking of having talks between ourselves—and I am glad to have them—I doubt whether we can separate the nuclear problem from the rest of defence because it is a matter of findingthe right balance between the nuclear and the conventional. When the right hon. Gentleman says in the Motion that priority should be given to conventional forces, I of course agree. But 90 per cent. of the expenditure on our defence forces is on conventional forces and 10 per cent. on nuclear weapons.
The abolition of nuclear arms would not lead automatically, as the right hon. Gentleman seems to think, to more conventional forces unless other decisions were taken in parallel. Neither is it a matter of money. If the right hon. Member, on his own showing, keeps the nuclear bombers, he will not save the 10 per cent. of expenditure for at least 10 years. It is a matter of manpower. The right hon. Member says that he wants more men and more weapons. He will not be able to save the 10 per cent. Therefore, how will he pay for them and from where will he get them?
I ask the right hon. Member two questions. I do not think that I need ask them because I believe I know the answer. He has told us that he does

not want to get the extra men by conscription and does not intend to do so. He does not want to get them by selective service and does not intend to recommend that. I think that I am right. The right hon. Gentleman is advocating that we get more men for the Services. How? Presumably through voluntary recruiting. If he has any new suggestions to make to us in that respect, I should like to hear them, either in public or in private.
I should like to close what I have to say—

Mr. H. Wilson: What about the other questions?

The Prime Minister: I have answered two of the right hon. Gentleman's questions and will answer a few more later. Perhaps he will allow me to say something about the substance of our defence policy which was set out in the Statement on Defence, 1962. The aims were set out in paragraph 3. We pointed out there—and the right hon. Member who is to reply may like to look this up—that military power should be used, where essential, only for the furtherance of the objectives previously mentioned. We went on to say that our intention was so to shape our forces that they would do the job without making impossible demands on our economy. That was our policy in 1962, and it is our policy in 1964.
I think that there are three implications in the Motion: that our military resources are falling short of our commitments; that our conventional forces should be increased to such an extent that they will meet any military contingency; and that the increase can be assisted by the abandonment of the nuclear policy. I think that I have dealt sufficiently with the last of those points.
I must reject the first two counts. We have taken our strain of the cold war. We have stood firm with our Allies in the three Alliances for collective security in very dangerous circumstances, as I know very well in the last eight years, and we have met our colonial responsibilities during the periods of the transfer of power. We have been faced with very particular security situations, as hon. Members know, in Kuwait, Malaysia, British Guiana, Cyprus and Aden. Wherever the job has had to be


done, it has been done quickly, efficiently and well. I was glad to hear the tributes paid to our soldiers in Cyprus. I wish that they had been paid by some hon. Members opposite three years ago.
The point that I wish to emphasise is this. Any additional units which we have had to send to any of these theatres have been provided from the resources in the United Kingdom, which are precisely for that purpose. We can still provide at home a fully constituted infantry brigade plus several unbrigaded units. There has been no need to call on or use any of the seven brigade groups in Germany. The right hon. Member almost suggested that it would be improper if we did that, but we are fullyentitled to do it under the Treaty in any acute overseas emergency. It would not matter whether the number of our troops in Germany was 55,000, 90,000 or any other figure. That is provided for under the Treaty, and various N.A.T.O. Powers have already madeuse of that provision. We have not called up any reserves and we do not contemplate doing so at present. When my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence was speaking at the airport he was talking in terms of troops which could be brought in to Borneo from other units in the Far East.
It must be remembered, I think, that in all these situations our defence forces are complementary to our diplomacy. As I said at the beginning of my speech, the cause of the debate is ostensibly the Cyprus situation. But this is not a new commitment which will last indefinitely. That was made clear yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in opening the conference on the Cyprus situation.
I now turn to Malaysia. Indonesia's policy ofconfrontation is serious. It could get more serious. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Defence will tell the House about it, because he has just returned from that area. He is confident that the confrontation can be contained. If any situation shouldchange radically, if it looked as though we would be involved in something like a war, we would, of course, adopt different measures. I should have so to advise the House. But on any prudent calculation, we can at present meet our commitments. We have been, and are, in the process of reducing

our commitments all along the line as our Colonial Territories become independent nations.
In 1957 the Government decided that, provided a satisfactory rate of recruitment could be achieved, our Regular Forces could meet our commitments, backed by reserves readily available for use in serious emergencies. We did that because we thought that Regular Forces were more efficient and more economical and that a highly-trained force with a high degree of mobility was theright kind of force for this country. The Minister of Defence, who will wind up the debate, will be relating our forces to our commitments and, therefore, the House will hear more about that matter.
I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman and the Opposition are saying that we are wrong to limit our commitments. We have done so and we are doing so. If I ask them what commitments they would shed, I think that they would become pretty shy and coy. The right hon. Member says that he wants us to have more conventional forces. Unless he is prepared to adopt conscription or selective service we can get them only by regular recruiting. I hope therefore that we can concentrate on getting regular recruits and encouraging regular recruitment to the Army.
The rôle of the Government in defence these days is to have a sense of realism so as to frame our policy within our means and a sense of foresight to frame one which will last and, when we have such a policy, to stick to it. This we have done. We have decided that defence expenditure should run at about 7 per cent. of the gross national product. We have decided that we should have a voluntary army of 180,000. I think that no one can say that the Government's decisions are not clear. They may be challenged, but at least they are clear for everybody to see.
I have thought it well—because the right hon. Gentleman really made quite a sensible point about talks with myself and other Ministers—to say that, of course, I win see him, but I should like him to consider what form any talks might take; and what I have said about the attitude taken by all his distinguished predecessors—the history of those talks is well worth looking up.
As Prime Minister, and I know that the same is true of my right hon. Friends the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Secretary, I am always willing to meet Leaders of the Opposition. We will do so, but as we were only given very short notice of this debate I should like to consider the right hon. Gentleman's proposition further, and I should like him to consider it, too. I would, of course, talk to him, but I hope that what I have just said in reply has made the Government's attitude on defence crystal clear.

5.41 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: Many important matters have been touched on this afternoon by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, so I feel that it would be more useful if I abandoned the remarks I had intended to make and tried to add something to the matters already under discussion.
In the latter part of his speech the Prime Minister said that we have a perfect right to withdraw troops from B.A.O.R. in the event of an acute emergency elsewhere. I thought that he implied that that justified the possibility of moving troops to Cyprus, though I appreciate that, so far, no troops have been so moved from Germany. But what I think worries people is that Cyprus should be thought of as an acute emergency. I do not believe that when that provision is generally talked about the situation in Cyprus is the sort of situation people have in mind. What frightens me—and, I think, other people in the country—is the thought of what would happen if there really were an acute emergency in the ordinary sense of the word, or, indeed, if there were many more such emergencies as Cyprus.
The Prime Minister said that the Leader of the Opposition has made it clear that he is opposed to conscription or selective service, and the Government have made their position on the matter clear—they, too, are against it. There is no one in this House who positively wants either conscription or selective service. No party at this moment, with the information now before it, would come out in favour even of selective service, but it would be most unwise if parties officially committed themselves against selective service. Were we faced

with more commitments, and if we failed to get the recruits, whom we may or may not get, selective service should not become a weapon with which the Opposition might beat the Government of the day who might well have to bring it in.
I am certain that the Liberal Party would not at the moment say that it was in favour of such service—there is no party with a stronger anti-conscription flavour than my own—but I hope that we would not attack any Government which, having failed to get the recruits to keep our conventional forces at a high level, felt it necessary to bring in new measures.
The Prime Minister was not very specific about how he would make good his assurance that the Army in Germany would be raised to 55,000 men. I do not think that we have so far paid quite enough attention to the strain imposed in sending troops to Malaysia, Borneo, Cyprus, and parts of Asia and Africa, but I must repeat that I do not think that these were really acute crises, and it is a fact that even quite a small call on our resources seems to strain them. That should be worrying the country.
Another matter that has been dealt with at some length is conversations on defence. That raises the wider issue of how the House can control all sorts of highly technical activities in which the Government are inevitably engaged. Defence, of course, is a special case, and such conversations have a long history—a much longer historythan back to 1949; such interchanges go back long before that.
I do not think that it would be desirable to take out of political controversy the differing views about whether Britain should attempt to remain an independent nuclear Power. This is a perfectly honourable argument, on which strong views are held both inside the House and outside it. These views lie to some extent between the parties, but the Prime Minister knows perfectly well that there are members of his own party who are against the Government's nuclear policy.
It would be wholly wrong at the General Election to deprive people of an opportunity of fair and frank discussion of the matter. That, however, should not prevent a good deal of exchange of information about weapons systems and alliedtechnical matters, and the manpower


situation. Parliament must find some way of keeping sharp the argument on matters of genuine disagreement and, at the same time, of spreading information and using our common will, in regard to matters about which there is some agreement.
I should have thought that there was agreement, whatever one may think about strategic nuclear weapons, on the country's keeping its conventional forces up to an adequate standard. There may be those who differ about how it shall be done, but I am sure that there is no one in this House who would want this country put in a position where it had to rely on nuclear weapons to make good deficiencies in its conventional forces.
I should like conversations at this lower level. I do not know how they will be pursued, but I do not think that it is entirely a matter between the Government and the main Opposition Front Benches. There are those on the back benches who take continued and well-informed interest in defence matters. I would be infavour of some form of committee system, although it is, perhaps, not now appropriate to go into that. Nevertheless, we should consider how those persons, too, should be informed. For myself, I have always found Ministers very willing to give information on an unofficial basis, on the understanding that the information is not used improperly. How much further than that we want to go, I do not know, but the main controversy must be maintained in public, because that is the duty of this House. I also think that there should be a very considerable interchange of conversations in private.
I will not go into the question of our strategic posture—it is constantly argued in our defence debates—but I do not agree with the Prime Minister when he says that there is real confusion in people's views. It is a difficult subject but, broadly speaking, it is just a debating point to say that we do not know what people stand for. We do know. The point I make is that one cannot divorce one's views about the strategic nuclear deterrent from one's general view about the rôle of this country in the world.
I firmly disagree with the Prime Minister's view that this rôle depends upon the retention by Britain of the

nuclear deterrent. I do not believe that that is the reason why we are of considerable importance in the councils of the world. I say again that, if he really thinks that it is, then, of course, that is an absolutely conclusive argument for other countries acquiring these weapons as well. There is no way round it. If it is our possession of nuclear weapons which gives us entry into the world's high-level discussions, that argument applies at once to Germany and every other country. I do not accept that argument. I think that the reason is quite different. It is our tradition, our skill, our contribution to the general balance of the alliances, not the possession of the strategic nuclear deterrent, which gives us our position of importance.
But those of us—and I am one—who dissent from the Government's policy in this respect must face squarely what is, I believe, their strongest case—it is the case put forward by General Gallois originally—that for the deterrent to be credible one has to know who can fire the weapon. There must be one person who can fire it if it is to be credible, and no one will fire it unless his homeland is threatened. It is part of this argument that it is not necessary for one country to possess a weapon which is equal to that of any other country. It is not necessary for a country to possess a nuclear power equal to that of the Russians so that it could completely wipe out Russia. The weapon may have a deterrent effect if it is only of a certain nuclear capability because the larger country—I have instanced Russia—would be inhibited by the risk of the degree, of destruction which might nevertheless have to be faced.
This seems to me to be by far the most powerful part of the Government's case. But it leads straight on to General de Gaulle's position, that one must have one's own weapon under one's own control and one must not be dependent upon a weapon borrowed from elsewhere. But this is a position, to my mind, which involves a mistaken view of the world today. It involves the view that self-sufficient countries are still viable today. I do not think that they are. My view on defence stems from my belief that no country can defend itself and that the nature of the world today requires that Britain and other countries should be


prepared to make certain sacrifices of sovereignty to new groupings, to the United Nations, to Europe, and so on. It is for that reason that I dissent from the argument which I have put forward on behalf of the Government.
I find the position of the Labour Party in this respect rather odd. The Leader of the Opposition told us today that he is willing to put the V-bomber force into the hands of N.A.T.O. The Prime Minister, too, is willing to have these weapons seconded to N.A.T.O. The difference between them, as I understand it, is that the Leader of the Opposition would give over the right to fire these weapons, putting it bluntly, into the hands of whatever authority N.A.T.O. appointed, and he would forgo the right of withdrawal. I gather that the Prime Minister's view—I have no doubt that I shall be corrected if I am wrong—is that he would retain the right to fire the weapon, and, of course, he would retain the right of withdrawal, although they might be targeted for N.A.T.O.
What strikes me as odd about the position of the Labour Party is that it involves a tremendous pooling of sovereignty. I myself face that. This is my position. But it does mean giving up some of our fundamental attributes of sovereignty as an independent State. I accept it, but, although that is the logic of the Labour Party's case, too, it was the Labour Party which opposed joining the European Economic Community because doing so would mean giving up Britain's right to make decisions which are of far smaller importance than these.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: It is a fact, also, that the Labour Party is the first political party in the world to come out in favour of world government. In other words, the Labour Party is prepared to make the necessary sacrifices of sovereignty provided that the aim of world peace is assured, and it was only because some of the members of the Labour Party felt that this aim would not be achieved by the European venture that they were not prepared to give up sovereignty for that purpose.

Mr. Grimond: I acknowledge at once the work which the hon. and learned Gentleman does for world government and the sincerity of his views, but I

am always rather suspicious of those who are in favour of absolute virtue but not in favour, in the meantime, of partial virtue. I find it a little difficult to understand the attitude of people who are in favour of world government and who are willing to surrender our sovereignty to Russia, China and the rest in a world authority but are not willing to surrender any part of our sovereignty to Europe. I find this difficult to apprehend, but I see the point and that is my answer to it.
I believe that the argument about the retention of major nuclear weapons involves much more than merely a defence argument.
The Prime Minister has argued—I have heard the argument before—that the retention of nuclear weapons is costing us only 10 per cent. I think he said, of the defence budget, and giving them up would allow us to make no significant contribution to conventional arms. I cannot accept this. I do not believe that 10 per cent. can be an accurate figure, taking into account all the attempts we have made to develop various weapons and so forth. Anyone who has noted what appears in the Guardian today with reference to the £3,000 million or so devoted to various projects since 1945—although, of course, they have not all been nuclear projects—must feel that the attempt to remain in the top class of nuclear Powers has diverted much of this country's effort from what is the far more important matter of conventional arms. In fact, we have not really been getting such very good value for money.
Although people may argue about whether the V-bomber force is of much, little or no use, it clearly was a very fine force with very fine machines. Nevertheless, as I have said before, I do not think that its addition to the world scene makes much difference to the general deterrent power of the West and I doubt, therefore, whether we are giving up very much. I do not deny that it has value, but I think that that value has been achieved at enormous cost to the nation.
I come now to the multilateral force. As I understand it, there are really five reasons advanced for the multilateral force. The Americans want to get rid of


part of the burden of Western defence, and I do not believe that this country realises how much they want to do so. Not only do they want to be relieved of some of the financial burden, but they want to get some of their boys back home. Americans like America, and they are not imperialists. The talk one sometimes hears about the American attitude, as though the Americans were longing to set up bases here, as though they were an imperialist nation wanting to get their grips on the rest of us, isutterly untrue. We, of course, with a long history of Empire and Commonwealth, undertook certain defence responsibilities as a matter of course, and no one questioned that the British Fleet should go to Sydney, and so on. We were very pleased to do these things, and I never remember any argument about how much the Empire or the Commonwealth paid towards defence. But the Americans have a totally different tradition, and they want to be relieved of some of their burdens. The country should be informed about this. I believe it is one of the basic reasons behind the proposal for the multilateral force.
Another reason is that there is a certain feeling among Americans that they may get involved in a nuclear war in Europe without being adequately consulted. They are, I believe, going to draw back a little from Europe, and they are a little afraid of various developments. I do not believe, and I know that the Minister of Defence does not believe, that there is any intention on the part of America to go back on her undertakings or to leave her allies, but there may be some pressure in America to try to alter the form of the Alliance. In 1966, of course, the whole of N.A.T.O. becomes renegotiable, if anyone wants to do so.
The next reason is supposed to be that the European nations want the multilateral force. I should like the Minister of Defence to say exactly what is the official attitude of the N.A.T.O. Governments in this matter. As far as I can gather, they are all willing to consider the proposal, but I have notmyself found any great enthusiasm for it. I think I am right in saying that Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland have said that they will not take part, or that it is very unlikely that they will. The Germans have said again and again that they do not want themselves to control

nuclear arms. I do not think that the Italians are very enthusiastic and I suppose that the French would not take part at all. It would be helpful, therefore, if the Government would say what is the official position of the European Governments. A further argument is that, whatever the present position may be over the control of nuclear arms, Europe should be willing to do its utmost to play its part in providing support for the nuclear deterrent.
My last point on this issue is tied up with the growing movement for political unity in Europe. I do not believe that this country is aware that Europe is again moving towards political unity. Europeans regard this force in that context. Britain would be ill-advised to turn her back on the new movement towards common defence and foreign policy in a European political community.
Having made these points, we must consider which of them are valid. Surely the Americans want to be relieved of some of the cost. That argument must be absolutely valid. If it will stop proliferation, then that would seem a valid argument, though I do not believe that at the moment there is a desire among the European countries to have their own weapons. Is this force designed to stop that proliferation? I do not believe, for instance, that it will add anything significant to the military power of the West. For this real on it must be in the form of taking a certain proportion of the present force rather than creating a new force. I hope that the Government will confirm that this is their intention, otherwise it would be contrary to disarmament and would be extremely alarming to the Russians.
The Prime Minister said that he accepts the political argument but wishes to be certain that it is militarily possible. That isinteresting because it commits the Government to this type of force. There is no way round that. We are committed to some form of multilateral force, although this particular form may not be right or necessary. I do not believe that there is any great technical difficulty in having mixed crews. To oppose this conception is outdated and is the attitude of some people who retired from the Services and who are now out of touch with things. But we must consider whether it is possible


to answer the legitimate desire of the Americans and others for Europe to have a greater say—that Europe should be more concerned with nuclear strategy and accept some of the burden in other ways without creating a new force. A greater European contribution could be made in various ways, including associating Europe with some of the sites in America, at Omaha, for instance, and planning in Washington. This force is not the only way in which these legitimate desires for making a move in this direction can be met and itdoes not solve the problem of control.
I had expected the debate to focus the attention of the country on the failure of the policy outlined in the 1957 White Paper, which was based on the belief that it was total war or total peace. That has been disproved. The rôle of this country, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, is not to focus attention on trying to become a greater nuclear Power, but on considering how to discharge our obligations—keeping peace and order—in various far off parts of the world and in the conventional contribution to the Army in Germany.
I join in the congratulations which have been expressed to our troops on the wonderful work they have done in these places. I am not one of those who thinks that there is anyeasy way out, for instance by giving up all commitments. However, this widespread demand for conventional forces which is posing a difficult problem now, is the subject to which the House as a whole should be primarily paying its attention.

6.4 p.m.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: The right hon. Member the Leader of the Liberal Party ended his remarks by saying that Britain should be concentrating on conventional forces and trying to keep the peace of the world. That is exactly what is being done now as a result of what has happened in the rather difficult weeks since Christmas. Earlier in his speech he referred to the multi-national force and, while I go a long way with him, there are many reasons why I am dead against the idea, for I believe that the concept would be colossally expensive, would not work and would be a waste of money.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Americans wishing to be relieved of the cost. Britain's effort, even with Polaris, will to some extent relieve them of a percentage of the cost. However, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition rather ridiculed the suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence in Paris about the TSR2 becoming the mixed-manned force. The Americans made nonsenseof it, too. I wonder what the Americans would have said had my right hon. Friend suggested that not the TSR2 but the TFX should be the basis of that force. I believe that they would have given it a totally different reception. I have an idea that in a year or so the N.A.T.O authorities may come back to my right hon. Friend's suggestion.
I was pleased to hear for the first time the Leader of the Opposition paying credit to the TSR2; that is, on the point it has so far reached in its development. It is indeeda remarkable development, although I have heard many hon. Members opposite run this aeroplane down and belittle the effort that is being made. Not only is it a remarkable one, it is at least three years ahead of the American TFX and great credit is due to Sir George Edwards and the Vickers team who are soon to fly the aeroplane on its trials.
When things are quiet in the world, which is not for very long these days, one hears little about defence. It is only when trouble arises that attention is drawn to the subject, as has happened recently. We have been shown the importance and necessity of having an efficient defence organisation, mobile and able to do its job. The British forces have done that job superbly. It could, perhaps, have been done by eliminating stops for refuelling, but that situation will improve as new techniques and equipment comes along. As the Prime Minister said, Britain's responsibilities in the world have, to a certain extent, diminished in the last year or so as the Colonial Territories have gained their independence. Nevertheless, we still have important and far-reaching obligations stretching halfway across the world.
One of the most important is in Malaysia where, without wishing to appear mercenary, there are large British


investments and interests. In Malay there are the tin and rubber interests, with many thousands of British subjects employed there. No one has been more loyal to Britain than the Malayans in trying to help us in years gone by both economically and with forces. They have played a great part in their contribution, particularly in the difficult years just after the war when we needed hard currency. We must see Malaysia through the time ahead so that it may become a great country and play its part in the world.
The Leader of the Opposition referred to Australia and New Zealand and the part that those countries were playing. He wondered whether they could play a greater part. I am sure that no one is more willing to play his part than is the Australian and New Zealander. The people of those countries are brave and courageous but, at the moment, their forces are not in the fighting zone. The Australians and New Zealanders would be the first to want to be in the fight should the necessity arise. Nevertheless, the troubled areas are nearer Australia than Britain—and with 100 million Indonesians on their doorstep, I imagine that they must be expressing great concern.
I would like to know whether, if the situation worsened—which I hope it will not—my right hon. Friend has had discussions with the leaders of Australia and New Zealand about our future plans for giving reinforcements, because the Australian Press—and I emphasise Press and not the Australian Government—has not been particularly kind to this country in recent weeks. I saw one quotation to the effect that Britain could take a running jump at herself should she ask for help. Help has not been asked for, however, and it would be interesting if my right hon. Friend would elaborate this point and so clear the air.

Mr. Reginald Paget: Is it not the case that we have a Commonwealth Brigade in Malaya consisting of British, Australian and New Zealand troops? Is it not also the case that the Australian and New Zealand Governments will not release that brigade for reinforcement in Borneo?

Sir A. V. Harvey: No doubt my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence will refer to that when he replies.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister showed that, while we have a lot to undertake, the forces, although stretched, are not unduly so. As he said, under our treaty obligations in Germany we have the right to withdraw our forces if necessary in order to deploy them elsewhere. The French did that with their troops for many years and had very few in Germany. In any case, the total of British forces in Germany is very little below what it should be.
The British forces stretch from the Persian Guff to Borneo, and, as far as I can see, the only American force in that vast area is an aircraft carrier which recently arrived in the Indian Ocean. The area is, in effect, solely a British responsibility. I do not think that the N.A.T.O. Powers and Washington sufficiently take into account this great British contribution, stretching across 6,000 or more miles, taking in Aden, Kenya, Gan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Borneo.
That is an enormous responsibility resting on this country and the Government. But the Americans say that we must do more in Germany. We cannot do more everywhere, however. I do not believes that we require so many troops in Germany at the present time, although I know that there is a treaty. But if the Americans can move 18,000 troops from the United States to Germany in a few hours, how easy would it be for our troops to be moved from Salisbury Plain to Germany in an hour, provided we had the right aircraft and equipment.

Mr. Paget: indicated dissent.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman does not agree, but today we must have freedom and mobility to use our forces.
Mr. McNamara and his advisers must take a broader attitude towards the British contributions in the Middle East and the Far East. The Americans pay lip service to this when one discusses it with them in Washington and elsewhere, but quite differentthings are said in their Press and at meetings. I would like to see better understanding by them.
There is the delicate question of the use of American arms by Indonesian troops. I understand that the Americans have stopped supplying arms to Indonesia at present, and I ask my right hon. Friend to tell us categorically what the Americans are or are not supplying. I was very alarmed to read in the Daily Telegraph that an Indonesian soldier killed or captured had in his possession an American Armalite high velocity rifle. Today we read of Indonesian aircraft with American markings.
The Americans raise the greatest objections because we do not refuse to sell commercial buses to Cuba, but I would like to know how they stand on their supply of arms to Indonesia. Malayan and British troops are being killed in Borneo. The total casualties may be small in number but may increase, and even if one man is killed that is enough to justify a complete working arrangement with the United States. If we do not have suchan arrangement we will be opposing each other and that really would not make sense.
Now I want to deal with the Labour Party's defence policy. Like many others, I have been very confused about it in the last 12 months. There have been many half truths and equivocations. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) is not with us today and I hope that he will make a speedy recovery and return to the House soon. When he spoke in the Debate on the Address on 13th November, he said:
When we come to power, it is not our intention to destroy the nuclear force which the Government leave behind. We have never been committed to destroying the V-bomber force if it exists when we come to power".
That sort of thing is not clearly understood in the country. The impression among a great many people is that the Labour Party wants to get rid of our nuclear forces lock, stock and barrel. Then, of course, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister pointed out today, the right hon. Member for Belper also said:
we shall…negotiate within the alliance for a genuine Atlantic alliance nuclear organisation in which we can obtain a greater sharing of the command and of the control of other weapons—not our own alone".—[OFFICIAL

REPORT, 13thNovember 1963; Vol 684, c. 195–6.]
In other words, the party opposite would seek more power over nuclear equipment and weapons but would not be a party to their possession.
Even today, their attitude has not been straightened out. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition told us that he would assign the V-bomber force to N.A.T.O. for integration. I asked him whether it would be equipped with nuclear weapons and he dodged the question. I did not get a clear answer. The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) a short time ago interrupted and said that these bombers would carry conventional weapons. What does his right hon. Friend say?

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do what these bombers are capable of. He knows the histories of Skybolt and Blue Steel. These are subsonic bombers and their chances of operating in daylight within the range of Soviet fighters is exactly nil. The hon. Gentleman knows their rôle.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I know their capabilities. I flew one of these bombers up to 54,000 ft. about eight years ago. Do not let us underrate the V-bombers, even today. With the stand-off weapon Blue Steel, which is being constantly improved, they should not be underrated. The point I was making was that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition dodged my question about what weapons the V-bombers would carry.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman is, Ibelieve, a director of Handley-Page. He knows the range of the Mark I Blue Steel. Will he tell the House?

Sir A. V. Harvey: I resigned from Handley-Page seven years ago. The hon. Gentleman gets carried away by his own thoughts in these matters. A short time ago I asked him to visit Vickers and see the TSR2. Has he been? He is a great expert and ought to follow it up. These questions of what weapons the V-bombers would carry were the Labour Party unfortunately in power should be answered.

Mr. Paget: Does the hon. Gentleman really want to know the answer? They


would be allocated to the N.A.T.O. Command, and the N.A.T.O. Command would decide what weapons they would carry.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Then if Britain, as suggested by the right hon. Member for Belper, were to get any return for extra or additional control of other forces they would have a responsibility to carry nuclear weapons.
Now there is the question of the position of President de Gaulle and France—assuming he lives another ten years, and I imagine that he is probably good for another twenty. Are we to recognise France as being the only independent nuclear Powerin Europe? We must not underrate the capabilities of the French technicians, either in electronics or in the building of weapons and aircraft. They are very competent and are making tremendous progress, as has been shown in the last five years. It would be a very difficult situation if Britain were without the independent deterrent while the French had it. I know that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton and I disagree on that point. It is unfortunate, but I think that it would be equally unfortunate if the position were as I described it.
Ithink that the country would like to see a united Parliament on these matters. I think that what has been suggested about the talks is probably worth while, but the fact is that today we are very wide apart on these matters. I think we have to recognise that the two main parties are miles apart because of the question of the deterrent. In my view, many of the Socialist supporters in the country are extremely worried about the policy being adopted by their party. Having listened to the Leader of the Opposition making speeches for nineteen years, I sense today that he too is worried about it. I do not think there is that certainty about him that there was some time ago.
When the supreme national interests are at stake, the deterrent is integrated for war, and independent for deterrent. As the Prime Minister said a short time ago, the deterrent is there for deterrent purposes; it is not to be used. If it is used, it is not a deterrent. The fact that we have had peace in Europe since

the end of the war is I am sure due to the retaliatory power of the allies, but the Opposition would voluntarily put Britain out of the nuclear business.
I am still sorry that a year ago when the Americans decided not to go ahead with Skybolt we did not continue with it in some form or another in this country. We may not have made a 100 per cent. success of it, but we would have been teaching our scientists, and we would have been in the business. We would have been gaining something from it scientifically. It is unfortunate that we did not carry on with it, but the next best thing was done. The Polaris proposal was accepted, and this is undoubtedly a fine weapon indeed. I do not want to go over the ground again, but I do not think that three submarines are nearly sufficient.
The Opposition talk about the V-bomber force being kept until it is worn out or run down. What does that mean? Aircraft art: continually being sent back to the makers to be overhauled and given new life. They have a rôle to play for many years. The Opposition talk about the force being run down or worn out, but I think that with modifications, and with the possible introduction of comparatively simple new weapons, the manned aeroplane will still be able to play an effective rôle. During discussions in Washington a year ago with the Secretary of State for Air, he said to me, "Do not let anybody underrate the value of the manned aeroplane. It is all right to have these electronic devices, but the manned aeroplane still has an important rôle to play".
If, as the Opposition suggest, we hand over the V-bomber force to N.A.T.O., we shall place the key of the bomb bay in the hands of the President of the United Status. It was all right to do that when Mr. Kennedy was President, and it is all right to do that now that Mr. Johnson holds that post, but who knows who will be the President of the United States in a few years'time? It is asking a lot to put that control in the hands of a man who may be an isolationist. He may hold different views from those held by the late Mr. Kennedy, and by Mr. Johnson. As a Britisher, I would be reluctant to even contemplate doing that, and I think that even the Americans


would be surprised if we carried out that proposal.
A reference was made today to the chiefs of staff. Presumably the chiefs of staff give their best advice to the Government of the day. In olden days, if their advice was not accepted, one frequently heard of resignations, but we do not hear of many resignations today. The Labour Party, if it were in power, would find itself in difficulties with the chiefs of staff if it rejected their advice lock, stock and barrel. It is not easy today to run a complicated fighting machine if one disregards the advice of the experts, and I think that hon. Gentlemen opposite ought to explain how they would overcome the difficulty, assuming that the chiefs of staff maintain the policy that they are advocating at the moment.
We are spending about 7 per cent. of the gross national product on defence. This is not a tremendous amount compared with that spent by other countries. We are told that the Russians and Americans spend a considerably higher percentage of their national product. Mistakes have been made in the past over ordering equipment, but that has happened in every country which has tried to develop modern weapons. The Americans build ten or twenty different weapons, but often only one will be successful, because modern weapons are so complicated that in the development stage many of them do not work. We have had our failures, and if I were to criticise successive Governments I would say that they have been rather slow in deciding when to scrub out a project, but these things are better understood now than they were.
I think that my right hon. Friend learnt a lot from his tour in the Far East. He is now well informed on the position there, and he has done a good job in encouraging our forces who are carrying out a difficult task remarkably well. Do not let us underestimate what British men are doing throughout the world. They are doing a tough and difficult job. We must also remember the Gurkhas. They have a great tradition as fighters. Over the last three years there have been rumours about the numbers of Gurkhas in the British Army being run down from 10,000 to

7,000 or whatever it is. I hope that everybody has realised the real value of the Gurkhas, and that they will be assured that their numbers will not be reduced. The individual Gurkha soldier ought to be toldthat his career is secure, and that there is no question of his being sent home. In any case, I understand that if they leave the British Army many immediately join the Indian Army. The Gurkhas are remarkable fighting men, and we ought to be grateful to them for the part they play in our fighting services.

Mr. Paget: It is not merely a question of the Gurkhas themselves. We also have to consider the British officers who lead them. Unless we give these officers an assurance about their future, we shall not be able to retain people of the required standard in the necessary numbers. It is essential that their future should be guaranteed.

Sir A. V. Harvey: The hon. and learned Gentleman is, of course, quite right. The Gurkhas are led by British officers, and always have been exceptionally well led by them. They, too, must be sure of where they stand, and that they have an assured future.
I think that the Government are following the right policy. They are being honest with the country. There are no secrets to hide on matters of broad detail, and I ask the Government to go on and be bold and support the fighting services as they deserve to be supported.

6.27 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: If I wanted to be insulting to the Prime Minister, I would say that he believed in his speech. If I wanted to be insulting to the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), I suppose I would pay him the same compliment. I propose to dwell for a moment or two on one or two points made by the hon. Member, because his speech illustrates the ignorance and foolishness of hon. Gentlemen opposite who ought to know better.
The hon. Gentleman rightly said that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said that what this is all about is really the 1957 White Paper and the continuance of the policy laid down therein in the 1962 White Paper. Let us start, as the hon. Gentleman did, with


the question of mobility. He dismissed the fact that the aircraft flying to Cyprus had to land at Nice or Malta. He said that this problem would be put right very quickly; that in just a short time everything would be all right.
The hon. Gentleman led the House to believe that this was a passing phase. He talked about withdrawing units from the Rhine Army, about having mobility, and about being able to put our forces wherever we wanted them.

Sir A. V. Harvey: HANSARD will show what I said. I recognise that the aircraft used on the Cyprus airlift had to make intermediate landings, but I said that the position would improve week by week and monthby month, and so it will when the VC10 and other aircraft come into service.

Mr. Wigg: I accept that as much better than my phrasing. The hon. Member said that week by week and month by month the position will be improved. Yesterday we had from the Estimates Committee the Second Report on Transport Aircraft. It says that of the 10 types now in service, only two—the Argosy and the Comet 4—could be described as modern aircraft. The Comet flew one sortie and the Argosy eight. The hon. Member ought to know—I assumed that he did but apparently he did not—that there is no possibility of it improving in the near future. We shall not get the Belfasts, the first one of which flew a fortnight ago, for some time. This aircraft was planted on the House as a military version of the Britannia. It was called the Britannic in the early stages. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations sold the dummy to the House that this aircraft was the military version of the Britannia. The Estimates Committee report makes no pretence about that. It does not pretend that it was a derivative from the civil project.
Perhaps there should be a successor to the Belfast. There are only 10 of them and it will be years before their delivery is completed, which means, of course, that the idea that the British Army is mobile in the sense envisaged in the 1957 and subsequent White Papers is tommyrot. The hon. Member, with his reputation as an Air Force officer of great distinction, ought not to mislead

the House. He, above all men, should inform himself of that simple fact. That was not his only misleading operation. The hon. Member, if he has not lost his form, knows as well as I do what the argument about the V-bombers and the atomic deterrent is.
I have never looked at this problem as do the overwhelming majority of my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite. For me the Rhine Army depends upon atomic tactical weapons and they happen to be American. I greatly regret the Government decision not to go on with Blue-water. If the Government are sincere in believing and asserting that atomic weapons are the linchpin of British defence policy, and that we should not depend upon the Americans but should have independence in action, they ought to have gone on with Blue-water, but they cancelled it. It was cancelled in July, 1962, the House having conveniently departed for the Recess. The Estimates are first looked at in July each year, and the Government found they were up against their financial ceiling. This year, for the same reason the Government have to think again about the P1154 and the aircraft carrier.
I should be delighted to be interrupted by the Minister of Defence or the Secretary of State for War on the subject of atomic tactical weapons. The British Army depends on Honest John, the 8 inch atomic howitzer, and Corporal, all of which are obsolescent with warheads under American control. The American Army has kept Sergeant which is a solid fuel weapon, but it is not so good as Blue-water I believe, would have been. The Germans are getting Pershing, the order for which was placed as far back as 1961. It has a range of over 400 miles.
What was the position in 1957? It was that the end of the life of the V-bombers could be seen. Paragraph 48 of the Defence White Paper says that we were not to build a successor but that we should put our money on a missile. I regret that hon. Members on both sides of the House fell for this nonsense. They accepted the idea that it was possible within the economic capacity of this country to develop an independent British deterrent called Blue


Streak. That was the first untruth. Blue Streak was not British. Blue Streak was the American Atlas without the sustainer. The Government know this. The Minister of Defence—I am one of his greatest admirers—knows the truth if the Prime Minister does not. The Prime Minister is a nice man but stupid, and the Minister of Defence is very clever.

Viscount Lambton: How does the hon. Member classify himself?

Mr. Wigg: As an earnest seeker after truth, and I find it more often than the hon. Member does because I am more assiduous in my search. The country is in exactly the same position now as it was in 1959. We are faced with the possibility of catastrophe, and the Government conceal the truth from their own back benchers and from the country. I speak from memory—this perhaps is one of the advantages I have over the noble Lord the hon. Member for Berwick-on-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). He should look at The Times for 19th February, 1959. The distinguished defence correspondent of The Times gave an account of a conversation he had with the Minister of Defence, in which it was made absolutely clear that Blue Streak was being kept on for political reasons. It was a dead duck, but the Minister of Defence was pouring cold water on Polaris. The hon. Member for Macclesfield and the Prime Minister talk about Polaris as a great and powerful weapon. They should see what the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relation said about it in 1959. Then in 1960 the moment of truth came and in April Blue Streak was cancelled.
The heaving bosoms of the female supporters of the Tory Party had to be kept heaving. They had to have something to catch hold of when Skybolt was to be cancelled. I am engaged in a controversy with the Minister of Aviation about an article by Mr. Brandon in the Sunday Times. So far as I am concerned the controversy is going on. I keep mentioning the veracity and truthfulness of the Minister of Aviation, but I am not worried about that. I understand what that is worth. What I am concerned about is what the Minister was up to in relation to the Skybolt cancellation.
When the President of the United States told him that he should not bank too much on Skybolt, he said it mustbe made to work. When the President said that it might not work the Minister of Aviation almost fell off his seat, and, red in the face, said it must be made to work:
It is the basis of our nuclear defence".
In other words, it did not matter a damn whether Skybolt worked or not so long as the pretence could be kept up.
I am very glad to have present the Minister of Defence for, of course, he knows the truth. He went to a meeting of the Association of American Correspondents at the Savoy on 1st November, 1962, and they questioned him about exactly the same thing. The same sources which gave me that information told me what he said to them, and what they said to him.
It is said that about the same time Mr. McNamara stated that the previous Minister of Defence had been given five distinct warnings that Skybolt was an "iffy" proposition, the reason being not technical ones on their own but the improbability that in terms of cost effectiveness Skybolt would ever come to fruition to make sense in the life span ofthe manned bomber. Two warnings were given by Mr. Secretary Gates in 1960, two by Mr. McNamara in 1961 and another one in 1962. Yet the Government pretended—and the Prime Minister went to Nassau—that the cancellation of Skybolt was somethingout of the blue, but they had been warned months before. Mr. Brandon said in his article that at Nassau the President reminded the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) that the President had warned the Minister of Aviation nine months before that Sky bolt was an "iffy" proposition.
For nearly a year, the story of Blue Streak has been repeated. The Government dare not tell the House of Commons, their back benchers or the country that having put all their money on Blue Streak—and that was a non-starter—they gambled on Skybolt and that that failed them, and then they had come back on Polaris, the very weapon that the former Minister of Defence, now Commonwealth Secretary, had gone out


of his way to denigrate and to describe as useless. In those circumstances we are left with the V-bombers. 180 of them.
The extent of the Government's duplicity is unfathomable to ordinary men concerned with the ordinary usages of honourable truth-telling. It is such a story that it is like a child's fairy tale. Take the example of the V-bombers being placed under the control of N.A.T.O., of SACEUR. I had the great pleasure last autumn to go to the N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians conference. We listened to an interesting discussion and to an interesting statement by General Lemnitzer. In the course of it, he referred to the weapons that were placed under his control at the Ottawa conference.
General Lemnitzer referred only to the Vulcans and the Victors. I could not understand it. I thought that it was a slip of the tongue. Therefore, when the time came for questions, I asked him whether it was a mistake or whether it was because the Valiants were obsolescent that he did not mention them, because they were part of the 180, as we weretold in part of the statement which came from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Aviation. Hon. Members can look it up in the Daily Telegraph if they wish. The 180 V-bombers were the Valiants, the Victors and the Vulcans.

Sir John Maitland: I was there, too. Will the hon. Member say what General Lemnitzer answered?

Mr. Wigg: Yes. He turned to me and said that the Valiants had already been committed. I asked him whether the Valiant was obsolescent. He replied that it was not and that it was a very good aircraft—of course it was. General Lemnitzer said, however, that the Valiants had already been committed. They were committed in 1961 to the Second Tactical Air Force.
So the Government committed them twice. This is what has become known in American defence circles as the double count. They were committed to the Second Tactical Air Force and then they were committed again after Ottawa. This kind of thing goes on all the time.
Let us, however, go on with the V-bomber force. This subsonic obsolescent aircraft—and the word "obsolescent" is not mine—

Sir J. Maitland: It certainly was not General Lemnitzer's.

Mr. Wigg: I agree. I will present the hon. Member with a copy—

Sir J. Maitland: I have it.

Mr. Wigg: Does the hon. Member have a copy of the statement made to the Senate Committee in September, 1962, in which the V-bomber force—not only the Valiants, but the lot—was described as obsolescent and as depending for their capacity to be credible, to be a viable fighting force, on a stand off? If that is not true, what was the case of Skybolt? If it is not true that the V-bomber force is viable only with a stand-off, what did the Minister of Aviation mean when he said to the President, It is the basis of our nuclear defence"? Skybolt was the basis because it gave a stand-off of 1,000 miles.
Mark I Blue Steel has a range of 100 miles. At vast expense, the Government carted 40 defence correspondents to Woomera to see it fire, and then it failed. If that iswhat it depends upon, hon. Members can imagine the Russians not shivering in their shoes if all they have to know is that we are dependent on the V-bomber force. The V-bomber force is not a viable deterrent force. It is a cardboard box. It is "x" in the equation, but it is "x" only to keep up the failing spirits and the myth which exists in the ranks opposite.
The whole case for conversations is not to damp down controversy. Controversy is the lifeblood of democracy. What talks are for, and why I have put forward suggestions for a defence committee with rather more powers than the Estimates Committee, with the ability to question policy and not only how policy is carried out, is to fulfil a vital part in the effective working of our democratic system and our capacity to produce defence forces within our capacity to pay and so that there shall be an understanding of the facts. That is why all my actions are related to that simple proposition.
I have had on the Order Paper for weeks a request for a Select Committee


to consider the Canberra replacement. The hon. Member for Macclesfield suggested that I should go down to Weybridge. I do not go round to aircraft companies. I am not a director or a shareholder. When their people came here, at the hon. Member's suggestion, I talked to them and listened to what they had to say.
I went over to Belfast, at my expense, to see Short and Harland's, but I do not accept hospitality from Government contractors. It is highly improper to do so and as far as I am concerned,I will not do it. I go there as an independent observer. It is no compliment to Sir George Edwards or to anyone else for me, who makes no pretence to understand anything about an aeroplane—a horse, yes, but not an aeroplane—to go and see something which has never flown. If I say that it is good, that is humbug. If I say that it is not good, it is equally humbug. I can only look at acknowledged form.
Two hundred and fifty million pounds has been spent on this. I doubt the cost effectiveness. Therefore, I should like to do what the Americans have done. They have the TFX before a Congressional Committee, and a Congressional Committee includes representatives from Congress who have the same possibility of opening their mouths and talking indiscreetly as members of any other assembly. If they can be given an opportunity of being able to appraise the value of the TFX, why cannot the House of Commons use a Select Committee to come to a conclusion about the TSR2, which, when it originally broke surface, was not the nuclear get-out of the Minister of Aviation? That is what makes me suspicious of the claims which are made for it. I accept the straightforward statements by the Secretary of State for Air that this is a replacement for the Canberra with a strategic bonus. That I accept. It ought to be examined on that basis in the terms of its cost effectiveness.
I do not want to go over all these weapons, but I must touch on one or two more of them before I turn to the question of manpower, which I believe to be the Government's Achilles heel. Let us look again at the two announcements

of the Minister of Defence on 30th July. They were in truth remarkable. The first was about the Victorious replacement. What I could not understand about it in my poor, humble way was why that statement was made on that date, because in the Defence White Paper, in the First Lord's Memorandum, there had been an announcement that there was to be a Victorious replacement. Therefore, why say it again?
Equally, on the same day, the Minister of Defence said that the Hunter and the Sea Vixen were to be replaced by the P1154. But why say that? The memorandum of the Secretary of State for Air had said six months before that the P1154 was to displace the Hunter. What that did was to disclose the father and mother of a row between the Navy and the Air Force. When the hon. Member for Macclesfield quite improperly holds out the bait to the Chiefs of Staff that if a Labour Government comes into office and they do not like what we do, theyshould resign, that is an utterly improper and disgraceful observation from an ex-Regular officer.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I did not say it.

Mr. Wigg: It is a gross reflection on the hon. Member, because, clearly, if it is proper for the Prime Minister to authorise that little box in a Conservative pamphlet asking where the Chiefs of Staff stand on an issue on which they advise the Government in accordance with the views of hon. Members opposite, they are in honour bound to say so when they give divergent advice.

Sir A. V. Harvey: The hon. Member is again misquoting me. What I said was that in years gone by, one used to see resignations if there were disagreements, but we do not see them today. I would like to have seen resignations even in the last 10 years over certain decisions that were made. It would have been healthy. I put the question of what might happen with a future Government. As usual, the hon. Member has taken out of context something said by an hon. Member on the opposite side to himself to fit intohis own words. We are all used to it.

Mr. Wigg: We will put that to the test tomorrow. The hon. Member did not say that he wished that it had been


done often recently. He says that it used to be done, that it is not done now, but that he hopes it will be done in the future. That is reserved for us on this side.
I go back to the question of the "Victorious". The naval blimps opposite did not want one "Victorious" replacement; they wanted four. These cost only £240 million—£60 million apiece. Equally, even to them it was obvious—this involved some real hard thinking—that if we have aircraft carriers, we must have aircraft to put on them. This was going to cost so much that the yell went up for the cancellation of TSR2. This was not from my hon. Friends on this side. The yell for cancellation of TSR2 came from the naval lobby opposite. The naval boys were saying, "Cancel the TSR2", and the Air Force and others were saying that it suited them. So what did we get? A statement made in the Naval Memorandum in the spring, repeated for tactical political reasons on 30th July; and on 20th November along came the Minister of Defence, who suddenly found that there were difficulties about going on with the P1154. There was the difficulty of £500 million—the little difficulty we were up against last July.
We know what happened. In July they looked at the Estimates and said, "What! Let's cancel the aircraft carrier. Let's cancel the P1154." Everyone was for cancelling whatthey did not want. So when we came to November the P1154 was out. Why cannot we have a select Committee to do a little more than the Estimates Committee on transport aircraft and examine the P1154 as the Hunter and Sea Vixen replacement as well as similar proposals costing very large sums?
The hon. Member, who I am glad preceded me, went back to the transport point again. If he really believed what he said, if he was sincere—I pay tribute to his intelligence but not his sincerity—he would do what I am doing in putting pressure on the Government to make a statement on transport aircraft and about the A.W681 because in March we were told that it was a starter and that there was to be a project study. We all know that the argument about the engine was settled in

favour of Rolls Royce. On the 20th November, I put a Question down about the engine, and I was told an answer would be given shortly. Here we are in January, and no answer. We have the P1154, the aircraft carrier, the A.W681 and the whole story is that they are all marking time. Why? Because the Prime Minister this afternoon led us to believe that anything required in the defence field would be honourably undertaken and defence needs would be the only consideration. Does anyone reallybelieve that? Of course it is not true. What is operating in this field is the political convenience of the Government.
I shall keep the House only a few moments more on the question of manpower. I am not one of those who believe that the danger of the Cyprus situation, or the possible danger of the Borneo situation, can be solved by selective service. If I may answer the noble Lord. I am not one of those who ever believed that a complicated crisis could be solved by some convenient solution cooked up on the spur of the moment. Difficult problems take a long time to solve. Selective service is quite irrelevant to the present issue. The Government have all the Reserves they want. The Government are sitting pretty in terms of manpower, as of now. They can handle the Cyprus situation. Any possibility of things going wrong in Borneo, and they on handle it. If they have to take one company of the Staffordshire Regiment and put them in Zanzibar it will be there.
I was a little struck when the Prime Minister told usthat the policy of the Government was to get rid of commitments. Will hon. Members make a study of the commitments that we had in 1957 and those that we have now. We have Zanzibar, Swaziland, Borneo, with 6,000 troops, going on all the time. I do not think that I am sufficiently important to be able to pass an opinion on this, I do not go round the world at the expense of some newspaper—I have to go on my own feet as far as I can or take an odd trip in my car because I insist on paying for myself. I do not know about these things. I tend to take commitments as I find them. But I ask myself: how do the Government manage to be so sure of themselves in handling existing


situations? The first thing that they rely on is the faithfulness, the forgetful-ness and the ever-present stupidity of hon. Gentlemen opposite. That never fails them. It has not failed them now. I have kept against this day a confidential memorandum circulated to Commands in 1961, at the time of the passing of the Army Reserve Act of 1962. If hon. Members want to enjoy this and get its full flavour, let me suggest that they start off by reading the Queen's Speech in 1961 where they will find a section in which it is stated that it was the Government's intention to call back a category of National Servicemen, and it went on to say that there would be an examination of the Reserve.
The last point was also mentioned in the 1962 White Paper. Then we got the Army Reserve Act. What did it do? The Secretary of State for War at that time, in a Second Reading speech on 27th November, 1961 was very truthful. He spelled it all out. He said that Clause 1 would hold National Service men for a period of six months. That he said was only concerned with the position in Europe and the Rhine Army. On Clause 2 giving powers of recall he said that we should not want them in 1961. We should not want them until at the earliest. That was the earliest time when we should need them.
What was the position? Under Clause 2 the Government imposed a liability to recall for six months on all National Servicemen during their period of 3½ years'reserve service. There are 105,000 of our fellow countrymen at the present time who were unfortunate enough to get caught right at the end of the National Service Acts.Many of them are older men than those normally called up—men of 23, 24 and 25—some of them university graduates, doctors who have finished their training, pharmacists, technicians and the like. There are 105,000 of these men who do not knowthat they are under a liability to recall for a period of six months. Again the Secretary of State for War, with great honesty, spelled this out. He said that we should not want all this number, but we shall select them. In Hansard of 27th November, 1961, columns 50 and 51, he said that they would select the categories and trades that were needed. He then went on to say that experience

had shown in this that these emergencies came upon us like a clap of thunder. Prior notice could not be given because the call-up would have to be at very short notice indeed. I see the Parliamentary Secretary to the War Office here. When he gave a Press Conference in the earlier part of the week, extensively reported, thank goodness, in the Liverpool Post, he said that one of the things that the Government will not do is ever to have selective service. I wonder whether he would be good enough to tell us what this means. If the Government have taken powers to recall and they have said that they will arbitarily select and will, if necessary, recall without notice, except a notice pushed through the letterbox—if that is not selective service, I should like to know what is.
Generally speaking, neither the noble Lord nor I back winners after the event. That is an unprofitable occupation. I backed this before it ran. I said this:
For it must be remembered that we are here introducing a form of selective service of the most wasteful short-term, and militarily inefficient type that it is possible to devise. First, those fortunate enough to go into the Navy or the Air Force are exempted completely. We are going to swing our policy over to the using of our Army reserves, and we shall be using up extravagantly the very forces on which we have to rely in the case of serious trouble."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th November, 1961; Vol. 650, c. 123.]

Viscount Lambton: Many hon. Members will agree that the hon. Gentleman has been right many times about the deficiencies in manpower. I want to ask him one question now. I agree with himthat there are reserves at present, but would not he agree that in, say, a period of two years these reserves will have disappeared and it will perhaps be impossible for any Government to lay their hands upon them without the restoration of some sort of selective conscription?

Mr. Wigg: I entirely agree. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will come to that later. I am saying that there are 105,000 men who can be quite arbitrarily selected without their knowledge, without them ever being consulted, without notice. Men in Section A of the Army Reserve—that is to say, that category for which a man can volunteer and for which he gets extra pay per day; and


men whom the Government have taken power, rightly in my view, to allocate to Section A—can be called back without proclamation; but they know it. Either they have been told that they are so designated, or they have taken the cash and they know it. Men in category I of the Army Emergency Reserve, which again is a category of men who can be called out without proclamation and without notice, have had the bounty. So they know about their liability.
Here the Government have deliberately spread the net over as wide an area as possible to meet their political convenience. I hope that I shall get support from hon. Members on both sides in what I am now demanding. I recognise the Government's dilemma. They now have 105,000 men; they know that they can narrow it to a much smaller number; they can narrow it, let us say, to 20,000; that 20,000 could be in a pool from which in certain circumstances the Government might have to call men back for two years. Those 20,000 ex-National Servicemen—men who have done their Service, are rebuilding their careers, perhaps newly married and buying homes, with hire purchase commitments—should be told that they have been designated and are in a pool and could, if the Government's policy goes wrong, be recalled. They should be told this so that the other 85,000 who are free from this shadow can know it and can carry on their normal lives without worry. A considerable number of these men are intelligent enough to have read all about this and their fears should be met.
I believe that the Government are gambling. The Minister of Defence came off an aeroplane the other night and said, "We have all the reserves we want". However, the noble Lord has put his finger on the problem. This is why one should be worried about the present situation. The National Service man has this liability for three and a half years. The last one to go in was in November, 1960. He will have come out in November, 1962. It does not matter very much for the purposes of discussion whether he did an extra six months, because, if he did, the extra six months under Section I would be deducted from the three and a half years. By May, 1966, this pool of 105,000 which

was created by the Army Reserve Act, 1962, will have gone.
Hon. Members on this side should now begin to take notice. This is precisely what that clever Minister of Defence knows. He knows one thing for sure—namely, that he will not be there in 1965. The Prime Minister, who I think is an innocent, a perfectly honourable but utterly non-understanding man, does not realise it. I believe that if he did he would not be party to it. He does not fully understand that in two years from now Sections 1 and 2 of the Army Reserve Act, 1962, are out.
I come now to Section 3. This was the Government's saving grace. Can hon. Members think back two years? Do they remember the exciting debate we then had? Do they remember the exciting announcement that the Government had found the cure? Have they forgotten the term "Ever-readies"? They were to have a bounty of £150. The "Ever-readies" were to fill in the gaps in the thin red line. There were to be 15,000 of them. There are only 4,200.
So the Government are 11,000 short of the "Ever-readies" which Section 3 was to provide to lessen the strain on Section 2. Therefore, we can now do another sum. There are 9,000 short on the establishment. This afternoon the Prime Minister said that we are committed to 55,000 in Germany, although he did not say when. I hope that the Minister of Defence will tell us tonight whether he stands by his undertaking of 3rd July last that the 55,000 for Germany will be there by the end of 1964 or, if not, when they will be there. There are 9,000 short on the strength; there are 11,000 short on the "Ever-readies"; that is 20,000, plus the real deficiency between 180,000 and what it ought to be if in fact we were keeping units up to establishment.
On this point the Government are making no attempt whatever. Many battalions are non-operational in the strictest sense of the word. This afternoon my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was terribly kind. He talked about the establishment being 774. He took the answer of the Secretary of State for War and computed that they were only 25 per cent. under establishment. On that basis the figure is nearer 100


per cent. than 25 per cent. Overall, the Services are certainly not less than 10,000 under strength.
This springs from one simple fact. The 165,000 is an entirely "phoney" figure. It was the political figure. We want no better evidence for this than the very distinguished gentleman the present High Commissioner in Malaysia, who told the House the truth in a burst of confidence one evening after he had ceased to become Secretary of State for War. In fact, the 165,000 was the political figure, and those of us who know anything about it know full well that the veryminimum that the ceiling could be was 169,000. Even that made no provision for any emergency.
The story does not change. I will go on a few months. We get very interested when a Cyprus or a Borneo comes along, but the bottom of the pit will not be reached until two years' time. In two years'time the Army Reserve Act will have gone; there will be no general reserve. Although I could guess, I dare not tell the House what the strength of Section A or Section B of the Regular Army is. The House must face the fact that, if nothing is done now—this goes to the core of the noble Lord's very pertinent question—in two years'time, if we get a Cyprus or a Borneo, or perhaps something worse, there will be nothing between calamity, national dishonour, and general mobilisation. The Minister of Defence knows this just as well as I do.
The purpose of an association between the two parties is not to stifle the conflict of opinion, not to stifle controversy. As I said earlier, that is the very stuff of which democracy is made. It is to enable hon. Members to be given advice which is sound, through the organisation of a defence committee, or in talks with Ministers.
At least we ought not to be worse off than the Americans. If they can work a technique in which members of the Senate and members of the House of Representatives can obtain the information necessary to enable them to come to sane and balanced views, we should be able to do the same. I have no faith in the Press. There are only two defence correspondents who are worth two-pennyworth of cold gin. The rest

do not begin to understand the question. I have little faith in the I.T.V. or the B.B.C. No; it is from this place that information should flow, from an understanding by hon. Members who are able to come to grips with the problems involved.
I apologise for saying this for the 700th time but, if in a democracy we want a sound and a sane defence policy to enable our country to meet the obligations imposed upon it, we must arrive at a proper balance between commitments and resources, and we can do that only one way—from the bottom upwards. That is why I put my shoulder to the wheel in support of my right hon. Friend in his efforts to bring about that state of affairs.

7.10 p.m.

Sir John Maitland: The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has taken most of the House over these fences many times. He has said quite a lot, and he will not expect me to deal with all the points he made; but I remember the question of General Lemnitzer, and frommy memory of the occasion I do not think that he said what the hon. Member indicated. I thought that the hon. Member tried to persuade General Lemnitzer into admitting that the V-bombers were not effective. That was the object of his rather loaded question. But to my recollection General Lemnitzer went out of his way to point out that the V-bombers were both effective and efficient.
When listening to the hon. Member, one sometimes almost thinks that nothing in this difficult world ever goes right. During the last year things have gone remarkably well for the Government in the defence world. In speeches, many other hon. Members and I have for some time been concentrating on mobility and on the special duty of the Commonwealth to prevent what are called brushfires from becoming world wars. That is why we have successively supported the Government in connection with the Commando carriers, the new generation of carriers, better transport aricraft, new landing craft and more and better helicopters.
During the last few weeks it has been fairly clearly demonstrated that


although we arc working on a shoestring we have been able to meet our commitments quickly and efficiently. It does not worry me that we are having to use our strategic reserve. As the Prime Minister said, that is exactly what a strategic reserve is for. I disagree entirely with the hon. Member for Dudley on this point. In this rather flexible age we must be prepared to use our other reserves. I am not nearly so frightened as he is about calling up reserves. On several occasions between the two wars we called up reserves. When I was in China, in the Shanghai Defence Force, we called up a lot of reserves, and in the world of full employment that we now have we must get into a new way of thinking about calling up reserves when they are needed—which we hope will be very seldom.
That is why I was interested when the idea of "Ever-readies" was introduced. I thought that it was a good idea, although I was somewhat critical of it, because it seemed to me that it put a little too much emphasis on special categories. In my opinion, it was made unnecessarily complicated, and I think that is one reason why it has not gone as well as it should have. As the hon. Member said, there are now between 4,000 and 5,000 "Ever-readies" who would be available for call-up. When my right hon. Friend replies I hope that he will tell us a little more about the "Ever-readies"—whether he has any ideas about changing the way in which they are selected and called up, and also whether sufficient education is going on in industry, so that it fully understands the need, in this new world, of having men who are willing to go back and serve their country in time of need. From my experience I believe that many firms would be quite ready and content to work on those lines if the situation were properly explained to them.
I also hope that my right hon. Friend will reconsider the question whether the financial inducements are sufficiently attractive. The risk of call-up may not be a great one, but the reserves must be prepared to be called up. The idea should be made so attractive to good men who have enjoyed their time in the Services that they will be ready to go back and serve their country, and be well paid for doing so.
As I attempted to indicate at the beginning of my speech, we have a special position, among all the nations which are attempting to prevent war breaking out, in dealing with brush fires. But there is a definite relationship between that sort of work and the nuclear problem, which the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister were discussing at great length earlier today. Things are not so complicated as some experts would have us believe. There is a real danger of what is known as nuclear blackmail.The fact that we have a deterrent of our own prevents that being effective, and enables us to do what we believe to be right. That, surely, is the right and duty of every country.
Among those people who attack our nuclear deterrent there is always a temptation to talk about our "poor little deterrent". This is a mistake. Today we heard the Leader of the Opposition say that all that could be done with the present British nuclear weapon was to take revenge after death. But that is the sort of thing which prevents war. That is what is meant by a deterrent. It is effective, and it is vitally important, and any Government who deliberately did away with a would not be serving the best interests of the country.
We have now been told quite clearly, and for the first time, that if a Labour Government were returned to power this country would take no more personal responsibility for a nuclear deterrent, either in respect of Polaris or of the nuclear bombs carried by our V-bombers—if they were carried at all. If there were a Labour Government we should completely discard our nuclear deterrent. That is a mutter upon which the country must make up its mind at the next General Election.
One of the arguments put forward by the Shadow Minister of Defence in last year'sdebate was that a considerable problem was involved in relying on America to help us in all circumstances, and that the fear of they themselves being the subject of atomic attack was so great that there was considerable doubt of America's coming in to help us at a critical moment. That, by itself, is an argument for maintaining a deterrent over which we have control.
I have not used the word "independent"in connection with the deterrent for a long time. I am satisfied that we


have a deterrent over which we have personal control.
I wish now to turn for a moment to another matter which has been discussed, the M.M.F. While, as I believe, we are maintaining an insurance by having a nuclear deterrent, and while we are devoting as much as we can afford to conventional weapons, I think that it would be a great mistake if we dissipated manpower and training—these things are much more important than money—by having a mixed-manned N.A.T.O. fleet. It is far more important that we devote all our attention to training manpower to carry out the very important duty of being able to put out brush fires which we, more than any other country in the N.A.T.O. alliance, are in a position to do. I should disagree strongly with any policy which committed us to having a mixed-manned force.
I do not say that it could not be done. It would be like playing golf backhanded. One could do so if one wished, but it would be a silly way to tackle the game. There would be no real practical difficulties about having a mixed force which could not be overcome, but it is would be a complete waste and not the sort of things that we ought to be doing to keep the peace. We cannot afford to let down our allies by wasting our efforts in that direction. Although I recognise the important political arguments in favour of it, I think that, as it is at present, the N.A.T.O. deterrent, or the deterrent protecting Europe, is sufficient. It was the Leader of the Liberal Party who said that under no circumstances should we have to build special ships for this. But if we had a nuclear fleet of surface ships, we should have to construct new ships which would be an added complication. There would be new training methods needed, and that is why this pressure on training and manpower should be avoided at all costs.
I wish to ask a question about Sarawak. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey). One of my constituents was in command of a detachment which actuallycaptured one of these Armalite rifles. These are terrible weapons. They have an enormously high velocity and there is a terrible shock effect when the target is hit. I understand that the rifles

have been turned down by the American Army since they would be right outside the terms of The Hague or the Geneva Convention. Here is a weapon which is considered so dangerous, lethal and thoroughly unpleasant that the American Army has turned it down.
What is it doing in Sarawak, and why have our men to face this weapon? I wish to ask the Minister to ensure thatone of these weapons is brought to this country and tested and the results carefully tabulated, and that we represent the circumstances to the United States. We cannot allow this sort of thing to go on. My hon. Friend referred to buses for Cuba and that sort of thing. But it is rather ridiculous that these things should be happening where our men are fighting and being killed. We must be quite blunt in indicating that we do not want that sort of thing to happen. I can understand that there should be American equipment there. But not this sort of equipment which is too unpleasant for the Americans themselves to handle.
My second point also concerns Sarawak and it refers to the handling of what one might call the political side of warfare. Since the war we have had some quite effective "adventures"—if one cares to call them that. Our troops have proved effective in the prosecution of various small wars in which we have been engaged. They have been efficient and have been on the spot at the right time. But so often we seem to lose the good effect gained by quick and effective action because we have not pushed home the lesson politically to those in a position to learn.
I believe that we are acting honourably and rightly in assisting Malaysia in its confrontation by Indonesia. But are we making plain to everyone concerned why we are doing so? To me this is just as important as any other aspect. We should drive home the political side of the lesson by modern means of propaganda and also by any local methods. I am sure that there are local methods of getting our message across and these should be studied.
I do not think that there is anything abnormal about the situation at present. We are having to fight disciplinary wars all over the world. But we must be ready and proud to do so, because it is


part of our duty. By so doing we are saving thousands of lives. The other day I was reading the Book of Ezra about those who built the Temple with a sword in one hand. If we are to build the new Jerusalem we must do the same.

7.27 p.m.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: I hope that the hon. Member for Horncastle (Sir J. Maitland) will forgive me for not following his arguments. I will take up one or two of the points he made, but I start from a different angle.From my point of view the whole of this debate is rather unreal, because it rests on sturdily ignoring the fact that we cannot defend anything with weapons which, if used, would destroy everything. The idea of playing power politics with nuclear weapons by using them to back one's own view of one's rights and interests in disputes, is not only contrary to the terms of the U.N. Charter but sheer suicidal insanity.
Having made that reservation of my fundamental position, I wish to say that within the assumptions of this debate it seems to me that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition knocked the Government's so-called independent, so-called British, so-called deterrent policy for six—clean over the pavilion. And the Prime Minister pretty well demolished the Opposition's policy of international control of nuclear weapons, including American nuclear weapons, through N.A.T.O. The fact is that both sides are trying to compensate, by cherishing their own brand of illusion, for their failure to recognise the fact that the price we must pay for staying unconditionally in N.A.T.O. is to accept annihilation without representation at the hands of the United States.
The very nature of nuclear weapons makes instant decisions necessary, and the distribution of power within N.A.T.O. makes unanswerable the American argument that they must be the Power which takes those decisions. As I elaborated that argument when we last debated these matters, on 2nd July, I will not go into it again.
I should like for a moment to glance at the policy put from this side of the House before I deal with the Government's policy. I regard the Government's policy as thoroughly bad all the way through and the Labour policy as

good in spots, like the curate's egg. I will take the two spots which seem to me to be good. The first is the categorical rejection of annihilation without representation. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition put that categorically in the House on 31st January and again when he was in Washington soon afterwards.
The second good point is Labour's refusal to admit any part of Germany to any form of participation, direct or indirect, in the control of nuclear weapons. This again was stated categorically by the Leader of the Opposition on 31st January and again in the House on 3rd July. This is a good position and is certainly accepted not only by the overwhelming majority of hon. Members on this side of the House, but, I believe, by the overwhelming majority of public opinion in this country.
However, we have recently had highly sponsored proposals from certain Members on this side of the House for giving Germany equal rights in N.A.T.O. through sharing in a four-Power directorate which would plan and control the occasions on which nuclear weaponsmight be used through N.A.T.O. Either such a plan envisages genuine collective control of nuclear weapons, in which cast; it is contrary to Labour policy for excluding Germany from participation in such control, or the reservation in the plan that the United States alone should have its finger on the nuclear trigger means that the whole plan is a kind of fig leaf to conceal the nakedness of surrender to annihilation without representation, and in that case also it is contrary to the policy of this party. In any case, the whole scheme is totally unreal. It is not militarily feasible and it is politically unacceptable to the United States.
In point of fact, the Government accept annihilation without representation. They boast that they did so in the case of Cuba, when the United States resorted to force in violation of the Charter and brought us to the brink of annihilation in a nuclear war by decisions in which we had no share whatever. But they know that the people of this country will not have it and so they conceal it by this elaborate pretence, with which my right hon.


Friend the Leader of the Opposition dealt forcefully and cogently, that through the Nassau Agreement and the grace and favour nuclear deterrent force supplied by the United States and amounting to about 2 per cent. of the American force, they are to be able to take their own line even when the United States does not support them.
My right hon. Friend dealt with the pretence that if we doubted that the United States would allow us to get away with starting a nuclear war against their wishes, we were implying doubt about whether the Americans would fulfil their obligations. Of course the United States never contemplated for a moment that any of its allies should be provided with nuclear weapons in order to start a nuclear war of its own and involve the United States in such a war, for it would be almost impossible to isolate it.
Some time ago, Walter Lippmann wrote a strong warning when this doctrine was being put forward here and said that the first thing that would happen if any serious attempt to act in this way were made would be that the United States would repudiate the alliance, and that this was the quickest way to smash up N.A.T.O. I should not grieve too much if N.A.T.O. were smashed up, but I am telling right hon. Gentlemen opposite, who have a greater love for N.A.T.O. than I have, what would happen.
As an extension of this humbug, there is the valiant pretence that with our relatively little grace and favour force—relativelysmall because standards of genocide are pretty high now—we shall be able to win friends and influence people, or, as the Prime Minister put it, have added influence and authority in the councils of the nations. The test ban treaty is adduced as anexample of this. The Government's share in producing this agreement is exaggerated. I shall not go into this again as I dealt with it in July. The main argument is that we would not have been at Moscow at all if we had not been a nuclear Power.
I turn that argument around and say that if this country had long ago renounced its vain attempt to be a nuclear Power, we would probably have avoided

the complications with General de Gaulle, who probably would not have started to try to be a nuclear Power if we had not preceded him. The chances are that we would have reached a better test ban agreement sooner. But that is a historical might-have-been and there is no way of proving it.
What is demonstrable is that the whole agreement could have been concluded through the 18-Power disarmament commission in Geneva, where all the basic work was done. Only the finishing touches were put to it in Moscow, and the only reason why a separate meeting was held in Moscow, instead of finishing the job in Geneva, was as a kind of sop to the importunate desire of the Government to have an Ersatz summit conference for pre-election purposes. The idea that we played a great part in the agreements at the Moscow Conference by being a nuclear Power and that we could not have played it if we had not been a nuclear Power, and that the job could not have been finished with the other members of the 18-Power disarmament commission in Geneva is sheer nonsense, to put it politely.
On the question of the influence of possessing nuclear weapons; I recall a remark of The Times on 25th February, 1959, when this claim was being pressed, when it said that the only result of possessing nuclear weapons so far had been to get blueprints of American weapons rather than political influence in Washington, and that so far as we enjoyed political influence in Washington, it was due to non-military factors, such as our reputation for political common sense and stability.
As right hon. and hon. Members opposite are ready to throw in our teeth, the, as I regard it, unfortunate remark in a bad speech by Aneurin Bevan in 1957, about not going naked into the conference chamber, I will permit myself to quote a remark in which he readjusted the situation. Speaking in the House on 20th February, 1958 he said:
I do not believe that the possession of the hydrogen bomb is worth while from the point of view of negotiation…
An instrument of suicide can never be an instrument of negotiation…One cannot leave the conference chamber and say, 'Unless I get my own way I shall commit suicide'."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th February, 1958; Vol. 582, c. 1409–10.]


There is also the remark, which I apologise for quoting again but which must be understood and rubbed in, which was made by Mr. George F. Kennan, former head of the policy planning staff of the State Department in broadcasts in this country in November and December, 1958, when he said:
The beginning of understanding rests in this appalling problem with the recognition that the weapon of mass destruction is a sterile and hopeless weapon…which cannot in any way serve the purposes of a constructive and hopeful foreign policy. The suicidal nature of this weapon renders it unsuitable both as a sanction of diplomacy and as the basis of an alliance.
That is the basic truth of the matter.
The most pernicious argument of all those used by the Government in defence of their nuclear deterrent policy was used by the Prime Minister. On this point my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was tookind to him when he said that he did not believe for a moment that the Government seriously contemplated resorting to nuclear weapons against another nuclear Power, namely, the Soviet Union, without the support of the United States. The Prime Minister gave a rather ambiguous reply on that. He spoke of resorting to nuclear weapons independently when Britain was in mortal peril, implying again the belief that if we were in mortal peril the Americans would not stand by us, which is a rather odd point of view.
However, in another place the Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, went much further on 26th June last and said:
We are the sole judges…as to when, if at all, we might want to use our own deterrent in the supreme national interest. This is a recognition of the fact that we are a world power and that threats to our vital interests may occur outside Europe and outside the Nato area."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 26th June, 1963; Vol. 251, c. 278–9.]
I should have thought that it was a vital interest to survive. It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which it is of supreme national interest to fry the people of this country alive. But apparently that is the meaning of this policy.
It was elaborated in the Conservative Party's Weekly Newsletter, to which the Leader of the Opposition referred, on 11th January as follows:

Suppose we did not have our own deterrent, and of r interests in some part of the world were threatened, perhaps several years hence. We should move forces".
To begin with, that policy totally disregards the United Nations and its Charter and obligations as though they had no relevance to the situation. When there are threats to vital interests or serious international disputes the matter should be dealt with through the United Nations by the civilised means prescribed in he Charter, and not by gun boat diplomacy.

Sir A. V. Harvey: I take it that the hon. Member would allow for the fact that there would be occasions when it might be necessary to move British troops very quickly in order to safeguard British lives. Or would he prefer us to wait to deal with the matter through the normal channels of the United Nations while British lives are, perhaps, being lost in the interim?

Mr. Zilliacus: The thing to do is to organ se the Security Council procedure and methods and have a small international force so that that kind of police action can be taken promptly.

Sir A. V. Harvey: But it is not so organised.

Mr. Zilliacus: Then we had better get down to doing that instead of talking nonsense about the nuclear deterrent.
The quotation continues:
Suppose the Russians or Chinese objected and said 'Stop, or we blast your island with H-bombs'. Our only hope would be that America would say, 'If you do that we obliterate Moscow or Peking'. The Americans might not necessarily think that our interests were as vital as we did, might not necessarily think it wise to put their own cities at risk in an issue with which they did not feel immediately concerned. In that event, we should have no option but to give in to nuclear blackmail. But with a nuclear deterrent under our own control, neither Russia nor anybody else could make any such threat—or even gamble on the possibility of America standing aside. They would know that wholly unacceptable damage would be inflicted on them whether America intervened or not.
If this is to be taken at face value—and it is an elaboration of what the Prime Minister said as Foreign Secretary on 26th June—the Government are telling the country that with our 2 per cent. nuclear force we are prepared to take armed action in some remote part of the world, not a part of the British


Commonwealth, in order to defend what they regard as interests by the traditional methods ofpower politics, in total disregard of the Charter, and to back that by courting nuclear annihilation. Considering that twelve ten-megaton H-bombs would wipe this country out and that the Russians have thousands of them and hundreds of medium-range rockets to deliver them, the whole thing is a piece of rodomontade and braggadocio which is either suicidal madness or a very low attempt to appeal to the electorate on a very low level.
There has been nothing like it since Neville Chamberlain, in October, 1938, said that we were "almost terrifyingly strong" and on 22nd February, 1939, followed it up with the ringing declaration:
Our arms are so great that, without taking into accountthe Dominions' contribution, 'come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock them' ".
That kind of nonsense was spoken then and similar nonsense is now being spoken by a Conservative Government and, not unfittingly, by a Prime Minister who is an unrepentant Municheer even bereft of the wisdom of hindsight, because he declared in the Observer in September, 1962, that Chamberlain had been right to try to appease Hitler. It is a terrifying spectacle and prospect, but we know that he is not long for this world politically.
I propose in my constituency—and I am sure that many of my hon. Friends will do it too—to take the offensive and to ask the electors, "Do you want to be cremated by the Tories or will you make peace with Labour?" That is one way of putting the issue. It is the way that hon. Members oppositehave asked for, and they are going to get it.
The Government have no policy formaking peace, for the simple reason that they put preparations for war, in the shape of preserving N.A.T.O., first and subordinate any policy for making peace to that. On the other hand, the Labour Party is committed to the principle, enunciated by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) in the defence debate on 4th March, when he was speaking for the party from the Opposition Front Bench, namely, that the firstprinciple of defence

is that defence policy must be the servant…of foreign policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 56.]
Contrast that with what the Foreign Secretary said on 15th November, when he laid down the principle that
no agreements can be reached with the East and no negotiations conducted which are likely to impair the cohesion of the Western Alliance".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th November, 1963; Vol. 684, c. 506.]
That means surrendering beforehand to the political blackmail of the most intransigent and backward ally.
As an example of that, may I ask where the Government stand as regards a settlement in Europe? They still stand where they stood about 12 years ago. They believe that Germany must be united by free elections, which is a policy about 10 or 12 years out of date. The last time that it had practical relevance was 1952, before the emergence of two German States. The second and worst part of that policy is that a united Germany should be free to be a member of N.A.T.O. The Government have said again and again in connection with disarmament that, whatever happens, we must do nothing which would upset the balance of power. But when it comes to foreign policy they put forward proposals which would completely overthrow the balance of power and which are entirely unacceptable as a basis of negotiation, and they know it. The Government therefore are stuck with policies which make a settlement impossible in Europe, in order to preserve N.A.T.O.
We find the sameattitude in their belief that there is a political reason for a multilateral nuclear force, namely, to strengthen the Alliance. The real political reason against a multilateral nuclear force, which was set forth with vigour by the Leader of the Oppositionon 3rd July last, is that it would completely wreck any possibility of a settlement in Europe with the Soviet Union. It would once more be a case of sabotaging peace for the sake of continuing and stepping up war preparations. That is what the Governmentstand for.
On the other hand, the Labour Party has a policy of disengagement, starting with the Rapacki Plan, a policy for uniting Germany through the efforts of


the Germans from both sides within a framework guaranteed by the powers of disengagement,collective security and disarmament, and at some stage with a plebiscite to ratify the agreement reached, which is feasible as a basis of negotiation and which could lead to a settlement. The same applies to Labour's provisional proposals over Berlin. Finally, Labour has proclaimed the principle, which I have enunciated, about subordinating defence to foreign policy.
The way out of the difficulty is to take that principle seriously. We should begin by revising our so-to-speak unilateral commitments in the Commonwealth. My view is that Malaysia is a misbegotten monster which needs re-negotiating or de-negotiating like the Central African Federation. I am not in favour of trying to prop up all that by pouring in more and more British troops until we have hadanother look at the situation and have tried to produce a community that can stand on its own feet.
Similarly, the Constitution and status of Cyprus need a thorough revision. Cyprus should be neutralised, and there should be a United Nations treaty guaranteeing the rights of the Turkish minority, as well as an international guarantee against interference in Cyprus's, internal affairs by Turkey or anyone else.
Again, we should cut our defence commitments according to our foreign policy. With our foreign policy, we can come to terms with the Soviet Union from common interest and cease having to chase the will o'the wisp of negotiation from strength. We do not need conventional or nuclear forces to induce the Russians to negotiate on the Rapacki Plan, which they themselves support. That also goes for all Labour's proposals for a settlement. That means that we could drastically cut our forces in N.A.T.O. If de Gaulle was entitled to take most of his forces out of N.A.T.O. in order to fight a colonial war in Algeria without being accused of breaking his obligations to N.A.T.O., we are equally entitled to do the same in conformity with our policy for making peace.
Since N.A.T.O. comes into operation only in cases of unprovoked aggression,

we have a perfect right to tell our Allies that as longas they pursue policies that we regard us provocative they have no right to expect British help, and will not get it; that in order to make the collective defence obligations of N.A.T.O. cease to be a dead letter, they must come to terms with us on a basis of negotiation with the Soviet Union, and that basis of negotiation, with Labour's proposals for disengagement and regional disarmament, would entail a progressive winding-up of both N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Alliance and the substitution for them of all-European collective security arrangements based on the Charter.
These arts the things that should have first priority. We should not discuss defence in isolation from foreign policy, but should give priority to considering how to reach an agreement on disarmament and the settlement of Europe that would obviate the necessity of spending more and more of our resources and making heavier drains on our manpower. There must be an initiative to put an end to the arms race, and allthis nonsense. The only country that can take that initiative successfully is this country, and I believe that we can do so only when we get a new Government.

7.53 p.m.

Mr. John Hall: I am a little alarmed that the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) has resumedhis seat so quickly. He has spoken for less than half an hour. I trust that he is not unwell, because this is so unlike him—though I am most appreciative. I want to take up one or two of his points before I turn to the main part of my speech. The hon. Member said that in his own constituency, and, he thought, in many other constituencies that will be fought by members of the Labour Party, the catch-phrase would be, "Be cremated with the Tories or make peace with Labour". Do I understand that he is announcing that the official Labour Party policy is that it will have no truck at all with nuclear weapons, will take no part in any alliance that may have nuclear weapons in its armoury, and will renounce, root and branch, nuclear arms of all kinds? Is that the official Labour Party policy to be announced at the next election?

Mr. Zilliacus: Perhaps I may reassure the hon. Member. I am not expressing the Labour Party's official policy. I do not think that he needs to be informed on this point but, to make assurance double sure, I will tell him that. I hope that he feels happier.

Mr. Hall: I do not know whether I feel happier, but I am sure that the Opposition Front Bench does.
I do not want to make any party points. I want to express my own personal views, which I do not know are shared with one party or the other. I do not think that defence is an occasion to make party points and I shall try to keep away from that danger—though the old Adam may come out. The last time on which I took part in a defence debate was in January of last year, and before that it was in February, 1961. Reading back through those debates, I find it difficult to find anything that I then said that I would now wish to alter.
I find that a little depressing, because I should like to have been shown that I was wrong in suggesting that our conventional forces were inadequate for the tasks that would face them, I should like to have been shown that I was wrong in suggesting that the conventional forces were not properly balanced and, particularly, I should like to have been shown that I was wrong in suggesting that we had no reason to continue as an independent nuclear Power when our present contribution to the N.A.T.O. forces ceases to be effective. I cannot see in the developments in recent months or years anything at all that makes me change my views.
I believe, and many of those who have spoken have made a similar point, that our conventional forces are, at the moment, strained to the utmost. Some years ago, the Hull Committee made an assessment of the forces we should require to meet the then known and the future anticipated commitments. In making that assessment, the Committee took into account a figure of some 55,000 troops in B.A.O.R., it took into account that the troop commitment in Cyprus would run down, it took into account our treaty and moral obligations in the Middle East, the Near East and the Far East, and arrived at a figure of between

200,000 and 220,000 troops, including 15,000 Gurkhas. Our present strength is about 171,000, plus 15,000 Gurkhas.
As I stand here at this moment, I am not apparently in any danger of suffering a personal disaster, but I can tell the House in strictest confidence that whereas I normally rely on fourbrace buttons I have at present only two, through circumstances beyond my control within the last hour or so. It is quite clear that although all seems normal on the surface, if a sudden unexpected strain is imposed upon me I shall quite probably face disaster, and, like the country if it has to face another crisis that strains our conventional forces still more, I shall be caught with my trousers down. That is not an inapt simile between myself and the nation as a whole, and this problem has bedevilled us ever since the end of the war when we ran our conventional forces down. No side has really faced up to this with real courage because all of them have always had an eye on the electorate.
If the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) will listen to me for a moment, I want to refer to "Wigg's Law". In the debate in February, 1961, the hon. Member adumbrated a new law that he had discovered—Wigg's Law. This law was to the effect that there was only a given number of men in the country who enjoyed service in the Armed Forces, that no matter what we did by way of encouragement the number did not increase and that if we so improved pay or conditions as to produce a temporary upsurge in recruitment, all we did was to mortgage the future. I think that I have fairly summarised Wigg's Law—

Mr. Wigg: I did not dicover that law in 1961. My discoveries always go back to 1066, but the hon. Member only heard it, or understood it, in 1961.

Mr. Hall: The hon. Member does me an injustice. I have never had any difficulty in understanding what he says although I sometimes get a little tired by listening to it at length. But I understand it only too well. I think I am right in saying, however, that he dignified it with the name of a law only in that particular debate.
It is a great problem to build up one's conventional forces to the size one may


desire by the ordinary processes of recruitment. On the Government side, it has been stated on one or two occasions, especially recently, that we have no great problem confronting us as a result of the present size of our force, that it is sufficient, with our reserves, to meet our present commitments and, presumably, any anticipated future commitments. On the other hand, the Opposition believe that our conventional forces should be very much strengthened, presumably, in terms of manpower and fire-power. They suggest various ways by which this could be done—the redeployment of forces, a change, perhaps, in the priority of commitments as between Europe and other parts of the world, and other methods of recruiting. For instance, the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), in a letter to The Times not long ago, suggested that there were other parts of the Commonwealth from which we might draw recruits.
All these suggestions have been advanced for improving and increasing the size of our conventional forces. But, in the end, if we agree that the forces must be larger and nearer, for instance, to 200,000, we shall, I am certain, have to come down to some form ofselective conscription. I do not believe that there is any escape from it. The hon. Member for Dudley rightly pointed out that selective conscription, or a form of selective service, goes on already, that it is embodied in the Army Reserve Act, 1962. Indeed, it happened under the previous National Service system. In his interesting article some days ago, the military correspondent of the Daily Telegraph gave a figure of, I think, 325,000 men in 1960 who were registered on attaining the age of 18. When one cut out all the exemptions, the miners, the Merchant Navy people, all those in Northern Ireland and everyone else entitled to exemption from National Service, one came down to about 86,000 out of the original total of 325,000 men of 18 who would otherwise be eligible to serve. We were practising a form of selective conscription then.
I do not believe that it would create such great difficulties if we had to do it again. The only thing is that both parties fight shy of making the announcement and saying that this is

likely to be the intention because they believe that it would be very unpopular with the electorate. In my view, we have got to do it. I believe that we shall not have an effective fighting force until we get the troops we require.
I do not want to say very much about our position as an independent nuclear Power. I deployed my arguments and expressed my view on this in the debate last year, and I shall not weary the House by repeating what I said then. All I do say is that I incline to the viewexpressed in the resolution passed by the British Council of Churches, on which members of both parties as well as of all Churches are represented. If the House will permit me, I shall read part of what was said by the Council. It sums up my own views, even if it does not sum up the views of anyone else except the Council itself.
On page 40 of the leaflet circulated to hon. Members, it is said:
In the light of what has been said above, Christians in Britain who believe that the way out of the present human predicament lies in the willingness of nations to give a lead in devising methods of supernational control of nuclear weapons will conclude that it would be preferable to surrender the status of an independent British nuclear power, if"—
I stress the word "if"—
if it is likely thereby to establish more effective joint NATO machinery for controlling the deterrent of the Western Alliance as a whole, and to arrest the tendency towards a proliferation of national nuclear forces within the Alliance".
I think that I carry the House with me thus far.
Britain has already virtually given up the right to take independent action within the NATO area".
I am not sure whether that may not be a little optimistic.
The Working Group considers that there is no case for independent nuclear action—that is, without prior consultation with our Allies—in any part of the world.
By and large, that sums up my own view as to the future part we can play in the deployment of nuclear weapons and the contribution we can make to N.A.T.O. in that way.

Mr. Paget: Will the hon. Gentleman agree also that it is a very accurate statement of the Labour Party's position as described by my right hon. Friend?

Mr. Hall: I should not like to say whether it is an accurate statement of the Labour Party's position. I do say, however, that it is a very accurate statement of mine. I do not necessarily have to leave these benches in order to express a view about it.
However, neither we nor any other country can pool its nuclear weapon resources in N.A.T.O. or make them available to N.A.T.O. unless there is adequate machinery within the N.A.T.O. organisation itself to control those weapons. Furthermore, it is difficult to do so unless all the nuclear Powers do it, and in this I include France. France has been a stumbling-block in all the attempts made to get the nuclear Powers to pool their weapons.
President de Gaulle has made very clear that France intends to go on retaining the nuclear weapon as an independent national weapon. Nevertheless, I thought that I detected a slight weakening in this position during the conference of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians last September. I thought that the French delegates indicated a French willingness to come together with the other nuclearPowers and to pool their weapons and resources of scientific manpower with the other nations, on certain conditions.
That was the first time I noted any weakening in the previously intransigent French attitude, and it may be that we could pursue this and, perhaps, find that all the nuclear Powers concerned could devise a way of preparing the right machinery in N.A.T.O. to give adequate control over nuclear weapons and make certain that all of us could play a full part in the development of the kind of weapons which N.A.T.O. requires, not necessarily by the outpouring of enormous sums of money on the production of missiles but by the provision of scientific ability and "know-how", of which we have a great richness. I believe that this could play a great part in the strengthening of N.A.T.O.
This leads me to consider the problems of the N.A.T.O. organisation as it now exists. In my view, there are certain changes which it is essential to make. First, there should be developed a N.A.T.O. weapons organisation which would state the requirements for N.A.T.O.

weapons. At present, what happens is that individual nations produce weapons which are basically designed to meet their own national requirements. We produce something which we may need to use in different parts of the world in quite different conditions. The French may produce one, the Belgians and the Germans may do likewise, and each tries to "flog"his weapon to N.A.T.O. N.A.T.O. should have a staff which could state its requirements for weapons to suit N.A.T.O. needs, and it should then go out to have the weapons made by those countries capable of doing it. Instead of there being competition to try to sell to N.A.T.O. a particular tank, for instance, which we have produced to meet our own needs, things should work the other way.
Second, and most important, we must develop an organisation which can effectively control nuclear weapons and which, at the same time, is able to act resolutely and effectively in time of emergency. The problem of the N.A.T.O. Powers being confronted with a decision on whether or not it was the right time to use a nuclear weapon is a horrifying one. Obviously, 14 nations cannot have all their fingers on the button. If they do, it will never be pressed, and the other side will knowperfectly well that it will not be pressed. There must be a very much smaller body than we have now. At present, whether we like it or not, the decision is taken by the President of the United States. We must find a way of producing the right organisationwithin N.A.T.O. itself.
I noted with interest that a previous Minister of Defence, at a conference of the Institute of Strategic Studies which took place at Oxford, I think, in September last, suggested the establishment of a small sub-committee which would comprise the three nuclear Powers plus certain non-nuclear Powers, of which Germany would probably have to be one. He suggested that to that committee could be delegated the authority to take the decision in the event of an emergency. I can see objections to this, but, none the less, I am certain that we must find an answer to the problem, even if it means surrendering a certain amount of sovereignty in so doing. I question whether N.A.T.O.'s responsibilities cover a wide enough sphere.
I recall making a speech five or six years ago in which I drew attention to the weaknesses of the flanks of N.A.T.O. They remain. N.A.T.O. should be considering the developments in parts of the world which are at present outside its immediate influence and which may be covered now by CENTO and S.E.A.T.O. It is as much of interest to N.A.T.O what developments take place in, say, India or China as what developments take place in Europe. If we are to strengthen the flanks of N.A.T.O. it must have a closer liaison, and perhaps overall control, over the areas which are now within the sphere and influence of CENTO and S.E.A.T.O., although those bodies were formed on a slightly different basis and for a different reason.
I do not wish to delay the House and I will refer lastly to disarmament. We discuss defence because it is the essential requirement of a nation which lives in a world in which we have not yet learned to live at peace with one another. We all pray for complete and utter disarmament and that the threat of war canbe removed for ever more. Unfortunately, human nature being what it is, it is, perhaps, a rather optimistic thought on our part. We must pursue the target of disarmament with every means in our power and we must accept partial steps towards this ultimate goal, but it is my strong conviction—and I have expressed this view before—that even if we were successful by agreement in producing complete disarmament, in both nuclear and conventional arms, this by itself would not remove the threat of war.
We could abolish all arms overnight, but we could not destroy the knowledge of how to make them. If nations found causes to disagree in the future it would be a matter of a comparatively short time before they were producing the same kind of weapons as they had before. The real problem is that somehow, in human nature, there is a desire for conflict. This is sometimes described as the "death wish". It is implanted for perhaps reasons of self-survival and it operates in all sorts of ways. Until we carry out research into the basic causes of war—what makes human beings decide to follow a lead or individuals to initiate a movement towards war which they know in their heart of

hearts will result in annihilation—I do not believe we will solve the problem of disarmament.
This problem goes far deeper than mere paper agreements, the machinery of technical control or the burning on bonfires of a certain number of weapons. This is a human problem which affects human beings and which lies within therealm of psychologists. Some countries are already carrying out research into this problem, although on a small scale. In Canada, Holland and Sweden movements have been started among scientists and others to carry out basic research on this topic. I hopethat it will be possible—although this may be regarded as a rather airy-fairy suggestion—for the Government to encourage work of this kind in Britain, but unless we can solve it we will not solve the real problem of disarmament.

8.15 p.m.

Mr. J. J. Mendelson: The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) referred at the end of his speech to the problem of disarmament and urged the Minister of Defence to comment on the desirability of conducting research in certain spheres. I would like to add to that a request for the right hon. Gentleman to refer to the instructions he proposes to send to the British delegation when the disarmament talks are resumed.
The hon. Member for Wycombe put his finger on an important point when he said that all our discussions on defence make sense in the second half of the 20th century only if they are always linked to our policies for disarmament. This is common ground, and I refer to it briefly now because I intend tonight to raise an important point of policy which is much more controversial.
The Prime Minister was today more forthcoming in his statement on the proposed multilateral nuclear force than he has ever been before. It was high time that he told the House of Commons in more detail what was in his mind on this topic, particularly since any reader of the American Press must be aware that a great deal more has been said in America on this subject by members of Her Majesty's Government than has been said in the House of Commons. I urge the Minister of Defence to elaborate upon the Prime Minister's statement. The


Prime Minister said that, politically, he was, on balance, in favour of Britain joining in an effort to create a multilateral nuclear force but that he wanted to find out by an experiment, which was now being started, whether it was practically feasible.
I regret that the Minister of Defence was not in his place—though he cannot be expected to stay in his seat throughout the debate—when the hon. Member for Horncastle (Sir J. Maitland) raised the subject of the multilateral force, made some cogent remarks about the practical difficulties and mentioned a series of objections to Britain being a part of this policy. I hope that the Minister will give an assurance that when this experiment is completed, and if at that time the present Government are still in office, the country will not be committed to the multilateral nuclear force before the matter is brought for debate and decision to the House of Commons.
The Prime Minister did not give us that assurance earlier. He left the matter completely blurred and open and confined his remarks to the subject generally and said that, in his view, he was politically in favour of going in. We need an assurance that no commitment will be entered into committing this country to this policy before the House has had an opportunity of debating it.
I do not know how long the present experiment will take, or how conclusive it will be, for we have not been told the estimated time. We are entitled to know and we should be able, when asked by our constituents, to give an estimate of how long it might be before the Government reach a decision on the matter. As the House knows, decisions on future policy of this kind commit the defence policy and defence budget for five to seven years ahead. There are certain decisions of this kind which are so important in their future consequences on our general policy that they should not be taken at this stage but should be left for final decision until after the GeneralElection has been held.
I would regard it as quite unforgiveable if the Government were to commit this country to participation in the multilateral force and then, after committing

us, in the last weeks of this Parliament merely announce what they had done. We therefore need a firm assurance to night that they will approach the House first.
The political advantages which the Prime Minister sees in this proposal are his own and are by no means non-controversial. It is impossible to debate our future defence commitments without at the same time considering some of the political dangers involved in this defence policy.
As the hon. Member for Wycombe rightly said, we must always be aware of the importance of future prospects of disarmament. If this country were committed to the multilateral nuclear force with West German participation it would make 100 times more difficult any hope of successful agreement with the Soviet Union and Eastern countries on future proposals for arms limitation. I deliberately putit in terms of arms limitation and limited schemes because I am not a romantic about policies of disarmament. Like the hon. Member, I know that it will take a good many years before we can make a great deal more progress in this. In this context it is right that we should be so concerned, as we have been in this debate, about the future of our conventional forces. It is equally important that the British Government should not support or advance any defence policies which, in themselves, would create further obstacles to agreement on limitation of arms and on disarmament. We have a good case in point.
Anyone who has recently discussed this matter with any Soviet representatives, either officially or informally, will have come to the firm conviction that the Soviet Government, and indeed the Soviet people, having hoped as a follow-up of the success of the Moscow Conference that there would be a complete standstill in the pursuit of any policies that might lead to allowing other nations a share in the control of nuclear armaments, did not expect so soon after the conference that we would try to follow a policy which they regard as highly dangerous to their future long-term security. It is particularly dangerous to pursue this policy now before there has been any attempt to


implement the policies contained in the statement issued after the Moscow Conference, when there was mention of hopeful developments, perhaps for future agreement on observer posts and a proposal for a non-aggression pact.
Judging by what accredited spokesmen for the Soviet Government have recently said publicly, there can be no question but that any development of a multilateral force with German participation before any attempt has been made to make progress on these other policies would be regarded as a deliberate going back on the agreed communiquéfollowing the Moscow Conference. I attach great importance—though obviously not having the support on this point of all my hon. Friends—to the contribution made by the British Government in these negotiations. I have always said this and there is a lot of evidence for my belief. It is precisely because I take this view that I would like us not to do anything that could be interpreted as moving away from the course set at the Moscow Conference.

Mr. John Hall: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that there can be no really effective long-term disarmament unless China is included in all future disarmament agreements?

Mr. Mendelson: On general grounds, there will be agreement with that immediately on both sides of the House. Nor do I think that the Government would disagree. But here we must be realistic. While it is not legitimate for the Government to use the excuse that the Chinese and the French might be developing nuclear arms to put forward an unrealistic policy to our people, we must realise that China is developing nuclear and foreign policies which are deeply opposed by the Soviet Government. That is one of the most important factors governing the present international situation.
Indeed, I am so anxious that the Government should continue with the policy initiated as the Moscow Conference precisely because I firmly believe that the present Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev personally are, to some extent, being assailed not only abroad but also, one is told, by some supporters at home for the policy they are pursuing and because I think that the Chinese are

beginning to have some success in convincing some members of Mr. Khrushchev's movement that his policy is not tough enough. It is therefore even more important at the present time to put forward proposals to show that the policy initiated in Moscow last summer is successful.
I urge again that the Minister give us a categorical assurance about the multilateral force. The matter is made all the more urgent by the fact that the whole process of introducing either West Germany or East Germany into participation in the control of nuclear arms is wholly founded on false assumptions. According to a reliable report some time ago, there was a conference between the East German Government and the Soviet Government when the East Germans said they would like to be supplied with a very modern form of rocket which, although it would not be equipped with nuclear arms, would have nuclear capability as well as conventional capability. The Soviet Government turned it down. I am sure that information became known to the Minister and the Foreign Office soon after their meeting occurred.
It is very important to realise that once the Federal Republic were allowed to participate in the control of nuclear arms, though associated with other Powers in doing so, it would become all the more difficult to prevent further proliferation of nuclear arms. Moreover, the arguments based on claims for parity also have no foundation. The Treaty of Paris is not founded on the conception of parity. There is no treaty obligation for parity of the Federal Republic in nuclear arms. This House has never, indeed, approved that argument.
Indeed, the Prime Minister today, in a significant passage, said that one of the reasons why he was, on balance, in favour of the multilateral force was that it would be accompanied by the firm continuation of the policy of the German Federal Republic that it did not want nuclear weapons of its own. But recent discussions in Western Germany have pointed in different directions.
There have been many statements by members of the majority party, including the Minister of Defence, which point in the direction of the Federal Republic


merely using a multilateral force as a means of establishing the principle that Western Germany must be armed with nuclear arms, and that it would go on from there to demand a much larger share in nuclear policy later on. That is a most dangerous policy on which to embark. The Government must have nothing to do with it, but if they think of deciding otherwise they must come to the House of Commons and debate the matter before making a final decision.
I turn from that important point to the question of the equipment of N.A.T.O. and to the policies which the Government will have to pursue there in the immediate future. I think that for electoral reasons the Government have decided on their general policy, at any rate in terms of words and declarations with regard to what they call the British nuclear deterrent. This matter was effectively dealt with by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, and by several of my hon. Friends and I do not think that I need spend any further time discussing it.
There are, however, more limited policies which the Government are pursuing, as a result of which there is grave danger that the main purpose of the defence policy will not be fulfilled. I have a lot of sympathy for the point of view which has been expressed on both sides of the House that there is an aspect of defence which ought not to be controversial; that it ought to be accepted by everybody. But that aspect is very limited. What I have in mind is the simple proposition that it is the duty of any Government to ensure that our soldiers and members of the other Armed Forces are not put in an impossible position when they have to go into action; that they are provided with the kind of weapons which will be useful at the right time; and that at the same time they are not in any way put in the position where they have to resort to certain weapons because of a policy imposed on them by our strategic planners rather than by a correct military decision.
What I have in mind is the over-reliance of the B.A.O.R. and all the N.A.T.O. forces on the use of nuclear arms. Nobody who has visited our Forces there—and I know that the right

hon. Gentleman has done so frequently and quite recently—and seen the set-up can be other than greatly disturbed at the kind of imbalance which we have allowed to develop. It is said that there are so many commitments in other places that we shall have to withdraw some troops from Western Germany. The hon. Member for Wycombe said that our Forces are stretched and strained to the extreme, and no doubt the Minister of Defence will tell us a good deal more about that aspect of the matter tonight.
I have no detailed information about how far that information is correct. When the right hon. Gentleman spoke on television on his return from his visit abroad, he seemed a little more reassuring than was indicated by his hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe, but I hope that we are going to hear a good deal more about that subject and I am awaiting the Minister's assessment of the situation. No military secrets are involved. The House of Commons must be told whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that we shall be able to meet the commitments that we have assumed, whatever one might think about our future commitments or about other commitments which might have to be curtailed or altered. We have assumed certain commitments, and the House of Commons has a right to be told the Minister's assessment of the present situation.
Given the possibility that because of the dangerous situations that have arisen in some parts of the world some troops will have to be withdrawn from N.A.T.O., does not that mean that the old argument of the reliance on nuclear weapons will be emphasised all the more, and will become all the more dangerous? Is it not true to say that this doctrine of our forces being dependent on nuclear arms is one which the Government must abandon, and that here we have the real meaning of the demand that much more money must be spent on conventional forces?
In urging such a policy, I would never say, either in this House or in the country, that we would make large savings on our defence expenditure. It is conceivable that large sums of money would have to be spent on bringing our conventional forces up to date and improving their general efficiency, but


what is important is that the Government should make progress in making our forces in B.A.O.R. less dependent on the use of nuclear arms.
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the people in command in B.A.O.R. are not in a position to state positively that they could hope for a decision which would not allow them to use nuclear arms. We all know, and it has been proved time and again by Ministers of Defence in this House, that such a decision is a political one, and must be made by the Members of the Cabinet in this country and ultimately by the President of the United States who will transmit his orders to the N.A.T.O. commander, who in turn will transmit it to the other military commanders. The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that anyone who is in command of our troops there, any senior officer, when pressed on this point will have to admit that he would hope, if he had to make the decision, that he would be given the authority as early as possible, earlier rather than later.
The imbalance there is one of the grave dangers to the strategy which might be pursued if there were a limited conflict. As we are making progress improving the international situation, I think it certain that the danger of a vast war and a large invasion will recede more and more. That is no argument for weakening our forces, but it must influence the kind of balance we are giving to our forces. It does not make sense not to make progress in providing for the kind of modern conventional forces which might be used if limited action were to become necessary on the Continent.
Speaking for myself, I do not believe that in the next few years there will be any need to use forces there, but no Minister of Defence, of course, can base his policy on that assumption. He must guard against potential dangers, even those which he does not regard as highly likely. At the same time he has to keep in mind that if the political situation changes there must be a subsequent change in the kind of forces he keeps in a specific theatre.
I touch on disarmament, which has been referred to only briefly by a number of hon. Members. I assume that the resumption of the Disarmament Con-

ference will be accompanied by some new initiatives from all sides. I was very glad indeed that the Leader of the Opposition recently sent a detailed memorandum to the Foreign Secretary on the kind of disarmament proposals we ought to pursue. It is quite possible that there will not be either a foreign affairs or another defence debate before the Conference resumes.
The Minister of Defence, as a senior member of the Cabinet, must, of course, be well informed and must be consulted and given authority on any such disarmament proposals which might be put forward or supported by Her Majesty's Government Therefore, I urge him to tell the House this evening of at least the first reaction of the Government to the precise proposals sent to him by the Labour Party, It would be too bad if a defence debate like this were to be concluded without some detailed reference to the forthcoming conference and if there were no mention of the Government's first reaction to these proposals.
The matter of providing for our defence is one which continues in its importance whether we are in opposition or in Government. If there is to be a change of Government it will be as much the duty of hon. Members of the Opposition to examine critically the state of affairs they find when they come into office as it will be their duty to continue what policies we find useful and acceptable. There is no party glory in defence in that sense, but it is the duty of the Government of the day to respond to a general proposition by taking the House of Commons into their confidence as far as they can, and at the same time not trying to make party capital out of the matters which should be regarded as matters of supreme national importance.
There must be political conflict over defence and disagreement over the allocation of resources to defence policies. There must be disagreement on proposals for disarmament, and we must insist that only those which are not obstacles to arms limitations must be supported. At the same time there should be agreement on some of the basic resources and the assessment of what might be immediately necessary to make it easier for limited conventional


forces to be properly trained and, secondly, in the right position at the right time. All these things should be subject to general consultation in the House. There seems no reason at all why they should be hedged about by political considerations if the Government accept them.

8.40 p.m.

Viscount Lambton: The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) will, I hope, forgive me if owing to lack of time I do not follow some of the controversial points which he has made. We have had a debate which has been underlined by a general feeling on both sides that we are approaching a manpower crisis, which it is politically difficult for all parties to contemplate in a totally unbiased manner. The "thin red line" was one of the great myths of the nineteenth century and the thin khaki line is one of the realities of the second half of the twentieth century. What is disturbing is how events tend to extend rather than contract our liabilities all round the world.
I should like to be slightly more detailed than certain other hon. Members have been and to look piecemeal at certain positions in the world and how unlikely it is that they will not provide trouble in the future. Looking at the Mediterranean, we are engaged in Cyprus. It is unlikely that anybody, on either side of the House, would regard it as possible to take our garrison away from Cyprus. Nor should one forget that basically the garrison there is connected also with the whole security of Greece and Turkey and the position of our forces in the Middle East and in Libya. The forces in Cyprus are not there primarily to preserve the peace in that island, but as part of our defence bloc for that part of the world.
Going further south and looking at Aden, can one believe that with the recent trouble in the Yemen, the unsettled state of the succession in Saudi Arabia, the trouble in Kuwait and the uncertainty in Iraq, there is likely to be continuing peace in that area and that we can do without our garrison there? Passing over the sea to Kenya and Somalia, one again finds a generally considerably deteriorating situation.
One other question which is likely, perhaps, to involve us in difficulties in the future is the retention of British ex-civil servants in the Northern Province of Kenya and their employment under the Kenya Government. If there is a foreseeable explosion between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, it seems that we will inevitably be involved by direct association with one side of the triangle, and we may well not be on the side that we would wish.
Moving also to the Caribbean, one finds that our responsibilities are extended in number if not in size. In the old days, it was possible to look at the whole of the West Indies and British Guiana as one unit whose troubles could be solved by the dispatch of troops, a cruiser or something like that. Now, however, we have the independent States of Jamaica and Trinidad, the left-over of the Federation, which is in not at all a happy state, and the situation in British Guiana. I think it very unlikely that we will have continuing peace in British Guiana. Can we believe that this is an area where we will not need troops in the foreseeable future?
Going again round the world, this time to Singapore, one finds another deteriorating situation. Are we to believe that Soekarno is finished with his territorial ambitions in Borneo? The most frightening aspect for reflection is that in the time of crisis in Malaya, 80,000 troops were employed there to fight against, perhaps, 10,000 guerrillas.It would not be possible for us to send 80,000 troops to Borneo now. Not only is it likely that Soekarno's activities in Borneo will increase, but there remains the continuing threat to Malaya. Over its northern frontier, there are still a few hundred Communists in the jungles of Siam. It would be only too easy once again for them to infiltrate into Malaya.
Where are the troops to come from if the situations in these places deteriorate? There is not much doubt that there will be generally a slight reallocation of troops in the Far East and withdrawals from Hong Kong. The argument is put forward again and again that it is not necessary to have six or seven units in Hong Kong, on the ground that they would not be of much use against the whole force of China if she decided to


march upon Hong Kong. That is true, but what is also true is that the existing garrison of Hong Kong would probably be required to enforce order internally should there be a repetition of the riots of the late 1950s in Hong Kong. The withdrawal of two units there could well impose a great strain upon internal security for our garrison. When we think of the great value of Hong Kong to us, this is something which should be seriously considered.
For our final reserve, we come back really to Germany. In his extraordinarily able speech today, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that our defence forces should be complementary to our diplomacy, and I associate myself entirely with that view. Would it, however, aid our diplomacy in Europe, our say in the councils of N.A.T.O. and our eventual political association with Europe to have in Germany an undermanned, weak force which is constantly being withdrawn or under threat of withdrawal?
One comes, therefore, to the fact that we are under-manned. As the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) said, we have a reserve and we will continue to have it for, perhaps, two years more. In two years the reserve will have gone. It is for two years ahead that we must prepare now.
As I understood it, the Leader of the Opposition said that he would like to make approaches to discuss defence. I believe that it would be most advantageous if the whole matter of our manpower reserves could be taken out of the political arena. If it were possible to get an all-party committee to discuss this matter, it would at least be one step forward to realism and would enable all the parties to face the facts which it is most difficult and unpalatable for them to face in election year.
I turn to the Labour Party's attitude to our nuclear deterrent. The Leader of the Opposition said that for four years he had thought that we should cease to be a nuclear Power, that this had been obvious to him for four years. He said later that the two Powers alone should have nuclear weapons. Heasked that we should go forward with our disarmament. What does this mean? This is a question on which I hope that the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr.

Healey) will dwell when he winds up the debate for the Opposition.
Does this mean that the Labour Party is prepared to tell the electorate, "We will give up our nuclear deterrent independently of whether other countries do or not"? Will the Labour Party say that England shall do without a nuclear deterrent when France has one and China has one and when China is in a position not only to have one but also to give one to Egypt or Indonesia if the occasion moves her? Should some local war or other situation such as we are now facing in the Caribbean or in the Malaysian Peninsula arise, are we to have no nuclear deterrent, although other countries have it and may give the nuclear weapon or bombs to countries opposing us? Is this a responsible security risk? The hon. Member for Leeds, East must give a detailed account of what the Labour Party plans to do.
It is no good saying, "We do not want a nuclear weapon. We will keep it for a little while". Does the Labour Party, or does it not, intend to advocate the abolition of the British deterrent although other countries have it? This is the real crunch of the whole question, and I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence will dwell on the weakness of the Opposition's case when he winds up.
The Opposition's attitude is very irresponsible. How can they say, "We will do without a nuclear deterrent"? In words reminiscent of ones once used by the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus), "We will burn under the Labour Party". What the Labour Party advocates is not only that we should go, as Mr. Bevan once said, naked into the council chambers but also naked into local wars.

8.51 p.m.

Dr. Alan Thompson: In the very few minutes remaining to me there is little to do except dot a few i's and cross a few t's and answer one or two of the points which have been made, including the last point made by the noble Lord the Member for Berwick - upon - Tweed (Viscount Lambton). My hon. Friends have made clear our view that the nuclear deterrent cannot be the ultimate and overriding objective of a defence policy. Further,


it is an objective which, if pursued according to its intrinsic technical objectives, will distort our economy.
We must accept that our defence objectives are the much less spectacular but much more useful and much more flexible objectives which have been emphasised from both sides of the House. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) who is to reply, will not need much assistance from me. I will merely quote briefly from a thoughtful speech in which he recently outlined the three conventional objectives which seem to the Labour Party to take priority—the need for modern equipment; the need for transport aircraft; and the need for the recruitment and mobility of our regular forces. These are much less spectacular and much less headline catching than the great nuclear objectives.
However, these are the bread and butter needs. They are the day-to-day requirements in Malaysia and Cyprus. The type of situation which arises in defence policy is very rarely the once-for all cataclysm. It is exactly the type of local incident which may arise within the Commonwealth or outside it which requires the defence methods I have outlined.
We on this side cannot help feeling that the reasons for the emphasis on nuclear independence put forward by the Government are not primarily defensive. There are theoretical defensive reasons for it, but the use of the ultimate nuclear weapon would take place only in such an unreal situation that it should not engage our attention in the day-to-day problems which face us. We cannot help feeling that these reasons are not primarily defensive. They are partly psychological; they are partly keeping up with the Joneses. Other countries, it is argued, have the bomb. Why therefore shouldn't we?
If this is the objective, we completely repudiate it. We want to keep up with the Joneses in our social policies. We want to be the country with the best educational system in the world and with a system of social services that is an example to all. These are the objectives of national policy in which we want to keep up with the Joneses and, indeed, surpass them. We do not particularly want to keep up with the Joneses, as an

objective in itself, in the question of nuclear independence.
The point has been made several times that somebody has to set an example to stop the spread, and why not let it be ourselves? We have a reputation in world affairs for humanity, for flexibility, and for setting a pattern of decent behaviour to other countries. This is a reputation which we should continue to earn.
Hon. Members on this side of the House cannot help feeling that the question of nuclear independence may be used as an electoral weapon. This is perhaps the worst charge of all. To use a weapon as hideous as the nuclear bomb and to try to convince the British electorate that the only patriotic party is that which possesses it is, in our opinion, a thoroughly dishonest act. I may be doing them an injustice, but if the Government intend to use the possession of nuclear independence as an election weapon, and to suggest that we are unpatriotic because we oppose it, and they are the party of patriots, this propaganda will redound upon them as so many similar gimmicks have done in the past.

8.55 p.m.

Mr. Denis Healey: For the most part, this has been a thoughtful debate. Real differences of view have been discussed in what I believe to be the right way, that is to say, a non-partisan way. It is probably a mistake to aim at a bipartisan policy on a question where differences go very deep and are very sincere. On the other hand, it is vital that when we discuss real differences in respect of such an important matter we should not disagree unless we have to, and that our disagreement should be couched in as sober language as possible.
The Prime Minister opened the debate with one of his more engaging performances—simple, direct, and jaunty, almost to the point of being a little cocksure. Certainly to those who like that sort of thing, this was the sort of thing they like. But in one respect I cannot help feeling that he failed to show a quality which was very evident in the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). The Prime Minister's


speech on this subject reeked of complacency. To adapt a saying of a previous Member of this House, it seems to me that complacency has been the tsetse fly of this Administration.
Perhaps the most appalling thing about the Prime Minister's complacency, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) pointed out, was that it was 100 per cent. sincere. Nevertheless, we would all agree with him that a defence policy should be marked by realism and foresight, and that a British Government should frame a defence policy which would last, and stick to it. I could not agree more—but what an extraordinary way of describing the action of Her Majesty's Government, of which the right hon. Gentleman has been a Member for many years. The Ministry of Aviation alone is a cemetery of abandoned projects—£250 million down the drain, according to the Minister of Aviation, on 20 major projects which have been abandoned before completion.
Let us follow up the extraordinary vagaries of the Government's deterrent policy. The right hon. Gentleman who is now Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations told us in 1957 that the day of the manned bomber was over and that we must rely on the missile Blue Streak. Two years later the same Minister told us that the missile was no good and that we must go back to the manned bomber with Skybolt. At the same time he told us that the alternative, Polaris, was no good because it would soon be possible for the Russians to detect it under water. Three years later his successor told us that we could not have Skybolt and that the only thing that was any good was Polaris. Now the Government are playing about with the TSR 2—originally produced as a tactical strike weapon—in the rôle of the strategic deterrent.
The right hon. Gentleman said that realism should be the mark of the Government's defence policy. I want to refer to the basic fact, which is the foundation of our criticism of his Administration, that after thirteen years and the expenditure of £18,000 million our defence commitments are disastrously overstraining both the available money and the available manpower. I

want to say a few words in turn about both.
The problem of money was discussed in the debate that we had before Christmas on defence reorganisation, and the argument can be simply put. It is that owing to the fantastic speed of weapons development the cost of weapons is rising about ten times as quickly as is the gross national product. This is true of conventional and atomic weapons. That means that as time passes, if the Government intend to maintain defence expenditure at the fairly constant level of the gross national product as at the moment I think they do, they are compelled to choose, to establish priorities. Heaven knows, anyone who has thought about these problems realises that it is no easy matter to choose between weapon systems, especially when, as was pointed out in the last debate by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones)—who has a great deal of governmental experience in this sphere—as the cost of weapon system rises one is faced not only with a choice between commitments but a choice between strategic rôles. One may even be faced with a choice between Services, because the abandonment of a weapon may mean the end of a Service, at least in the rôle to which it has become accustomed.
A previous Minister of Defence, the right hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson), used to say that it was essential for the British Government to have in respect of defence what he called a mixed bag of clubs. This was a ten able view at a time when it was possible for a country of this size to produce a little of everything and have something effective of everything. But the trouble now—as the present Minister of Defence knows better than anybody else—is that if we try to have a little bit of everything we do not have enough of anything. It is no use having a mixed bag of clubs if the bag is so heavy that one breaks down halfway round the course or if in order to reduce the weight of the mixed bag, the shafts of the clubs are made so thin that they break in one's hand the first time they are used. I believe that this is precisely the situation facing the Government at the present time. They are hopelessly over-committed in major weapon projects.
During the last year the Minister of Defence committed himself to at least one new major weapon for each of the Services. He promised the Navy a new carrier with a replacement for the Sea Vixen to fly off it. He promised the Army, through the Air Force, a long-range strategic troop carrier, the AW681. He promised the R.A.F. a Canberra replacement, a Hunter replacement and a Shackleton replacement. He is now finding out that he cannot possibly do all those things and keep the defence budget within more or less 7 per cent. of the gross national product, which he undertook to do last year.
One of the reasons why hon. Members on this side of the House called for this debate is because we are genuinely worried that the Government, fearing the political consequences of making a choice between a number of projects, some of which they must jeopardise, will avoid taking any decision at all in this year's defence White Paper. I hope that the Minister of Defence will give us some indication about which of the projects to which he committed the Government last year he will give priority in this year's Defence White Paper; because he knows perfectly well that it is quite impossible for us to carry all these projects to completion. At present the only one of those projects to which the Government have committed themselves directly and financially is the Canberra replacement, the TSR2.
The Minister of Defence knows as well as I do that if he delays a decision and a choice in this regard, not only will our Armed Forces go short of weapons which they desperately need to remain efficient, but our industries will lose any chance of competing in the foreign markets. Because most of the developed countries in the world also want new weapon systems of this nature and if the right hon. Gentleman delays any longer over the P1154, the French or the Americans will take the market and British industry will be left, as so often before, without any rôle whatever to play.
I have a nasty feeling that what the right hon. Gentleman is doing is telling all the firms concerned, "It is going to be all right on the night; do not worry; but I just cannot get it in this year;

spend your own money". He is thinking that it will not matter too much what happens, because right hon. Gentlemen opposite will be out of office by the time the bill comes to be paid.
This is one of the reasons why we have sought to have this subject debated while there is still time—I hope—before the Defence White Paper for 1964–65 has been brought to completion. So far as I can see, the only one of the seven major projects to which the Government are financially committed is the TSR2, and if one considers the likely need this seems the least useful of the lot, in spite of the fact that the aeroplane, if it does exist, will be a flying laboratory unique in the world, as I said before.
The reason why we are committed to the TSR2, is that there is one Minister in the Government who knows what he wants, the Minister of Aviation—he wants to keep his seat in Preston. The Minister of Aviation's influence in the Government has had a disastrous effect over recent years. We have some example of that in the revelations about the Skybolt affair, which were recently printed in the Sunday Times and which no member of the Government so far has cared to dispute or deny.
I am told that the British Aircraft Corporation has been given an order to get the TSR2 off the ground and into the air before the election. This is its absolute priority even though it isquite impossible to test the TSR2 in its major rôle of low level flight unles it is taken somewhere like Aden or Australia to test. I am told that no order has been signed for a production delivery of 30 TSR2s. Here, again, the Minister of Aviationmisled the House, wittingly or unwittingly, when we last debated this subject, before Christmas, when he gave the impression that newspaper reports that a production order had been signed were true. I hope that the Minister of Defence will answer the question whether the Ministry has signed a production order for TSR2 aircraft, other than the 20 aircraft for test and other purposes which were ordered some time ago.
I now pass to the related question of the over-strain on our manpower. The history of this problem is well known. The present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the right hon.


Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), as Minister of Defence compelled the Army to accept a manpower target 20,000 men fewer than the minimum regarded as essential by the Hull Committee, which was chaired by the officer who is now Chief of the Imperial General Staff. If the Minister of Defence was to insist on a manpower target lower than that which the Army regarded as the minimum for carrying out its commitments, the Government had a clear obligation to the country and the Forces to cut commitments.
But commitments have not been cut in the intervening time, and it is perhaps a political irony that the same politician who, as Minister of Defence, forced the Army lo accept a manpower target of 20.000 below its minimum is the man who, as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, rightly or wrongly—for the moment I am not discussing that—has given us new and unforeseen commitments in Malaysia and Aden and, latterly, in Cyprus.
It is perfectly true, as the Prime Minister implied and as Ministers at Question Time in the last few days have pointed out, that so far the Army, though grievously strained and stretched, has managed to fulfil the commitments. I should like to associate my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself with the praise which the Government give in their Amendment to our Motion to the skill and despatch with which Transport Command and the other branches of the Armed Services responded to the unforeseen emergency in Cyprus. It was a remark able achievement and does the Services great credit.
However, as the defence correspondent of The Times pointed out in an impressive article the other day, to claim that because it is all right so far it will stay all right, is like the man who jumped off the Empire State Building and at the 30th floor on the way down said, "So far, so good."The Prime Minister knows, the Minister of Defence knows, and every Service Minister knows perfectly well that if public order breaks down in British Guiana, which is certainly possible, if there is trouble in the Protectorates, or if there is even a marginal increase in guerrilla activities in Borneo, it will be absolutely impossible for us to meet those additional commit-

ments without defaulting on some of the commitments which we have already. This is not a satisfactory position for any British Government.
The Prime Minister proudly said in his speech that he accepted that the obligation to put 55,000 men in the British Army of the Rhine still stood. I suggest to him that it is no good accepting obligations unless we create the capacity for fulfilling them. The Prime Minister knows perfectly well that at this moment he does not have that capacity and that if there is any further call on our very limited military manpower we shall be obliged to withdraw from the B.A.O.R. one of the seven brigades already there and committed to it. I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman very seriously that Britain's influence inthe world today depends not on empty postures of nuclear grandeur but on the ability to give our friends the relevant military help at the right time and, above all, on the ability to keep our promises. It is no good the right hon. Gentleman making speeches at by-elections about the overwhelming political importance of the British hydrogen bomb if at the same time our friends in various parts of the world are not receiving the help which we have pledged to them.
I believe that we have reached a point in this country at which the political commitments in defence which we have accepted are too great for our existing military capacity. Therefore, we have reached the stage, which the Government have been trying to put off and evade for years, where we must choose. We must now fix priorities and discuss which commitments really matter to us in the world and what are the forces appropriate to fulfil them. We must make these decisions quickly. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley pointed out in his impressive speech—and no one in this House knows more about military manpower than he does or who has been more often right about it—we must make these choices and decisions in the next two and a half years before the 100,000 reservists who are the last bunch of part-time National Service men with a reserve liability under the 1962 Act disappear.
I wish to devote the rest of my speech to suggesting what should be done. I believe that the Government have failed


to choose, or, where they have chosen, have chosen wrongly. We shall vote against the Amendment because it is clear from the Prime Minister's speech—and I suspect that this will be underlined in the Minister of Defence's speech—that the Government's conception of a balanced force istotally inappropriate to the real defence needs of this country. As the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed pointed out, the Prime Minister said that our defence forces must be complementary to our diplomacy. There is no doubt that the first thing to do is to make judgments—and I know that they are very risky ones—about the future trend of events all over the world and the likely challenge to our national security or the types of challenge to our national interest which we can legitmately and reasonably hope to meet by force.
I think that often, but not all the time, the Prime Minister talks a great deal of good sense about foreign policy. I think that he did so when he spoke in Kinross on 7th January, just over a fortnight ago, and said, as quoted in The Times, that:
Britain had been proclaiming for some years now that nuclear armaments had reached a point of perfection and multiplication at which war between the Soviet Union and the West was unthinkable.
The logic of that was that, without dropping our guard, we must seek areas of agreement with Russia and increase our contacts. He went on to say that the Americans and Germans had reached the same conclusion.
I agree with him here. If we are to frame a relevant defence policy, the beginning of wisdom is to accept the fact that the risk of nuclear global war is now very small, and that, in so far as it does still exist, it can be met only by the Atlantic Alliance acting as a whole. This is a point that the right hon. Gentleman made as Foreign Secretary at Ottawa; my right hon. Friend earlier quoted from that speech. In so far as there is a risk of global war, and that risk is decreasing, it can be met only by the united strength of Western Europe and the United States.
I would agree with the right hon. Gentleman, too, that there is now a real possibility of disarmament, though whether that carries with it the possibility of a fall in our defence budget which

was promised by the right hon. Gentle man in his own by-election, we shall see when the defence White Paper is produced—

The Prime Minister: That is not fair. What I was talking about in the by-election, and it has been misquoted time and time again, was international disarmament, and our part in that—not an actualreduction in the defence budget.

Mr. Healey: I will leave the right hon. Gentleman alone with his conscience and his memory on that particular issue.
My point here, and I think that the Prime Minister will accept it, is that in the situation into which weare now moving an independent British deterrent would be irrelevant, even if we had it, and that as far as we face a threat to our survival in global war that threat is best met, not by an independent nuclear deterrent—even assuming that we can afford it or that we are capable, operationally, of maintaining it—but by trying to revise N.A.T.O. stategy to take account of the real danger in Europe and not the imaginary dangers we believed existed some years ago—perhaps did exist some years ago—and trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control. The key to the solution of the problem is co-operation between East and West on arms control rather than continued competition in the arms race.
This side of the picture is, on the whole, a happy and encouraging one, thank God, and let us not forget that the strength and unity of the West in the past has been one of the major factors in bringing it about. At the same time, as the danger of global war is declining, instabilityin Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America seems to be growing worse year by year. The danger of instability and war in the neutral part of the world is the only real danger of war that now exists, and it is a danger to which the whole apparatus ofnuclear deterrence is totally irrelevant. It is a danger that can be met only by conventional forces on the ground, and that, in the modern world, means conventional forces that can be got to the spot very quickly and which it is known can be got to the spot very quickly.
I think that it was the Prime Minister, speaking in the defence debate in the


House of Lords a year ago to which he has referred, who pointed out that since 1945 Her Majesty's Forces had been engaged in 32 military operations all over the world. None of those operations has involved the use of nuclear weapons; the only one that involved a direct confrontation between Communist and Western forces was the war in Korea, and, even there, atomic weapons were not used.
We on this side of the House believe that this is the real threat to peace. I do not think that anyone who reads the newspapers every morning can deny that this is where the priority in our defence expenditure and organisation must go—in providing efficient, mobile, conventional forces to assist in maintaining stability in Africa and in Asia, and to prevent anarchy—not, incidentally, necessarily to protect British interests, because I believe that there are very few parts of the world today where it is likely to be appropriate for us to use force to protect our national interest, but to assist in the international work of maintaining peace and stability so as to enable these peoples of the troubled continents to achieve a better and higher standard of life with the minimum possible suffering.
Personally, I welcome the fact that, for historical reasons, Britain is involved in these problems all over the world. I believe that we shall often find that we are the only country in a position to fulfil such responsibilities for that reason. This was the case in Cyprus the other day. But it is equally important, faced, as we are, by the threat to stability in areas where we have a military presence, that we should not needlessly increase our commitments as, I believe, we have done in Southern Arabia by forcing through a Federation which was known to be unacceptable to the inhabitants of the Colony in which we have our base.
It is important also—I know that the Minister of Defence will agree, especially after having been out there—that we continue to seek political solutions for the problems as a result of which we are at present involved in the use of force, such as the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. With respect to the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, the idea that we have

any interest, or capacity in the long run, in being bogged down in interminable guerrilla warfare on the island of Borneo is something which all of us would accept very reluctantly indeed.
We must seek international support in maintaining these commitments, above all, through the United Nations. I believe that the Prime Minister must be bitterly regretting some of the things he said a year or two ago about the United Nations'rôle in maintaining stability in these troubled areas.
Whatever can be achieved by way of assistance from our friends in the Commonwealth—I hope that the Minister of Defence will tell us about any discussions he had on this problem with reference to Malaysia—the first priority in defence is the maintenance of adequate and effective conventional Regular Forces. It has been argued by the Prime Minister that getting rid of the nuclear deterrent will not help us to do this at all. With respect, this is not true. Is he tellingthe House that we should not have more effective conventional forces if we spent on mobility, fire-power and conventional equipment the £200 million a year which we are now spending on the nuclear deterrent? I believe that the Government have not given priority to this, and it is one of the reasons for the trouble.
As far as I have been able to discover, though it is extremely difficult to find an answer to such questions, the reason why they decided, a year ago, to cut Gurkha recruiting from 15,000 to 10,000 was not political or military, ft was Treasury. It was money. The reason why the Government stopped recruiting married men earlier last year was not defence. Again, it was money. Incidentally, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be able toassure us that there is to be no cut in the Army's programme for married quarters in the next Defence White Paper.
In fact there is a direct relation between the amount of money we spend on the nuclear deterrent and the amount which is a available for the equipment and mobility of our conventional forces. It applies just as much to mobility. We have not at present a single effective long-range troop carrier. The Belfast is just coming along, at enormous cost and in many respects not a very suitable aircraft


for this purpose. Nearly a year ago, the Government decided to produce the AW 681, and yet, as far as I know—perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell us—although the airframe has been ordered, no order has so far been placed for theengine. This is another decision which will be evaded in this year's Defence White Paper.

Mr. Stanley R. McMaster: Will the hon. Gentleman elaborate on that and say what the Labour Party's proposals are for the Belfast?

Mr. Healey: That is one of the questions I would rather answer after talks which I hope the Minister will allow us to have with him, because questions of weapons choice and priority are impossible to be answered satisfactorily without knowledge of all the facts, facts which are certainly not available to the Opposition. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."]

Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish: Then why run down everything if the hon. Member does not know what he is talking about?

Mr. Healey: Hon. Members opposite are easily amused; no doubt they feel the need for some distraction following the hard facts I am putting to them.
To explain what I mean I will give one illustration of choice. The Minister has recently been out to the Far East. He knows that our troops in Borneo are crying out for helicopters. The Government could get three-man helicopters for £10,000 a piece and I suggest that, from the point of view of our present commitments and those which we can envisage, we would be doing more good for our military capacity in producing long-range transport aircraft and tactical carriers like helicopters for the conventional forces who are engaged all the time all over the world than spending enormous sums of money on weapons which we are unlikely ever to use and could certainly neveruse alone.
Make no mistake about this, the Prime Minister admitted in his speech that efficient, highly mobile conventional forces are very expensive. I do not deny that the Government are spending a far greater part of our defence budget on

conventional forces. The question is whether we now have adequate conventional forces for our commitments, and I do not believe that it is possible to have adequate forces unless we give priority to them at the expense of the nuclear deterrent.
The other argument used by the Prime Minister—and this was the only argument produced for keeping the deterrent—was a political and not a military one, for he argued that it was necessary to have an independent deterrent force in order to have a place at the conference table. He also argued that he could foresee many countries acquiring their own nuclear weapons and that, in a world of nuclear anarchy, it would be necessary for Britain to have nuclear arms. He might be right, but a cyanide pill would be cheaper and more effective.
But the Prime Minister claims that he wants to stop nuclear anarchy and that the main aim of his foreign policy is to stop the spread of atomic weapons. The present nuclear deterrent policy of the Prime Minister and the arguments he uses to support it—not when speaking at the N.A.T.O. Council or Western European Union but at election meetings in Britain—are calculated to frustrate all the objects of his diplomacy. He says that Britain must have the H-bomb because this is the only key to influence on major world questions. He has also said that Britain and America agree that Germany should not have atomic weapons. Could there be a more direct way of inciting Germany into a nuclear alliance with de Gaulle? It is no good relying on the Paris Treaties in this respect. Ministers opposite know—although their supporters behind them may not—that the Paris Treaties have already been broken on nuclear weapons by France with the agreement of the other signatories. Treaties are no protection against things of this nature and that is why the right hon. Gentleman has overruled his right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence on the multilateral force.
The Government are supporting the multilateral force—although they know that it is militarily unnecessary and politically dangerous—because Germany wants it and Germany, although she has not got nuclear weapons, has more influence with the United States than


Britain, which has nuclear weapons. [Hon. Members: "No."] That is the only reason why we are supporting the multilateral force.
This afternoon the Prime Minister went so far as to imply that providing the multilateral force can be shown to be militarily feasible he will permit Her Majesty's Government to co-operate in it, although he knows it to be militarily unnecessary. It is difficult to draw any other conclusion from what he said in answer to my suggestion.
We could still head off this problem if we were to offer to integrate our own nuclear forces irrevocably in a combined N.A.T.O. force, but the Government will not do that before the election. This is another thing that they are leaving over because it makes political difficulties in their own ranks to suggest it. This is really what worries us.
The Prime Minister has failed to take control of the Government, has failed to force the Cabinet to make decisions that it should make—apparently, I suppose, through an aristocratic indifference to the problem and the attitude of apres moi, le deluge. The position of the Government in this field and in all others at this time reminds me of nothing so much as the state of the Chinese Empire before the revolution at the start of this century—a lot of departmental war lords fighting with one another with the last of the Manchus presiding over the anarchy with an impotent grin.
The nation cannot afford to waste any more time. We want to help the discussion. The talks we suggest would not always produce agreement—that is clear from this debate—but they could at least ensure that we did not disagree unless it was absolutely necessary. We would also make it clear to the Government that they would have no need to postpone essential decisions for fear that the Opposition would take unfair electoral advantage. The offer we made is seriously meant and I hope that it will be seriously considered. I believe that the Government can help themselves as well as the nation by accepting it.

9.32 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): I must confess that when I first heard of this Motion it was with rather mixed feelings. I was in Singa-

pore and anxious to proceed further east, but I had to reverse my path and return to take part in the debate. Nevertheless, I will also confess that when I read the Motion I realised that I had seen many worse Motions put down by the Labour Party. The Opposition do, after all, advocate more arms. It is in a sense a call to arms. I have known moments in the history of the Labour Party when they have done nothing like that, so it is a modest step in the right direction.
I certainly do not wish to quarrel too much with the call to a bipartisan approach. Indeed, I very much welcome what the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said early in his speech about Malaysia. It was important. It is to the benefit of us all that he should have declared in the clearest possible terms that we stand united in the House of Commons in support of our obligations, honourably entered into under treaty, to a newly emergent Commonwealth country.
I hope that what he said will be read not only here but in other places as well. Indeed, perhaps it might not be inappropriate if I start my speech by discussing the Malaysian situation and leaving aside for a few moments the theories of defence, the rival party positions and the question of the deterrent and the rest, though I may say a word about them if I have time later on.
I think the House should recognise that a grave situation exists in Malaysia. We are there in a country to which we have a commitment and an obligation. Our troops are disposed along a frontier of about 1,000 miles, in what is probably some of the most difficult military country that exists. The Gurkhas, who have some experience in these matters, say that even in Malaya the jungle was comparatively easy compared with what they are facing in those areas, with some dissident elements like the Chinese Communist organisation in Southern Sarawak or Indonesians in Tawau, and with Indonesian regular forces disposed along the frontier on the other side. Wherever they are disposed they are used, in effect, as a launching pad for members of the terrorist border organisations who are uniformed and well equipped and who come over and make a jab first in one place and then in another all along


that frontier. They are very well armed, sometimes—but not always—with American weapons, because the Americans have supplied weapons to the Indonesians, who in their turn supply them to these terrorist border raiding parties. So far we are resisting these attacks, which come sometimes from the land and sometimes from the sea.
I visited many of our troops there. I saw the 40 Commando Royal Marines, the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, the Leicesters, and, above all, the Gurkhas, to whom many hon. Members referred during the debate, and who are doing a magnificent job in that part of the world.
A serious and potentially grave situation exists there, and I agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said. There are no military answers to problems of this character, not in the last resort. There are no military answers to problems like this. One can help the position. One can fulfil one's obligations. One can give a country which is still struggling to be born an opportunity to find a political settlement, but a political settlement has to be found. After all, U.N.O. has already been called in. At the time when the referendum was being taken as to whether these countries in Eastern Malaysia wished to join the Federation, U.N.O.was called in, and in effect gave its imprimatur to this new arrangement that has been made, and this new Federation which has been set up.
I believe that our troops there are doing a magnificent job. I believe that the rôle we are carrying out is an honourable one, for we seek nothing. There is no self-aggrandisement; no defence of some old imperial interest or anything of that kind. We are there under a treaty honourably entered into, and we will carry it out. We can carry it out, but we must seek by all means open to us to try to find a political settlement.
I agreed with what the right hon. Gentleman said about Malaysia, but he went on to develop in a rather wide field his ideas about a bipartisan policy. I am certainly not going to deride the benefit of such a policy. If we can get some form of national agreement on defence, that cannot be anything but a

very good thing; something devoutly to be wished for. Of course it has to be bipartisan on issues rather wider than how many or what sort of married men we let into the Army. We cannot have a bipartisan policy which will be effective unless it covers some of the deeper and more difficult issues of defence.
I say, quite frankly, to the right hon. Gentleman that we are in something of a difficulty about these matters. I take one of what I might call the fundamental issues—not fundamental, but larger questions of defence—and examine how far the bridge can be crossed. What about American bases in this country? This is a really important vital issue in defence. The right hon. Gentleman, I understand, said in the clearest terms that he does not believe we ought to have a deterrent, but he does believe America ought to have a deterrent. I think this is common ground. Presumably if America is to have a deterrent it must be given all possible facilities to poise that deterrent in order that it should carry out its task.
Are we right in assuming that the Labour Party as a whole now is united in its determination to secure that American bases can stay in this country? Are they united? Are they prepared to proclaim that American bombers will stand upon our airfields and that the American Polaris submarine—never mind whether we have our own—will stay available in the Holy Loch? I hope they are, but that is not what their party conferences have always tended to say. That is one of the issues on which bipartisanship would certainly be helpful.
The Polaris submarine is a big issue. We have been in some genuine doubt as to what the right hon. Gentleman's policy was about the Polaris submarine. I understand his policy now is that he will effectively abandon the Polaris submarine. I am bound to say we cannot meet him on that one. We are going to build the Polaris submarine.
What about the V-bombers? The right hon. Gentleman has always taken a rather doubtful view about the V-bombers. He said on 22nd October:
We take the view that this is very much on the way out. I doubt very much whether military experts consider that they could ever be a deterrent.


If they can never be a deterrent I do not see why we are trying to keep them. The right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) said:
We have our V-bomber force, which is a very powerful force with a life of five years or more."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd July, 1963; Vol. 680, c. 238.]
I am bound to say to the right hon. Gentleman that if there ever were a Labour Government I do not know what would happen to the Secretary of State for Air. How would he conduct himself in visits to the Air Force? What would happen to recruiting as he went from air station to air station and said, "These things are on the way out. I doubt very much whether any military experts consider they will ever be a deterrent". It would be a very odd speech to make.
The right hon. Member for Huyton spoke about commitments. I welcome what he said today about the Far East. I agree that a rôle wider than that of Europe is essential to our purposes. I do not think it is always fully understood what a contribution we make to Europe itself by undertaking these wider rôles. The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown)—and I join with other hon. Members who are sorry that he is not here and wish him a speedy recovery—said:
the wider world rôle…is rapidly diminishing…".
This was on 5th March, 1963—
This is a hang-over from the old so-called imperial commitments of imperial times."—[OFFRCIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1963; Vol. 673, c. 325.]
One would accept that as a possible view and indeed it was thought at one time that the policy of the Labour Party was to give up the wider rôle and try to bring the troops back to Europe. They were always criticising us for not doing something about that. Then one reads what the hon. Member for Leeds, East said only on 9th January:
We must cut commitmentsȆThe Government should have gone to the N.A.T.O. Council last December and asked for a change in N.A.T.O. strategy so that we could do the necessary job with fewer troops.
If we get out of the world-wide rôle and reduce the number of troops in Europe and we do not have a deterrent—and, indeed, there is a little doubt among the Opposition about whether we ought to do anything in Cyprus—it

is difficult to see exactly how we marry the policy on defence of this side with what right hon. Members opposite have been advocating. I am not saying that these things should not be attempted, and I welcome the one important thing that the right hon. Gentleman said. I emphasise, however, that if we are to struggle for a meeting of minds, we must have a meeting of minds on some of the things that really matter.
The Leader of the Opposition posed to us a series of questions which, he said, he would like to discuss—for example, whether there is a proper balance between our commitments and our resources. This is a matter that one could talk about for a very long time. We cannot have our commitments limited to a number which can be met if they are all active at the same time, because this would be a very limiting factor. In the obligations which one undertakes throughout the world, it must be assumed that one does not necessarily have to fulfil every one of them at the same moment.
The right hon. Gentlemanspoke about the Hunter and Sea Vixen replacement. I am quite clear about this. I have not the slighest intention of trying to make a decision until I am ready to make it. After all the talk about projects which have been started which should never have been started and which were then cancelled, I should have thought that those critics would not have tried to rush too hastily into the starting of new projects until all the careful procedures for examination, technical research and the rest were gone into.

Mr. H. Wilson: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us, therefore, why he announced this on 30th July last year?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I did not announce it on 30th July last year. The right hon. Gentleman ought to have some of these talks; then, he might understand a little more about these things. He asked a series of questions on these matters, but none of them touches—[Hon. Members: "Answer them."]—I am happy to answer all the right hon. Gentleman's questions, but not necessarily in great detail in the 15 minutes that remain to me.
The right hon. Gentleman asked, for example, whether we would amalgamate


Army units. We have at this moment no intention of doing so. The right hon. Gentleman asked a series of questions and I said that we were willing to meet him and give the answers to them, but they do not represent a combined or bipartisan policy.
Our policy has been clearly defined. It consists of the independent control of a deterrent which is capable of inflicting incalculable damage upon anenemy assailant. It consists of the acceptance of the responsibility for a world-wide system of alliances covering Europe, the Far East and the Middle East. It consists of a willingness and a capacity for coming to the aid of friends and allies when appropriate, either in their defence as in Malaysia or in support of the civil power. These rôles are carried out by a professional Regular Army. This concept of defence is limited and contained within expenditure which is not significantly above 7 per cent. of the gross national product. Within that general concept, it is certainly possible to have broad national agreement. Indeed, if we could have national agreement on a policy of that kind, it would undoubtedly considerably increase our general standing in the world.
When opening this debate, apart from the bipartisan aspects of these matters, the Leader of the Opposition referred to the reserves. From what he said, one would be led to suppose that he thought it wrong that reserves should be used for more than one theatre at a time. If they are to be moved from one theatre to another, the right hon. Gentleman refers to them as though they were a stage army. In truth, Army reserves are available for more than one theatre. That is the purpose for which they are established. We have no need to apologise for having committed the reserves at the present time. That is precisely what they are for.
The right hon. Gentleman also said what a shameful thing it was to use the regiment of artillery without its guns, but this is a rôle of the regiment of artillery. It has been used without its guns on a number of occasions. It is trained for this purpose and has been used before this occasion in Cyprus.
The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said that we

might one day need selective service. It is true that we might one day need it, and, if we did, no doubt the Government of the day would introduce selective service. At this moment, however, the question of conscription and selective service is, as the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) well knows, irrelevant to our problems. The Leader of the Opposition also said, and I agree with him, that defence is not a matter for the Front Bench only. I believe this to be very true. The hon. Member for Dudley said something of the same kind. Whatever we do in talks together, we should remember that most of the great issues of defence are not matters of secrecy. They are matters which can be brought out in the open and publicly debated, and they are very much better publicly debated. We must not try to obscure them with a smokescreen of talks and give the impression that they are limited to a narrow circle. I believe that the whole House of Commons would rather resent it if we carried on defence in thatway.

Mr. H. Wilson: Would the right hon. Gentleman begin this public confrontation by telling us, as the Prime Minister did about the 55,000 commitment for N.A.T.O., when he expects to achieve that figure? He told us once last year.

Mr. Thorneycroft: My right hon. Friend said that we are committed under treaty to 55,000 troops in Europe. At present we have approximately 52,000. We had hoped to reach 55,000 during the course of this year. Whether we do or not depends upon the rate of recruiting, but we shalldo so at the earliest possible opportunity. That is the position. It is quite wrong to say that we are simply falling down upon our obligation by constituting one brigade in B.A.O.R. as a reserve. We have an absolute right under that Treaty to take troops out of Europe if our obligations in other parts of the world so demand. That is the answer with regard to the 55,000.
My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) asked about the Australians and Malaysia. It is essentially and primarily for the Government of Malaysia to invite or not invite other countries to contribute forces in her defence. I agree with my hon. Friend that our contribution


to the world-wide rôle is not always properly appreciated, but it is appreciated by the United States of America, and not least by the United States Secretary for Defence. It is true that American arms have been found in Borneo, but these have been supplied in the ordinary course to the Indonesian armed forces and not to the insurgents.
The hon. Member for Dudley started by dealing with the question of air mobility, which I believe is a new theme for him. On the question of air mobility, I would recommend that he leaves aside for a little the long-range tactical transports, the Comets and the VC10s, and concentrates on what I regard as the most urgent form of air mobility—the helicopter. This is, as the Leader of the Opposition said, an important aspect of conventional arms.
On the subject of conventional arms, to which the Motion is largely drawn, I believe that the issue is not between the 10 per cent. spent on the nuclear and the 90 per cent. spent on the conventional. The issue is how that 90 per cent. is disposed. In that there is a real matter for debate, argument and consideration. The right hon. Member for Huyton said that we have the balance wrong, but within that 90 per cent. there is a tendency to go for too sophisticated weapons. I believe that what is required is a very great concentration on what is robust, simple and portable, not only by air, but also by men.
If we can concentrate upon that aspect, if we could discuss it amongst ourselves, I believe that we would be making a far greater contribution to the realities of likely warlike conditions than in a rather abstruse argument between the nuclear and the conventional. For indeed I agree with some things which have been said in the debate. The nuclear war is so terrible as to be almost

beyond contemplation. This does not refer merely to independent deterrents but to all deterrents. A large-scale conventional war is, on the whole, unlikely. What is very likely is that year after year we may have to fulfil rôles not dissimilar from what we are doing in Borneo or police rôles such as we are doing in Cyprus, Swaziland or British Guiana, or all the multifarious requests which pour in upon any Minister of Defence. In that, and in the type of conventional weapons that we have to deal with, a great deal of useful work could be done.

The hon. Member for Dudley returned to his favourite theme of the all-party defence committee. I am for sharing information. I remember offering to address the Labour Party Defence Committee, if it so wished, perhaps in a rash moment, but the right hon. Gentleman, probably wisely, turned it down. I am not for denying information. However, the best forum for information still remains the House of Commons. There is no substitute for the House of Commons. I hope that from time to time we will have continued opportunities to confront each other, not on the smaller matters which were raised in some of these questions, but on the larger issues of defence which we can debate with sincerity but not with acrimony and which I believe improve our knowledge in the general conflict of argument which takes place.

We have met all the demands made upon us in the last few months and both sides of the House can be proud of our soldiers, sailors and airmen for the tasks they are undertaking.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—

The House divided: Ayes 214, Noes 296.

Division No. 8.]
AYES
[10.0 p.m.


Abse, Leo
Blackburn, F.
Chapman, Donald


Ainsley, William
Blyton, William
Collick, Percy


Albu, Austen
Boardman, H.
Corbet, Mrs. Freda


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)


Awbery, Stan (Bristol, Central)
Bowden, Rt. Hn. H.W. (Leics, S.W.)
Cronin, John


Bacon, Miss Alice
Boyden, James
Crosland, Anthony


Baird, John
Bradley, Tom
Crossman, R. H. S.


Barnett, Guy
Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Cullen, Mrs. Alice


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Dalyell, Tam


Bence, Cyril
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Darling, George


Benn, Anthony Wedgwood
Callaghan, James
Davies, Harold (Leek)


Benson, Sir George
Carmichael, Neil
Davies, Ifor (Gower)




Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Probert, Arthur


Deer, George
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Proctor, W. T.


Delargy, Hugh
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry


Dempsey, James
Kelley, Richard
Randall, Harry


Diamond, John
King, Dr. Horace
Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)


Doig, Peter
Lawson, George
Reid, William


Donnelly, Desmond
Ledger, Ron
Reynolds, G. W.


Driberg, Tom
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Rhodes, H.


Duffy, A. E. P. (Colne Valley)
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Edelman, Maurice
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)
Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Rodgers, W. T. (Stockton)


Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
Lipton, Marcus
Ross, William


Evans, Albert
Loughlin, Charles
Silkin, John


Fernyhough, E.
Lubbock, Eric
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Finch, Harold
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Skeffington, Arthur


Fitch, Alan
McBride, N.
Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)


Fletcher, Eric
McCann, John
Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)


Foley, Maurice
MacColl, James
Small, William


Forman, J. C.
MacDermot, Niall
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
McInnes, James
Snow, Julian


Galpern, Sir Myer
Mackie, John (Enfield, East)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


George,LadyMeganLloyd(Crmrthn)
McLeavy, Frank
Spriggs, Leslie


Ginsburg, David
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Gourlay, Harry
Mahon, Simon
Stonehouse, John


Grey, Charles
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Stones, William


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Manuel, Archie
Stross,SirBarnett(Stoke-on-Trent,C.)


Griffiths, W. (Exchange)
Mapp, Charles
Swain, Thomas


Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.
Marsh, Richard
Swingler, Stephen


Gunter, Ray
Mason, Roy
Symonds, J. B.


Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Mayhew, Christopher
Taverne, D.


Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Mellish, R. J.
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Harper, Joseph
Mendelson, J. J.
Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)


Hart, Mrs. Judith
Millan, Bruce
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Hayman, F. H.
Milne, Edward
Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)


Healey, Denis
Mitchison, G. R.
Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)


Henderson,Rt.Hn.Arthur(Rwly Regis)
Monslow, Walter
Wainwright, Edwin


Herbison, Miss Margaret
Moody, A. S.
Warbey, William


Hewitson, Capt. M.
Morris, Charles (Openshaw)
Watkins, Tudor


Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Morris, John
Weitzman, David


Hilton, A. V.
Moyle, Arthur
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Holman, Percy
Mulley, Frederick
White, Mrs. Eirene


Holt, Arthur
Neal, Harold
Whitlock, William


Hooson, H. E.
Noel-Baker,Rt.Hn.Philip(Derby,S.)
Wigg, George


Houghton, Douglas
Oliver, G. H.
Wilkins, W. A.


Howell, Charles A. (Perry Barr)
O'Malley, B. K.
Willey, Frederick


Howle, W.
Oram, A. E.
Williams, D. J. (Neath)


Hoy, James H.
Oswald, Thomas
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Owen, Will
Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)


Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Padley, W. E.
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Hunter, A. E.
Paget, R. T.
Winterbottom, R. E.


Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Woof, Robert


Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Pargiter, G. A.
Wyatt, Woodrow


Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Parker, John
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)


Janner, Sir Barnett
Parkin, B. T.
Zilliacus, K.


Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)



Jeger, George
Peart, Frederick
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)
Pentland, Norman
Mr. G. H. R. Rogers and Mr. Redhead.


Jones,Rt.Hn. A. Creech(Wakefield)
Popplewell, Ernest



Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Prentice, R. E.





NOES


Aitken, Sir William
Biggs-Davison, John
Burden, F. A.


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Bingham, R. M.
Butcher, Sir Herbert


Allason, James
Bishop, Sir Patrick
Butler, Rt.Hn.R.A.(Saffron Walden)


Anderson, D. C.
Black, Sir Cyril
Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)


Arbuthnot, Sir John
Bossom, Hon. Clive
Carr, Compton (Barons Court)


Ashton, Sir Hubert
Bourne-Arton, A.
Carr, Rt. Hon. Robert (Mitcham)


Atkins, Humphrey
Box, Donald
Cary, Sir Robert


Awdry, Daniel (Chippenham)
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John
Channon, H. P. G.


Balniel, Lord
Boyle, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward
Chataway, Christopher


Barber, Rt. Hon. Anthony
Braine, Bernard
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)


Barlow, Sir John
Brewis, John
Clarke, Brig. Terence(Portsmth, W.)


Barter, John
Bromley-Davenport,Lt.-Col.SirWalter
Cleaver, Leonard


Batsford, Brian
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
Cole, Norman


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Cooke, Robert


Bell, Ronald
Browne, Percy (Torrington)
Cooper, A. E.


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos &amp; Fhm)
Bryan, Paul
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.


Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Buck, Antony
Costain, A. P.


Bidgood, John C.
Bullard, Denys
Coulson, Michael


Biffen, John
Bullus, Wing Commander Eric
Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)







Crawley, Aidan
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Critchley, Julian
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Prior, J. M. L.


Crowder, F. P.
Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho


Curran, Charles
Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith
Proudfoot, Wilfred


Currie, G. B. H.
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Pym, Francis


Dalkeith, Earl of
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Quennell, Miss J. M.


Dance, James
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Ramsden, Rt. Hon. James


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. Sir Peter


Deedes, Rt. Hon. W. F.
Kershaw, Anthony
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Kimball, Marcus
Rees, Hugh (Swansea, W.)


Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.
Kirk, Peter
Rees-Davies, W. R. (Isle of Thanet)


Doughty, Charles
Kitson, Timothy
Renton, Rt. Hon. David


Douglas-Horne, Rt. Hon. Sir Alec
Lagden, Godfrey
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas


Drayson, G. B.
Lambton, Viscount
Ridsdale, Julian


du Cann, Edward
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey


Duncan, Sir James
Langford-Holt, Sir John
Robson Brown, Sir William


Duthie, Sir William (Banff)
Leather, Sir Edwin
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


Eden, Sir John
Leavey, J. A.
Roots, William


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


Elliott,R.W.(Newc'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan


Emery, Peter
Lilley, F. J. P.
Scott-Hopkins, James


Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Lindsay, Sir Martin
Seymour, Leslie


Farey-Jones, F. W.
Linstead, Sir Hugh
Sharples, Richard


Farr, John
Litchfield, Capt. John
Shaw, M.


Fell, Anthony
Lloyd,Rt.Hn.Geoffrey(Sut'nC'dfield)
Shepherd, William


Forrest, George
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)
Skeet, T, H. H.


Foster, Sir John
Longbottom, Charles
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)


Fraser,Rt.Hn.Hugh(Stafford &amp; Stone)
Longden, Gilbert
Spearman, Sir Alexander


Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Loveys, Walter H.
Speir, Rupert


Freeth, Denzil
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn
Stainton, Keith


Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Stanley, Hon. Richard


Gammans, Lady
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Stevens, Geoffrey


Gardner, Edward
MacArthur, Ian
Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)


Gibson-Watt, David
McLaren, Martin
Stodart, J. A.


Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)
McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm


Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Storey, Sir Samuel


Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)
MacLeod, Sir J. (Ross &amp; Cromarty)
Studholme, Sir Henry


Godber, Rt. Hon. J. B.
McMaster, Stanley R.
Tapsell, Peter


Goodhart, Philip
Macmillan, Maurice (Haifax)
Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)


Gough, Frederick
Maddan, Martin
Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)


Gower, Raymond
Maginnis, John E.
Taylor, Sir William (Bradford, N.)


Grant-Ferris, R.
Maitland, Sir John
Teeling, Sir William


Green, Alan
Markham, Major Sir Frank
Temple, John M.


Gresham Cooke, R.
Marlowe, Anthony
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Grosvenor, Lord Robert
Marshall, Sir Douglas
Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Marten, Neil
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)
Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)


Harris, Reader (Heston)
Maude, Angus (Stratford-on-Avon)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter


Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Thornton-Kemsley, sir Colin


Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Mawby, Ray
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)


Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon


Harvie Anderson, Miss
Mills, Stratton
Turner, Colin


Hastings, Stephen
Miscampbell, Norman
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Hay, John
Montgomery, Fergus
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Moore, Sir Thomas (Ayr)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John


Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis


Hendry, Forbes
Neave, Airey
Walder, David


Hicks Beach, Maj. W.
Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Walker, Peter


Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Noble, Rt. Hon. Michael
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek


Hobson, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Nugent, Ht. Hon. Sir Richard
Ward, Dame Irene


Hocking, Philip N.
Oakshott, Sir Hendrie
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Holland, Philip
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Webster, David


Hollingworth, John
Osborn, John (Hallam)
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John
Osborn, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Whitelaw, William


Hopkins, Alan
Page, Graham (Crosby)
Williams, Dudley (Exeter)


Hornby, R. P.
Page, John (Harrow, West)
Williams, Paul (Sutherland, S.)


Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Dame P.
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)
Partridge, E.
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Hughes, Hallett, Vice-Admiral John
Percival, Ian
Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard


Hughes-Young, Michael
Peyton, John
Woodhouse, C. M.


Hulbert, Sir Norman
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Woodnutt, Mark


Hutchison, Michael Clark
Pike, Miss Mervyn
Worsley, Marcus


Iremonger, T. L.
Pitman, Sir James



Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Pitt, Dame Edith
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Jackson, John
Pott, Percivall
Mr. Chichester-Clark and Mr. Finlay.


James, David
Pounder, Rafton



Jennings, J. C.
Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch

Question put,That the proposed words be there added:—

The House divided: Ayes 295, Noes 216.

Division No. 9.]
AYES
[10.13 p.m.


Aitken, Sir William
Elliott,R.W.(Newc'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)
Leather, Sir Edwin


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Emery, Peter
Leavey, J, A.


Allason, James
Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Anderson, D. C.
Farey-Jones, F. W.
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Arbuthnot, Sir John
Farr, John
Lilley, F. J. P.


Ashton, Sir Hubert
Fell, Anthony
Lindsay, Sir Martin


Atkins, Humphrey
Forrest, George
Linstead, Sir Hugh


Awdry, Daniel (Chippenham)
Foster, Sir John
Litchfield, Capt. John


Balniel, Lord
Fraser,Rt.Hn.Hugh(Stafford &amp;Stone)
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)


Barber, Rt. Hon. Anthony
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)


Barlow, Sir John
Freeth, Denzil
Longbottom, Charles


Barter, John
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
Longden, Gilbert


Batsford, Brian
Gammans, Lady
Loveys, Walter H.


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Cardner, Edward
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn


Bell, Ronald
Gibson-Watt, David
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos &amp; Fhm)
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)
McAdden, Sir Stephen


Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)
MacArthur, Ian


Bidgood, John C.
Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)
McLaren, Martin


Biffen, John
Godber, Rt. Hon. J. B.
McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia


Biggs-Davison, John
Goodhart, Philip
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John


Bingham, R. M.
Gough, Frederick
MacLeod, Sir J. (Ross &amp; Cromarty)


Bishop, Sir Patrick
Gower, Raymond
McMaster, Stanley R.


Black, Sir Cyril
Grant-Ferris, R.
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)


Bossom, Hon. Clive
Green, Alan
Maddan, Martin


Bourne-Arton, A.
Gresham Cooke, R.
Maginnis, John E.


Box, Donald
Grosvenor, Lord Robert
Maitland, Sir John


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Markham, Major Sir Frank


Boyle, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward
Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)
Marlowe, Anthony


Braine, Bernard
Harris, Reader (Heston)
Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest


Brewis, John
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Marshall, Sir Douglas


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col.SirWalter
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Marten, Neil


Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)


Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Maude, Angus (Stratford-on-Avon)


Browne, Percy (Torrington)
Harvie Anderson, Miss
Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald


Bryan, Paul
Hay, John
Mawby, Ray


Buck, Antony
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.


Bullard, Denys
Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
Maydan, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.


Bulls, Wing Commander Eric
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Mills, Stratton


Burden, F. A.
Hendry, Forbes
Miscampbell, Norman


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Hicks Beach, Maj. W.
Montgomery, Fergus


Butler, Rt.Hn.R.A.(Saffron Walden)
Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Moore, Sir Thomas (Ayr)


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Hobson, Rt. Hon, Sir John
More, Jasper (Ludlow)


Carr, Compton (Barons Court)
Hocking, Philip N.
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles


Carr, Rt. Hon. Robert (Mitcham)
Holland, Philip
Neave, Airey


Cary, Sir Robert
Hollingworth, John
Nicholls, Sir Harmar


Channon, H. P. G.
Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John
Noble, Rt. Hon. Michael


Chataway, Christopher
Hopkins, Alan
Nugent, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard


Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Hornby, R. P.
Oakshott, Sir Hendrie


Clarke, Brig. Terence(Portsmith, W.)
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Dame P.
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Cleaver, Leonard
Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)
Osborn, John (Hallam)


Cole, Norman
Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)


Cooke, Robert
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John
Page, John (Harrow, West)


Cooper, A. E.
Hughes-Young, Michael
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Hulbert, Sir Norman
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)


Corfield, F. V.
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Partridge, E.


Costain, A. P.
Iremonger, T. L.
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)


Coulson, Richard
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Percival, Ian


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Jackson, John
Peyton, John


Crawley, Aidan
James, David
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth


Critchley, Julian
Jennings, J. C.
Pike, Miss Mervyn


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Pitman, Sir James


Crowder, F. P.
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Pitt, Dame Edith


Curran, Charles
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Pott, Percivall


Currie, G. B. H.
Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Pounder, Rafton


Dalkeith, Earl of
Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith
Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch


Dance, James
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Price, David (Eastleigh)


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, sir Henry
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)


Deedes, Rt. Hon. W. F.
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Prior, J. M. L.


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho


Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.
Kershaw, Anthony
Proudfoot, Wilfred


Doughty, Charles
Kimball, Marcus
Pym, Francis


Douglas-Home, Rt. Hon. Sir Alec
Kirk, Peter
Quennell, Miss J. M.


Drayson, G. B.
Kitson, Timothy
Ramsden, Rt. Hon. James


du Cann, Edward
Lagden, Godfrey
Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. Sir Peter


Duthie, Sir William (Banff)
Lambton, Viscount
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin


Eden, Sir John
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Rees, Hugh (Swansea, W.)


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Langford-Holt, Sir John
Rees-Davies, W. R. (Isle of Thanet)




Renton, Rt. Hon. David
Stodart, J. A.
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Ridley, Hon. Nicholas
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John


Ridsdale, Julian
Storey, Sir Samuel
Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis


Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey
Studholme, Sir Henry
Walder, David


Robson Brown, Sir William
Tapsell, Peter
Walker, Peter


Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)
Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek


Roots, William
Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)
Ward, Dame Irene


Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
Taylor, Sir William (Bradford, N.)
Webster, David


Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan
Teeling, Sir William
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Scott-Hopkins, James
Temple, John M.
Whitelaw, William


Seymour, Leslie
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret
Williams, Dudley (Exeter)


Sharples, Richard
Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Shaw, M.
Thomas, Peter (Conway)
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Shepherd, William
Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon S.)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Skeet, T. H. H.
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)
Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin
Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard


Spearman, Sir Alexander
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)
Woodhouse, C. M.


Speir, Rupert
Tilney, John (Wavertree)
Woodnutt, Mark


Stainton, Keith
Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon
Worsley, Marcus


Stanley, Hon. Richard
Turner, Colin



Stevens, Geoffrey
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Tweedsmuir, Lady
Mr. Chichester-Clark and Mr. Finlay.




NOES


Abse, Leo
Ginsburg, David
McInnes, James


Ainsley, William
Gourlay, Harry
McKay, John (Wallsend)


Albu, Austen
Grey, Charles
Mackie, John (Enfield, East)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
McLeavy, Frank


Awbery, Stan (Bristol, Central)
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)


Bacon, Miss Alice
Griffiths, W. (Exchange)
Mahon, Simon


Baird John
Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)


Barnett, Guy
Gunter, Ray
Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)


Bence, Cyril
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Manuel, Archie


Benn, Anthony Wedgwood
Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Mapp, Charles


Benson, Sir George
Harper, Joseph
Marsh, Richard


Blackburn, F.
Hart, Mrs. Judith
Mason, Roy


Blyton, William
Hayman, F. H.
Mayhew, Christopher


Boardman, H.
Healey, Denis
Mellish, R. J.


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Henderson, Rt.Hn.Arthur(Rwly Regis)
Mendelson, J. J.


Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W.(Leics, S.W.)
Herbison, Miss Margaret
Millan, Bruce


Boyden, James
Hewitson, Capt. M.
Milne, Edward


Bradley, Tom
Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Mitchison, G. R.


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Hilton, A. V.
Monslow, Walter


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Holman, Percy
Moody, A. S.


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Holt, Arthur
Morris, Charles (Openshaw)


Callaghan, James
Hooson, H. E.
Morris, John


Carmichael, Neil
Houghton, Douglas
Moyle, Arthur


Chapman, Donald
Howell, Charles A. (Perry Barr)
Mulley, Frederick


Collick, Percy
Howie, W. (Luton)
Neal, Harold


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Hoy, James H.
Noel-Baker,Rt.Hn.Philip(Derbys, S.)


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Oliver, G. H.


Cronin, John
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
O'Malley, B. K.


Crosland, Anthony
Hunter, A. E.
Oram, A. E.


Crossman, R. H. S.
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Oswald, Thomas


Cullen, Mrs. Alice
Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Owen, Will


Dalyell, Tam
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Padley, W. E.


Darling, George
Janner, Sir Barnett
Paget, R. T.


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Jeger, George
Pargiter, G. A.


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)
Parker, John


Deer, George
Jones,Rt.Hn.A.Creech(Wakefield)
Parkin, B. T.


Delargy, Hugh
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Pavitt, Laurence


Dempsey, James
Jones, Elwin (West Ham, S.)
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)


Diamond, John
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Peart, Frederick


Doig, Peter
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Pentland, Norman


Donnelly, Desmond
Kelley, Richard
Popplewell, Ernest


Driberg, Tom
King, Dr. Horace
Prentice, R. E.


Duffy, A. E. P. (Colne Valley)
Lawson, George
Probert, Arthur


Edelman, Maurice
Ledger, Ron
Proctor, W. T.


Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry


Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Randall, Harry


Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)


Evans, Albert
Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)
Reid, William


Fernyhough, E.
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Reynolds, G. W.


Finch, Harold
Lipton, Marcus
Rhodes, H.


Fitch, Alan
Loughlin, Charles
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Fletcher, Eric
Lubbock, Eric
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Foley, Maurice
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Forman, J. C.
McBride, N.
Rodgers, W. T. (Stockton)


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
McCann, John
Ross, William


Galpern, Sir Myer
MacColl, James
Silkin, John


George,LadyMeganLloyd(Crmrthn)
MacDermot, Niall
Silverman, Julius (Aston)







Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Symonds, J. B.
Wilkins, W. A.


Skeffington, Arthur
Taverne, D,
Willey, Frederick


Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Williams, D. J. (Neath)


Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)
Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Small, William
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)
Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)


Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Snow, Julian
Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)
Winterbottom, R. E.


Soskice, Fit. Hon. Sir Frank
Wainwright, Edwin
Woof, Robert


Spriggs, Leslie
Warbey, William
Wyatt, Woodrow


Stewart, Michael (Fulham)
Watkins, Tudor
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)


Stonehouse, John
Weitzman, David
Zilliacus, K.


Stones, William
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)



Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)
White, Mrs. Eirene
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Stross,SirBarnett(Stoke-on-Trent,C.)
Whitlock, William
Mr. G. H. R. Rogers and Mr. Redhead.


Swain, Thomas
Wigg, George



Swingler, Stephen

Main Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House commends the effectiveness and speed with which the armed forces have met the recent heavy demands on Great Britain's military resources; and recognisesthe need for continued provision of adequate and appropriate conventional forces as an essential part of a balanced military capability.

Orders of the Day — WAYS AND MEANS

[19th December]

Resolution reported,
That towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March 1964,

the sum of £40,084,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Resolution agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolution by the Chairman of Ways and Means, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Green.

Orders of the Day — CONSOLIDATED FUND

Bill to apply a sum out of the Consolidated Fund to the service of the year ending on 31st March, 1964, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 58.]

Orders of the Day — BICYCLE INDUSTRY

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. I. Fraser.]

10.26 p.m.

Mr. Peter Tapsell: I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss the stateof the bicycle industry. Raleigh Industries, Ltd., is in my constituency. Its factories provide employment for nearly 10,000 people. Its level of economic activity vitally affects the prosperity of the whole City of Nottingham. The future of the bicycle industry is important to my constituents and to a very large number of people in the Nottingham area, but it is also of more than merely local importance.
The Raleigh Company is the largest manufacturer of bicycles in Britain and the largest exporter of bicycles in the world. Half the total production of this Nottingham factory is sold in North America. I shall return to the export side of the matter in a few minutes, because the bicycle industry has an exceptionally fine record in this respect, but I wish,first, to say something about home sales.
Home sales of bicycles have declined by more than 50 per cent. since 1955, and the decline is still continuing. The reasons are not difficult to find. The rising prosperity of the country as a whole has meant that many families who, only a few years ago, would have had one or two bicycles or a motor cycle now have a small motor car instead. Moreover, the enormous increase in the number of motor cars on the roads has, I suspect, made parents a little cautious about buying bicycles for their young children.
I recognise that it can be argued that this is an inevitable trend in the modern world, and I have never been one to advocate the feather-bedding of industries which have outlived their usefulness. On the other hand, it is no part of the Government's task to accentuate the problems of industries which already have trouble enough. No one could say that a bicycle is a luxury.

Indeed, if the congestion on the roads in the centres of great towns becomes worse, as seems likely, possession of a bicycle may be an absolute necessity. Yet the bicycle is at present subject to the top rate of Purchase Tax—25 per cent.
At this point, I would like to express my gratitude to the Economic Secretary, who is sitting besidemy hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade on the Front Bench. I know that the Economic Secretary and his colleagues at the Treasury have given very careful and sympathetic consideration to the views which have been put to them, andthey have received a depution representing the industry. The industry has appreciated the way in which its case has been heard. I fully understand also that, with the Budget now only a few weeks away, I cannot expect a Minister to give a firm public commitment here and now about tax changes, but I hope that the mere fact that the Budget is now being put into its final form in the Treasury means that this debate is being held at a particularly opportune moment.
Although a Minister from the Board of Trade in going to reply on the wider aspects of his problem, to which I shall come in a moment, I wish to say emphatically in the presence of my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury that here we are dealing with an industry in which the home sales have more than halved since 1955 and in which the products are still bearing the top rate of Purchase Tax. I ask my hon. Friend to make this known to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to ensure that there is either a big reduction in,or an abolition of, Purchase Tax on bicycles in the next Budget.
If the Treasury is unmoved by the figures of falling home sales of bicycles; if the Treasury feels that the Purchase Tax yield of this industry, about £1,700,000 a year, is something it cannot do without; and if the Treasury points out, what Is mercifully true, that alternative employment prospects in Nottingham are exceptionally good, I hope, nevertheless, the Treasury will bear in mind the fact that we are dealing with an industry with an exceptionally fine


export record, as I am sure the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade will be the first to recognise.
Successive Governments have frequently exhorted industries to export. Here is an industry which really does export. This factory in my constituency is supplying over 90 per cent. of the total imports of bicycles into North America, and this vast business has been built up in the last few years in the face of fierce competition from Europe and Japan. It makes an important contribution to our dollar earnings, and the bicycle industry's total overseas earnings, I understand, amount to £26 million a year, a very considerable figure.
It is an economic platitude to say that an export programme, if it is to be sustained, requires a broad home base. The bigger the home market, the lower the unit costs of production and the more competitive the selling price of its products overseas. This was explicitly recognised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he reduced the Purchase Tax on motor cars. I hope he will recognise the force of this argument as it applies to bicycles.
The overseas bicycle markets are very competitive indeed. It is true that there are expanding markets for bicycles in places such as Africa, India, and other developing parts of the world, where the ownership of a bicycle is something of a status symbol as the motor car now is in this country. But more and more of these countries wish to manufacture bicycles themselves, even when in doing so they perhaps produce a less efficient bicycle at a higher cost than could be provided for their home market by the Raleigh factory at Nottingham. Nevertheless, the industry has made very great efforts to export. It has a splendid record in this respect, and I am sure it will continue to do all it can, but if its home base continues to contract it will find it increasingly hard to maintain its export drive.
Apart from the reduction in Purchase Tax for which I am asking, there are certain other steps which it seems to me might help the bicycle industry.
I accept that the industry's advertising could be considerably improved. It

should be more imaginative. I would like to see plenty of pictures of healthy, happy cyclists sailing past traffic jams of apoplectic motorists. In the towns bicycling is now the healthiest and most efficient form of travel, and I hope that the industry's advertising experts will make more use of these facts.
I would also like to see more public propaganda stressing fitness—the keep-fit aspect of bicycling. Fitness campaigns are something which we tend to sneer at in England, although we should not underestimate the impact of the appeal for fitness made in America by the late President Kennedy, which led to marathon walks being undertaken by an astonishing number of people. This is something which the British Government should not ignore.
I should like, too, to see greater stress laid by the Minister of Transport on the commuting advantages of the bicycle. My right hon. Friend often sets a splendid personal example in this respect, and I would have thought that as new towns are being developed, in the light of the Buchanan Report and as existing towns are replanned, it would be wise for cycle tracks to be built alongside the main roads leading to the centre of towns. In fact, this may become essential if all movement in the centre of towns and cities is not to come to a standstill in the future. This would necessitate better provision by offices, big shops and Government Departments of facilities for the storage of bicycles and the provision of proper changing rooms for those wishing to cycle to and from work and desiring to change their clothes. Factories are better in this respect, but in many cases no facilities of this sort are provided in offices, shops and Government buildings.
All these are long-term suggestions, but the industry cannot wait. An immediate stimulus to sales at home is urgently required. Past experience has shown that Purchase Tax changes, whether up or down, have a big effect on the home sales of bicycles. Curiously enough, the publicity which a tax reduction attracts apparently produces more impact than a comparable price reduction achieved in another way. When Purchase Tax has been reduced in the past the leap in sales has been considerably more than might have been expected.
The immediate need of the bicycle industry is the total abolition or, at the very least, a major reduction in Purchase Tax, as it is at present levied on bicycles, to safeguard the present large export earnings of the industry and to protect its thousands of workers in Nottingham and elsewhere.

10.39 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. David Price): It falls to me as a Board of Trade Minister to reply to the speech which has just been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. Tapsell). The House will realise that the main burden of my hon. Friend's argument this evening has been directed towards my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But, for reasons which my hon. Friend knows and which the House will appreciate, my right hon. and hon. Friends at the Treasury are unable to reply on Purchase Tax matters at this season of the year.
We in the Board of Trade are the production department with responsibilities for the bicycle industry. As my hon. Friend knows, we in the Board of Trade enjoy close and happy relations with the industry. This country has always held a leading position in the world as a producer of bicycles and our bicycle industry has over the years made a substantial contribution to the country's export earnings, to which I should like to pay public tribute.
As with other long established industries, however, the bicycle industry has seen many changes in consumer choice and market conditions, at home and overseas, which have resulted in a decline in the demand for the industry's products. I will give the House a few figures to illustrate this.
If we take the years from 1952 to 1962, production of bicycles for the home market fell from 760,000 units to 580,000 while production for export decreased from 2,870,090 to 1,350,000 units. Over the same period production of motorised two-wheeled machines—that is, motor cycles, scooters and mopeds—for the home trade decreased from 88,000 to 71,000 while production for export went down from 70,000 to 29,000. When we come to passenger cars we find that over this same period production for the domestic market increased from

173,000 units to nearly 700,000 while export production went up from 275,000 to over 500,000.
In terms of machines on the road, about 1 million motorised two-wheeled machines were registered for use in Britain in 1952. By 1962 the figure was 1·8 million—while the number of passenger cars on the road rose in the same period from 2,500,000 to 6,600,000. This enormous increase in the possession of motor cars, and hence, of course, in their production, has been, I think, the basic reason for the decline in the home demand for bicycles. In 1962 the bicycle industry exported no less than 1,300,000 bicycles worth £11,400,000. These 1962 exports were exceeded in 1963. By the end of November, 1,400,000 units worth £12 million had already been shipped overseas. The December figure is yet to come.
In spite of the decline in the demand at home, the bicycle industry is still putting up an impressive export performance and, n these circumstances, it is not surprising that there have been changes in the structure of the industry. There are fewer manufacturers and companies rave merged.
The years since 1960 have seen the completion of a major rationalisation programme within the industry. Production is now concentrated in fewer plants and the industry has a smaller labour force. Employment figures for the bicycle industry alone are not available, but I think we can get some indication of the fall in the numbers employed by looking at the employment figure for the manufacture of bicycles and motorised two-wheeled machines. In this class of employment, there was a decline between June, 1960, and June, 1962, from 41,000 to 31,000.
A large part of the industry is concentrated in Nottingham, and there is also production in factories in the Midlands and elsewhere. The rationalisation of production has meant making difficult adjustments, some of which have been painful, since they have involved the closing of some factories. But these changes have been aimed at strengthening the industry's competitive position in meeting the challenge of changed circumstances. New designs and new models are being introduced by a manufacturing company which is new to the industry as well as by those which


have been long established. It has already been said that there are indications that, following a marked decline, the home demand is now levelling out and the efforts which the industry is making may enable it to compete successfully for a better share of the public's rising purchasing power in future.
About three-quarters of the industry's output goes overseas and about one half of the exports go to the United States market in which British machines have always done well and in which in recent years the British industry has increased its large share of the market for imported bicycles. Price-wise, of course, the United States market is very competitive. Our industry fears it will mind it difficult to maintain the same level of trade it achieved so successfully last year. It is understood that it was mainly on this account that redundancies were declared at the end of last year. I believe that the number of redundancies has in the event proved to be less than was originally feared. The difficulties in placing those declared redundant should not prove to be too great, and I understand that most of them have found alternative employment.
In some of the other export markets, for example, in Asia and South America, which in the past have provided substantial outlets for the industry, imports are now limited by restrictions imposed either for balance of payments reasons or for the protection of growing domestic industries. The development of local industries does, however, provide the opportunity for British participation in domestic production as it has in the case of India, to their benefit and ours. The Board of Trade is in close and continuous touch with the industry on these matters and is always ready to examine with the industry difficulties which may arise. These developments in overseas markets, however, do represent a part of the changing circumstances which the industry has to face.

Mr. Cyril Bence: Does the bicycle industry export bicycles like motor cars on what is known as "C.K.D." so that they can be assembled in the country to which they are exported? If that is not done, could the Board of Trade give a lead in creating that sort of trade?

Mr. Price: One would have to look at each individual traditional market in turn, because I understand that the majority of under-developed countries are not prepared to make a distinction in the case of bicycles such as is sometimes made for C.K.D. motor cars. As an engineer, the hon. Member will appreciate that a lot of work is provided in assembling a motor car or lorry in a knock down form, whereas there is comparatively little work to be done on assembly of a bicycle. But if the hon. Member has a special case in mind, I would be glad to consider it.

Mr. Bence: I was thinking of India.

Mr. Price: In India it is almost impossible to get bicycles imported because of the need to protect the infant industry, but I am glad to be able to say that British capital and technique are used in the Indian bicycle industry.
The debate is concerned with the bicycle industry, but the industry also produces mopeds and the problems which affect production of mopeds are different from those relating to cycles. The distinction between motor cycles and mopeds is not always clear to the layman. Exports of mopeds are small and imports—mainly from France and Western Germany, are high—in recent years much higher than the total deliveries of the British industry. From a peak in 1959, the demand in this country fell until 1962, but in 1963 home deliveries increased considerably on the 1962 levels and imports increased even more.
The British industry is making an effort to popularise the moped in this country and has recently produced a lower-priced model. Automatic transmission has just been introduced. At present the engines used are mainly of French design. The cycle industry is exporting a high proportion of its output and it is largely on the grounds that it needs to increase sales at home to provide greater support for its considerable export efforts that it has repeatedly represented to the Government its case for the removal or reduction of Purchase Tax, a case which was extremely well put by my hon. Friend.
All I can say tonight is that the representatives of the industry put their case to my hon. Friend the Economic


Secretary to the Treasury at a meeting which they had with him last October. Certainly, the industry and those employed in it could not have a more determined advocate of their case than my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, West.
The industry has been assured that its representations will be taken fully into account by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. These assurances can be repeated. My hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who has made a special point of being present for my hon. Friend's Adjournment debate, will, no doubt,

have taken careful note of all that my hon. Friend has said on behalf of the industry. Like other Treasury Ministers at this season of the year, my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary has to endure a quite uncharacteristic silence on all tax matters. For my part, I assure my hon. Friend that we in the Board of Trade will continue to do all we can to support the industry's many efforts to earn export orders and to adapt itself to the changing conditions of the home market.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at nine minutes to Eleven o'clock.